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Executive Summary   
“Immigration is not a problem to solve,  
it is a human reality that needs more thought than we thought till now”  
Ambassador Swing, Director General of the International Organisation for Migration,        
EMN & the Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice European Conference 2016 
Amsterdam, 12th January 2016, 
 
Following the European refugee and migrant crisis in 2015, the Director General of the Joint 
Research Centre (JRC) established on 11 September 2015 a 'JRC Task Force on Migration and 
Demography'. Its aim was to propose a way forward to support the Commission services in a 
structured and coherent way in their response to the management of the refugee crisis 
specifically and migration more generally. One of the tasks given to the Task Force (task 5) 
was to "identify approaches and solutions to overcome gaps and challenges including poor 
data, inadequate models, insufficient information sharing, inaccessible, non-comparable and 
fragmented knowledge affecting the community working on migration and demography in the 
EU; this includes a scanning of the activities and output of competent bodies outside the JRC". 
This report describes the outcome of this exercise carried out in early 2016. 
After the Task Force finished its activities and as a direct follow-up to its work, the European 
Commission's Knowledge Centre on Migration and Demography (KCMD) was launched on 
20 June 2016. Its first knowledge management activities addressed several gaps that are 
highlighted in this report by developing tools such as the KCMD Migration Data Catalogue 
and Dynamic Data Hub, Migration Profiles, maps of migrant communities in cities, and an 
inventory of Commission and EU agencies activities related to migration. Furthermore, the 
KCMD is working towards an EU Policy on Migration Data to identify shortcomings in 
migration and demography data and to suggest improvements, taking into account costs and 
benefits associated. Linked to this initiative, the KCMD is identifying big data and alternative 
data sources that hold the biggest promise for informed policymaking on migration and options 
to advance in the use of privately held data for the public good.   
In the context of this report, the seminal policy document for migration in the short, medium 
and long-term is the European Agenda on Migration (the Agenda). The Agenda explicitly 
highlights the need for more and better use of information in the areas of smuggling, return, 
root causes of irregular migration, border management and job matching. This report considers 
the wider policy and academic debates of migration and demography, incorporating the 
Agenda's structure, to better understand the knowledge in this quickly evolving, cross-cutting 
and at times nebulous topic. In order to fully understand the migration phenomena, it is 
important to look at it from many perspectives: the academic debate, the policy challenges and 
the data gaps. This report aims to achieve such a daunting and difficult task in order to assist 
policy makers and relevant stakeholders to be more informed and plan at best future researches. 
The report has identified a number of gaps and challenges for those working on migration and 
demography. The executive summary presents four of the most prominent challenges and 
matches them with some proposals in terms of approaches and solutions. A table summarising 
the gaps and challenges, in addition to the proposed approaches and solutions, is available in 
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Annex 1. DG JRC, as the science and knowledge service of the Commission, is in a unique 
position to provide added value in the goal of filling some of these gaps.  
1. Challenge: Facing new types of migration  
Migration has become far more complex in recent years. A twofold process can be observed: 
first, the terminology is becoming more nuanced, moving from the term 'migration' to 
'mobility'. Rather than being permanent and one-way, it involves a number of intermediate 
steps, and it is often considered (from both migrants and countries of destination) as a short-
term experience. This fluid nature, already present in global migration literature for more than 
ten years now, cannot be ignored. Second, the EU is affected in a relatively unprecedented way, 
by migration that is more complex: different geographies and forced nature of migration mean 
more "mixed" migration flow. The increase of secondary movements and the inherent difficulty 
in tracing them is one concrete example of the changes we are witnessing nowadays.   
The policy response to the migration flow is hampered by the difficulty in identifying what 
type of migrant is entering the EU: definitions therefore are not only relevant in terms of 
scientific analysis but also with regards to the specific legislative or policy instrument that 
applies to each individual migrant. Asylum seekers, refugees, internally displaced persons, 
victims of trafficking, smuggling migrants, stranded migrants, irregular migrants are not only 
difficult to identify in a mixed migration flow for data collection, but sometimes their definition 
is not clear enough to allow for such an identification in the first place. For example, the 
conflation of a migrant being smuggled to that of being trafficked causes difficulties in 
separating one from the other in data collection, or the lack of an agreed definition of what 
constitutes a migrant makes it difficult to collect information on return migrants. Furthermore, 
a migrant may pass through more than one circumstance during his or her trajectory: e.g. going 
from being trafficked to being an asylum seeker to being a returnee. 
Therefore, this emerging challenge makes effective and timely responses demanding. In order 
to develop policies to address today’s challenges, more use of research and anticipation of 
future needs and trends is of great importance. Some of the yet under-developed research 
areas identified in the report are: migration and climate change, the long-term integration of 
return migrants in their country of return, social cohesion and the monitoring of public opinion 
on migrants, migration and welfare state; social remittances, in addition to the impact of 
remittances on developing countries. 
Approaches and solutions 
 Promote international cooperation to use harmonised definitions; 
 Standardisation in the application of definitions; including with regular capacity 
building activities on data collection (e.g. on identifying victims of trafficking) or 
with pro-active dissemination of tools developed at European and international 
level; 
 Commit to study and fill the research gaps in the different mentioned areas; 
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 JRC is already involved in the development of an EU Migration Index to propose a 
quantitative approach on push and pull factors in migration studies.  
 
2. Challenge: Availability of good quality and timely data is needed 
For several years, efforts have been made for better data collection. One of the main 
achievements has been the multiplication of online data portals (e.g. UNHCR, IOM, UNPD, 
OECD, EUROSTAT), which allow for maps and specific datasets to be downloaded for further 
analysis. Annex 2 presents a first inventory of migration data available, as summarised in 
Table 1. It shows that more data are available for legal migration and integration, while data 
on “dark figures” or unreported figures are more difficult to obtain and are often partial or 
incomplete at global and regional level. Other challenges with the latter concern their collection 
and data protection matters. Indeed, for topics such as smuggling, human trafficking or border 
management, reports rather than databases are more often available. 
Furthermore, looking at data limitations has brought to light that many international and EU-
level datasets and sources depend on the same set of national data, such as population registries, 
census data, information from immigration authorities.  
Table 1: Inventory of migration data and data sources by coverage 
Pillar / Section International EU Total 
I. IRREGULAR MIGRATION   27 
Ia - Access to data 2 5 8 
Ib - Root causes 5 1 6 
Ic - Smuggling and THB 6 2 8 
Id – Return 2 3 5 
II - BORDER MANAGEMENT  4 4 
III. ASYLUM & PROTECTION   11 
IIIa – CEAS 2 6 8 
IIIb - Unaccompanied minors  3 3 
IV. LEGAL MIGRATION   38 
IVa - Access to data 8 3 11 
IVb – Demography 4 2 6 
IVc –Visa  2 2 
IVd – Integration 6 5 11 
IVe - Maximising development for countries 
of origin 2  2 
IVf - Economic effects country of 
destination 2 4 6 
Total 39 40 79 
Source: Task Force on Migration, Annex 2  
What appears to be most pressing to policy makers is up-to-date data, particularly in fast 
changing situations. However, here lies a conundrum: does one refer to timely yet reduced 
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quality data or accurate yet untimely data? When providing objective, evidenced-based advice 
to inform policy makers, caveats on the reliability of the data and their subsequent uncertainties 
and consequences are necessary.  
Some migration studies often suffer from a lack of relevant operational data: such as the 
precise numbers of visa over-stayers; appropriate biometric test data for future technical 
systems to be deployed; secondary movements; migration drivers; data on return migrants; 
socio-economic data regarding the migrants who are entering the EU; data on unaccompanied 
minors; and disaggregation of the data at local level. In general, there is little information on 
migrants beyond their age, nationality and gender. This situation still gives rise to simplified 
stereotypes on asylum seekers and migrants in general; stereotypes that dominate public 
opinion following political debates and critical events. The more nuanced information that can 
be collected, the better policy makers are at making tailored and sustainable policy decisions. 
Approaches and solutions 
 Produce a review of available data and update it regularly, with the inclusion of 
critical analysis and quality checks; 
 Develop "best data sets" in the case of the environment – migration nexus or 
concerning smuggling and human trafficking, to give a more accurate picture of the 
data;  
 Form partnerships and observatories at EU level to produce data in a structured and 
coherent way and increase its quality (e.g. in asylum, demography, border 
management, health); 
 Enhance cooperation between the main players in data collection, e.g. Eurostat, 
OECD, FRONTEX, IOM and UNHCR to increase knowledge; 
 Promote data transparency and regular capacity building activities on data 
collection. 
 
3. Challenge: New methodologies and a higher degree of data comparability  
Perhaps the starting point in addressing this challenge is to acknowledge that different 
definitions leads to different methods of collection. Comparability of data is therefore hard 
to achieve. Additional difficulties behind comparability are short timeframes and limited 
geographic coverage; small samples sizes that are not necessary representative of the entire 
population; fragmented data; and risks of double counting. Moreover, there can be many 
stakeholders involved in collecting data, which is not easy to synergise (e.g. regarding conflicts 
as driver of migration; or trafficking and smuggling). 
On the international and EU level, much progress has been done to improve the comparability 
of data thanks to Eurostat, OECD and the UN. However, comparability is not ensured for all 
data, for instance, population data is collected at national and not at EU level; the OECD may 
provide a wealth of information for its member states, but there are difficulties retrieving data 
from the non-member states.  
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The methodology used may not be able to capture enough information to allow meaningful 
analysis and provide a detailed picture of the circumstances. For instance, quantitative data 
appears to be most favoured by policy makers, yet qualitative data is just as crucial (e.g. in the 
case of asylum, demography and integration). Models analysing economic drivers for 
migration fail to capture the complexity of social behaviour and individual choice in decision 
making. New technologies and consequent methodologies should be more explored and 
exploited to collect hard-to-find data and complement the available information.   
Invaluable information on migrants are captured at national level, however, important data gets 
lost in the EU cooperation between Member States and even at national level: the report appears 
to highlight the importance of increasing opportunities for knowledge and best practice 
sharing between Member States, e.g. in topics such as the issuance of Blue Cards or integrating 
migrants. Also at national level, there can be a lack of coordination, as sometimes happens in 
the treatment of unaccompanied minors between the many authorities in care of the minor.  
Approaches and solutions 
 Use a holistic approach to capturing data, via the integration of various disciplines 
/ methodologies;  
 Improve and blend the use of new methodologies, such as remote sensing and social 
media analysis; 
 Enlarge the use of qualitative research (e.g. for CEAS), longitudinal surveys (e.g. for 
integration), multi-dimensional projections (e.g. for demography), sample surveys 
(e.g. for migration and development), econometric models (e.g. for integration); 
situational approach and network analyses (e.g. regarding smuggling); 
 Increase information sharing between Member State authorities and at local level; 
 Encourage the exchange of best practice in all migration areas. 
 
4. Challenge: Need of a longer term vision when it comes to dealing with migration  
As necessary as it is to have up-to-date data to understand the current situation, it is just as 
important to look at the longer-term perspective. It has been noted that a number of areas need 
long-term, integrated responses: with the Common European Asylum System; with the 
impact of non-migration policies on migration and development; or with the policy decisions 
around health and welfare still very much grounded in the demographic challenges of today, 
rather than those of the future.  
There is a risk that measures taken in exceptional, emergency situation become the norm. This 
then results in responses, especially at the local level, that could be chaotic and precarious if 
they became of long-term. 
Insufficient evaluation and assessment of the long-term impact of initiatives and projects 
do not provide the opportunity to learn from past experience or align best practices among 
Member States. In addition, a constant monitoring of the implementation of EU/national 
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legislation at national and regional level could promote higher standards of reception and more 
effective and timely responses to the fast-evolving situations.  
Approaches and solutions 
 Take full consideration of other policies that are not necessarily migration-relevant 
yet have an indirect impact on migration; 
 Use foresight in order to improve policy or anticipate trends (e.g. in asylum and 
demography) in the future; 
 Ensure independent evaluation of current and past initiatives (e.g. in anti-trafficking, 




The influx of migrants entering the EU today has - amongst some political, public and media 
spheres – caused a sort of "immigration hysteria"1. Of course, the consequences and impacts 
that the reception of hundreds of thousands of refugees will have on Member State economies 
and societies are still largely unknown. However, existing data and lessons learnt from history 
can undoubtedly help steer policy makers. On many occasions, evidence highlighted in this 
report has allayed some of the fears perpetuated by media. Thus, it is not enough to produce 
knowledge, this needs to be explained clearly and expressed correctly so that 
misinformation is reduced to the minimum.  
Migration is not a new phenomenon. The EU can succeed in reducing irregular migration, but 
it cannot avoid giving protection to those who are in real need of it, or opportunities to those 
who are already in the EU and contributing to its growth. Perhaps opportunities that policy 
makers have today at hand are linked to the exploitation of new emerging technologies and 
methodologies.  
  
                                                          
1 As defined in the "The World Today" interview by Tariq Ali with Professor Bridget Anderson of the 
University of Oxford, in June 2015. 
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Methodology 
This report is the result of the research carried out under Task 5 of DG JRC's Task Force on 
Migration and Demography.2 Task 5 aimed to “identify approaches and solutions to overcome 
gaps and challenges including poor data, inadequate models, insufficient information sharing, 
inaccessible, non-comparable and fragmented knowledge affecting the community working on 
migration and demography in the EU; this includes a scanning of activities and output of 
competent bodies outside the JRC”. 
The report is structured following the four pillars outlined in the European Agenda on 
Migration3 (the Agenda). A few additional chapters are included to cover some aspects not 
explicitly touched on in the Agenda, but still considered to have a relevant role in migration 
and an impact on demographic trends.  
Contributors to Task 5 were divided into small groups, or in some cases, there were individual 
contributors. Each group (or individual) was assigned a sub-section or a chapter ideally based 
on their expertise. Contributions to each sub-section had to answer the following questions: 
1. What are main points/findings/debates concerning the priority area/sub-category 
allocated to you? 
2. How does the information gathered in question 1 relate to the scope and the structure 
of the European Agenda on Migration? 
3. What current information and data is available, who is producing it and how? 
4. What and where are the main gaps and challenges? 
5. What are the solutions or approaches to address these gaps and challenges based upon 
your research? 
Contributors conducted a review on the recent developments at policy and research level, 
through the mapping of what has been done by other Commission DGs (taking into 
consideration TF Task #1 deliverable), by DG JRC (taking into consideration TF Task #2 and 
3 deliverables) and by relevant international, European and national entities dealing with 
migration (taking into consideration the list of entities provided by TF Task #6).  
To complement this review, two Annexes were created: the first being an overview of the main 
gaps and challenges as well as the suggested solutions for the whole report (Annex 1), and the 
second being a preliminary inventory of available migration data and data sources (Annex 2). 
The inventory contains the relevant migration data and sources that have been identified in the 
course of carrying out this task.  If deemed relevant, the same database has been reported under 
multiple sections of the inventory. The information retrieved consists of databases at the 
international and EU level, with the acknowledgement that a lot of data are also produced at 
the national level. Some projects, studies or indices have been also reported. The data in Annex 
2 are not meant to be definitive, neither is it an endorsement of reliability or quality, rather it 
describes what data are being collected and how and can be considered as a preliminary 
inventory. Comments on the reliability or constraints of the data are captured in the report.  
The report and the Annexes are not meant to be exhaustive and neither can they be considered 
as fully complete. This is largely due to the sheer breadth and depth of the topics of migration 
and demography, and due to the fact that these are areas which can evolve quite fast and data 
                                                          
2 The Task Force was set up to assist the Commission in managing the migration crisis. One of the tasks of the 
TF is to identify the gaps and challenges concerning migration and demography in order for DG JRC to better 
assist the Commission.  
3 A European Agenda on Migration. Com(2015) 240 Final. 
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can appear out of date relatively quickly. Also the changing face of today's political climate 
can affect migration policy immensely. Precisely, since the completion of the main body of the 
report (end of March 2016), a number of policy initiatives have been published, such as the 
Communication on Smart Borders4; the Communication on reforming the Common European 
Asylum System5; proposal for the Eurodac Regulation6; the EU-Turkey Agreement7; as well 
as progress report made in the fight against trafficking.8   
There were two rounds of review of contributions. The final report has remained faithful to the 
original chapters although some subsections have been merged and new ones have been added. 
A third review (mid-March) and a final endorsement (May 2016) by all the members of the 
Task Force has then given.  
Finally, it must be noted that the opinions stated in this report are not officially attributed to 
that of the Commission. The purpose of this report is to inform, encourage and stimulate the 




                                                          
4 Com (2016) 205 final 
5 Com (2016) 197 final 
6 Com (2016) 272 final 
7 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-963_en.htm 
8 Com (2016) 267 final 
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I. Irregular migration 
a. Additional: Access to and quality of data 
Policy and debate 
The reasons why a person undertakes a (sometimes life-threatening) migration are many, 
complex and interlinked, ranging from seeking a better life, fleeing persecution or war, or to 
escape poverty. In some instances, such a migration does not comply with legal requirements 
for entry, or criminal gangs are involved, smuggling migrants into the EU for a price. A migrant 
can become irregular also once he or she overstays their visa permitting them to stay in the EU.   
There has always been irregular migration9 across land / sea borders into the EU. More recently, 
the unprecedented number of people entering the EU has re-focussed EU policymakers' 
attention on the need for an appropriate response, including, in the short-term, measures to 
reduce the loss-of-life, which has been reported to be around 7,500 between 2014 and the 
beginning of 2016.10 The migration flow is considered to be mixed, namely ‘complex 
population movements including refugees, asylum seekers, economic migrants, and other types 
of migrants as opposed to migratory population movements that consist entirely of one 
category of migrants’.11 Confounding an irregular migrant with a recognised asylum seeker for 
whom an asylum decision has not yet been made is also commonly done,  notably by the media. 
By definition, there are no reliable statistics on visa over-stayers nor indeed on the total number 
of irregular migrants currently residing in the EU. For the latter, an earlier estimate from 2008 
was that 1.9 to 3.8 million irregular migrants resided in the EU-27 (Citizens and Governance 
in a Knowledge-Based Society; European Commission 2009a). During 2014, data from 
Frontex Risk Analysis Unit (Frontex 2015) indicated that there were 441 780 detections of 
illegal stay in the EU. The vast majority (86%) of them were detected inland and therefore 
presumably to be long-term visa over-stayers.  
The treatment of irregular migrants within EU Member States (MS) is one area that attracts 
much debate, ranging from the terminology used to describe them, especially in the media;12 
their contribution, involvement and exploitation in the informal economy13 ; their fundamental 
rights, including access to healthcare (see, for example, European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights 2015); the different legal regimes across the EU or their criminalisation 
(see, for example, Provera 2015); their detention, including prior to return to their country of 
                                                          
9 Irregular migration" is defined as "Movement of persons to a new place of residence or transit that takes place 
outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving countries." Likewise, an "Irregular Migrant" 
is defined as "a third-country national present on the territory of a Schengen State who does not fulfil, or no 
longer fulfils, the conditions of entry as set out in the Schengen Borders Code, or other conditions for entry, stay 
or residence in that Member State." Source: EMN Glossary, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-
do/networks/european_migration_network/glossary/index_m_en.htm 
10 Till February 2015. IOM, Missing Project, http://missingmigrants.iom.int/  
11EMN Glossary, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-
do/networks/european_migration_network/glossary/index_m_en.htm 
12 See, for example, work of PICUM, http://picum.org/en/news/picum-news/45839/.  
13 See literature review in Haidinger (2007). 
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origin (Hatzis 2013; ICMPD 2013);14 the different practices for regularisation (ICMPD 
2009);15 and the measures adopted to reduce irregular migration16 .  
The need for effective policies to reduce irregular migration has existed since the Tampere 
Council conclusions in 1999.17 It received further prominence as part of the European Pact on 
Immigration and Asylum in 200818 and formed a major part of the EU Action on Migratory 
Pressures in 2012.19 More recently, in 2015 irregular migration has become one pillar of the 
European Agenda on Migration (the Agenda). Specific priorities on irregular migration are: 
 
 Addressing the root causes of irregular and forced displacement in third countries (see 
Chapter I.b); 
 The fight against smugglers and traffickers (see Chapter I.c); 
 Return (see Chapter I.d); 
 Implementing the "Smart Borders" initiative which will inter alia strengthen the fight 
against irregular migration by creating a record of all cross-border movements by third-
country nationals (see also Chapter II); 
 Modernisation of visa policy via a revision of the Visa Code and the establishment of 
a Touring Visa (see Chapter IV.c).  
 
The political declaration and Action Plan arising from the Valletta summit on migration20 
agreed on priority domains, including: a) maximising the benefits of migration and addressing 
root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement, comprising inter alia of 
mainstreaming migration in development cooperation or addressing instability and crises; b) 
prevention of and the fight against irregular migration, migrant smuggling and trafficking in 
human beings, comprising inter alia of improving intelligence gathering and sharing. 21 
There are many aspects called for in the Agenda that are not or cannot currently be routinely 
or accurately provided for. For example there is a policy need to have information on irregular 
secondary flows of asylum seekers,22 especially within the Schengen area.23 Furthermore, some 
well-defined links are not recognised enough. For example, concerning the link between 
migration and development, the Agenda mentions the need to ‘develop benefits of migration’, 
when instead it ought to mention the need to ‘maximise the benefits of migration’. Finally, the 
Agenda does not appear to cover the Employer Sanctions Directive,24 which aims to penalise 
those who employ irregular migrants.  
                                                          
14 See also http://www.detention-in-europe.org/.   
15 See also section 7 of EMN (2012). 
16 An overview of irregular migration and MS plus Norway's measures to reduce it can be found in a report by the 
European Migration Network (2012). 
17 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm (October 1999) 
18 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV%3Ajl0038 (September 2008) 
19 http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%208714%202012%20REV%201 (April 2012) 
20 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/11/12-valletta-final-docs/ (November 2015)  
21 Following the Valletta Summit, in  January 2016, the Commission adopted ten new measures to improve 
stability and tackle the root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa to be implemented by 
the end of 2016 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-69_en.htm  
22 The phenomenon of migrants, including refugees and asylum seekers, who for different reasons move from the 
country in which they first arrived to seek protection or permanent resettlement elsewhere. In the case of irregular 
secondary movements this is done without informing the relevant authority(ies). Source: EMN Glossary 
23 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/european-council/2015/12/201512-EUCO-conclusions_pdf/ 
(European Council of 17/18 December 2015) 
24 Directive 2009/52/EC 
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Data availability and research gaps 
By definition it is difficult to quantify in a consistent, comparable manner data on irregular 
migration simply because it is not officially recorded in a coherent way like, for example, legal 
migration. However, there continues to be a need to monitor irregular migration, notably for  
the fast-evolving developments.  
A number of approaches are currently used and identified below to at least obtain an estimate 
of the numbers of these migrants. Often such data have very partial coverage coming from, for 
example, surveys, apprehensions, regularisation programmes. More specific data on main 
(informal) working sectors, living conditions, access to basic social services such as education 
or health, public perception tend to be on a more ad-hoc basis and are certainly not available 
for the whole EU-28.  
This lack of data has been addressed using different estimation methods. The most common 
method is based on deducting from the foreign-born population the flow of regular migrant 
(residual). Other approaches use Delphi surveys, two-step capture/recapture method from the 
field of animal ecology, the reduction in population in countries of origin, the number of 
persons captured at border controls and the requests for regularisation.  
As highlighted in Annex 2, main sources of data on irregular migration come from Eurostat, 
Frontex, IOM/UNHCR and ICMPD. Eurostat ensures a high quality of comparable data, in 
accordance with the Migration Statistic Regulation (European Union 2007). However one 
criticism often made is that they are sometimes not up-to-date enough to inform topical policy 
discussions. Frontex, on the contrary, is able to provide information more rapidly, but the 
downside is that it has not been subject to the statistical rigour that Eurostat applies.25 The same 
is valid for data provided by IOM and UNHCR. The ICMPD annual yearbook obtains data 
from these reliable sources and the thorough analysis done by the ICMPD gives confidence in 
the quality of their reporting, which covers the whole year.  
The Clandestino project has been the reference database for irregular migration studies, but 
because the project is now finished, updated numbers for the EU-28 are no longer produced 
but updated estimates for some MS are done.26 The estimates provided by the Clandestino 
project were well-received, although there were some criticisms of their methodology, e.g. 
extrapolating estimates from the few countries that were analysed in the project to the whole 
of the EU-27.  
In addition, OECD provides some data along with regular migration. A disadvantage, from an 
EU-28 perspective, is that it does not cover all EU MS and the data published are from two or 
more years before (e.g. the 2015 report presents 2013 data). However, it is a recognised 
authoritative publication providing also a global (OECD Member States) analysis.27 Finally, 
                                                          
25 For example, Frontex clarified in 2015 that irregular border crossings may be attempted by the same person 
several times in different locations at the external border. This meant, for example, that a person who was counted 
by Greece could again be counted when they entered the EU for the second time through Hungary or Croatia. See 
http://frontex.europa.eu/news/710-000-migrants-entered-eu-in-first-nine-months-of-2015-NUiBkk.  
26 For example in Germany it is estimated that there were at least 180 000 and at most 520 000 irregular migrants 
in 2014, see Vogel (2015)  
27 See for example the International Migration Outlook publication.  
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sometimes other entities collect data for a specific study/need, for example, the EMN's ad-hoc 
query activity used to record information on irregular migration.28  
The quality, timeliness and comparability of data, notably for EU-28, are a challenge. A general 
issue29 is that data are often not based on common definitions making cross-country 
comparability difficult. Another issue is that verified and quality checked data are often for at 
least one calendar year before the year in which they are published (e.g. 2014 data are published 
in late 2015). 
The following parameters are considered to be the main gaps in providing comprehensive data 
for the flow and stock of irregular migration to inform policy. In an ideal situation, data on 
these parameters would also be disaggregated by nationality, gender and age. 
Irregular Migration Flow 
 Migration routes to EU's external borders: A report by the UK's Overseas Development 
Institute (Cummings et al. 2015) identified a need for more evidence on migration routes,30 
especially across North Africa and from Eritrea and Somalia, with little appearing to be 
known about the factors influencing how long someone spends in different countries during 
their journey to Europe. The role of networks in informing initial decisions to migrate; their 
role during the journey and in transit locations; the way that technology, communication 
tools and online media are shaping these networks and affecting decisions; and how 
individual characteristics, especially gender, relate to these networks are also relevant to 
understand the push factors. 
 Identification: The Luxembourg Presidency report31 pointed out the need of further actions 
in a) strengthening identification, registration and fingerprinting of all third-country 
nationals entering the Schengen area irregularly; and b) increasing checks regarding 
irregular migration inside the Schengen area. 
 Mixed Migration Flows: Migrants arriving at the EU's external borders may  enter for a 
number of different reasons (e.g. to seek asylum, for economic reasons, to reunite with 
family members). Such migrants may not enter via a designated border crossing point and 
thus would enter irregularly, including being smuggled, or trafficked or alternatively enter 
via a designated border crossing point and immediately claim asylum. Separating out the 
(type of) irregular migrant flow from this mixed migration flow is clearly difficult. 
 Migration routes within EU: As identified by the Luxembourg Presidency and the call 
from the December 2015 European Council, ways to measure movements of irregular 
migrants within the EU is called for, but the available data is, at best, limited. More 
evidence on why they move on to another MS would also provide a more complete 
overview (Cummings et al. 2015). 
 
                                                          
28 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/reports/docs/ad-hoc-
queries/298.emn_ad-hoc_query_irregular_migration_updated_wider_dissemination_en.pdf.  
29 Except for the data provided by Eurostat. 
30 Which would complement the maps that DG JRC regularly produces for the EEAS and those done by IOM. 
31 Managing migration flows: State of play - implementing solutions and remaining gaps 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/12/17-presidency-report-managing-migration-
flows/  
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Irregular Migration Stock 
 Number of irregular migrants: often available data (Eurostat, Frontex, etc.) are provided 
only for those found to be irregularly-staying in a EU MS, i.e. only after apprehension by 
the authorities. 
 Visa over-stayers: At least anecdotally, visa over-stayers are considered to be a significant 
means by which a third-country national becomes irregularly-resident in a MS, especially 
within Schengen. Whilst at one point proposed, there is no systematic recording of when a 
third-country national who has entered with a Schengen visa then leaves the EU, especially 
if they leave from another MS within the Schengen area. 32 The Visa Information System 
can, however, indicate when a third-country national's Schengen visa has expired.  
 Number of irregular migrants working illegally: Available data does not cover all MSs 
and does not seem to be provided or updated on an annual basis. For example, there is a 
report on the implementation of the Employer Sanctions Directive33 which provides some 
data, but only from 2012, on the number of irregular migrants identified by MS authority's 
raids on companies. From a fundamental rights perspective, there is a PICUM report from 
2005, which offers recommendations on ways to protect what they refer to as 
"undocumented migrant workers" (LeVoy and Verbruggen 2005) plus a report from the 
Fundamental Rights Agency on irregular migrants employed in domestic work (European 
Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2011). 
Approaches and solutions to overcome the gaps and challenges 
Addressing irregular migration should be seen as part of a comprehensive approach to 
migration. President Juncker, in his Political Guidelines, called for a robust fight against 
irregular migration, traffickers and smugglers, and for securing Europe's external borders, 
which must be paired with inter alia a new European policy on legal migration34.  
As noted by the Clandestino project, irregular migration is the result of a complex interplay of 
factors, including the lack of legal migration channels as well as the failure in making existing 
ones work (Citizens and Governance in a Knowledge-Based Society; European Commission 
2009b). The same concept was echoed by the UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights of 
migrants in 2013, saying that recognising the labour needs of destination States would reduce 
irregular migration, as well as the power of smugglers.35   
                                                          
32 A Commission proposal for a Regulation on an Entry- Exit system which could have provided such data was 
withdrawn and is currently being re-formulated as part of the new EU Smart Borders System proposal. 
http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/roadmaps/docs/2016_home_001_revision_smart_borders_en.pdf. Proposal 
expected in 2016. 
33 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of 
Directive 2009/52/EC of 18 June 2009 providing for Minimum Standards on Sanctions and Measures against 
Employers of Illegally Staying Third Country Nationals, COM(2014) 286 final; 
http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2014/EN/1-2014-286-EN-F1-1.Pdf. See, in particular, Table 3 of 
inspections carried out by MS’s authorities. 
34 (European Commission 2015c); this new legal migration policy would also aim to address, for example, the 
EU's increasing skills needs. 
35 “Mainstreaming a human rights-based approach to migration within the High Level Dialogue” Statement by 
the UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, François Crépeau. PGA Plenary Session – 
Criminalization of Migrants New York, 2 October 2013. 
           
17 
In terms of the approaches used in the EU, the EMN Report on Practical Measures to reduce 
Irregular Migration (EMN 2012)36 albeit from 2012, provides a good summary of the issues 
and how they are/could be tackled. The study found that reducing irregular migration is a policy 
priority of the EU and its MS, as well as for Norway; that there is a need for joint EU action 
and MS cooperation, as a common EU approach is a major influence driving the 
implementation of MS measures, but that national policies tend to respond to their specific 
national needs.  
Enhancing cooperation with Eurostat, Frontex, IOM and ICMPD would serve to develop a 
(collaborative) approach to improve our knowledge on irregular migration. A workshop with 
relevant stakeholders could be organised as a first step on this direction. 
The MPI Report (Rosenblum and Hipsman 2016) whilst focussing on the US situation, may 
provide some useful insights into approaches to be developed. It presents the various metrics 
to measure the phenomenon37, which could be used as a starting point to develop a more 
complete, coherent picture of irregular migration in the EU. For example, Frontex already 
provide data on the first two metrics and possibilities in respect of the last two metrics have 
been addressed. Other metrics could also be developed based on and bringing together what 
data already exists.  
In a similar vein, and also from the US experience, consideration could be given to producing 
an EU version of the Pew Research Center's recently published assessments of irregular 
migration,38 including a public survey on what Americans want to do about irregular migration 
and an estimate of the irregular migrant population. 
Elsewhere, there is work from Australia which looks at Expanding the evidence base on 
irregular migration through research partnerships (McAuliffe and Parrinde 2015). It identified 
specific research gaps in the Australian context and developed a “toolkit” to identify key 
themes and research questions to guide a policy-relevant research programme.  
 
 
                                                          
36 This study could thus be a good starting point from which to formulate a research programme along with the 
findings from an EMN Ad-Hoc Query on national definitions of irregular migrants and available data available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/reports/docs/ad-hoc-
queries/298.emn_ad-hoc_query_irregular_migration_updated_wider_dissemination_en.pdf 
37 Adapted to EU terminology: 1) How Many Irregular Migrants Enter Between Border Crossing Points? 2) How 
Many Irregular Migrants Enter Through Border Crossing Points? 3) How Many People Overstay Schengen Visas? 
4) How Many Unauthorised Immigrants Live in the EU? 
38 http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/11/19/5-facts-about-illegal-immigration-in-the-u-s/  
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I. Irregular migration 
b. Root causes of irregular migration 
 
Understanding the determinants of migration is essential for the analysis of current and past 
trends and a pre-requisite for forecasting. Forecasting and modelling deserve particular 
attention since they may represent the final and most direct input in policy support from the 
research on migration determinants. 
The determinants of migration are generally classified into push, pull and cost factors. Figure 
1 from Bodvarsson and Van den Berg (2013) gives a good summary of the many factors which 
are considered in the scientific literature and policy debates on migration. 
Figure 1: Push, pull and cost factors 
 
As can be with regular migration, irregular migration is driven by a combination of push and 
pull factors. The following sections give more details on environment, conflicts and economic 
factors driving irregular migration.  
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i. Environment 
Policy and debate 
Global environmental change is considered as a driving force of migration through its influence 
on a range of economic, social and political sectors which eventually affect migration 
(Foresight 2011). Various studies predict large environmental migration flows due to the 
impacts of climate change and others environmental stressors (Foresight 2011; Laczko and 
Aghazarm 2009; N. Myers 1997; N. Myers 2002; C. A. Myers, Slack, and Singelmann 2008; 
IMO 2014).  
Changes in the frequency and intensity of severe weather events, such as floods, storms or heat 
waves, geographic and seasonal shifts of rainfall and dry periods, already have major socio-
economic impacts today and are predicted to become more pronounced as global temperatures 
are rising. Some slow onset disasters such as sea-level rise are expected to continue for many 
centuries to come39 and represent major threats for coastal areas and soils. Particularly affected 
are islands in the southern Pacific, Gulf of Bengal and possibly Alaska, making them in fact 
uninhabitable40 and thus leading to long-term and irreversible displacements. Furthermore, 
frequent exposure to extreme or long-term weather driven hazards can lead to environmental 
degradation with direct influence on water resource management, food security and agricultural 
production and health.  
According to Adger et al. (2014) the major movement of people within a country is from rural 
to urban settlements, a trend that is expected to continue in the future (Randers 2012). Severe 
weather events may lead to temporary (internal or international) displacements; examples are 
the hurricane Katrina in 2005 and the devastating Pakistan floods in 2011. Abrupt and extreme 
climatic changes or repeated exposure to disasters could force people to migrate permanently 
from some areas (e.g. low–lying coastal zones such as in Papua New Guinea, Tuvalu) (Table 
2).  
However such cases do not allow for a general conclusion on a direct and unidirectional 
relationship between environmental change and migration, since other factors such as coping 
capacity, adaptation strategies and political context add complexity (Figure 2). Furthermore, 
the impacts of climate change and environmental degradation may exacerbate also latent 
conflicts.  
 
                                                          
39 IPCC, 2013: Summary for Policymakers. In: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution 
of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, 
T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley 
(eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA. 
40 http://www.bpb.de/gesellschaft/migration/kurzdossiers/57257/klimawandel-und-migration?blickinsbuch 
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Table 2: Empirical evidence on observed or projected mobility outcomes (migration, immobility, 
or displacement) associated with weather-related extremes or impacts of longer-term climate 
change 
 
Source: Adger et al. (2014, 769) 
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Figure 2: Environmental drivers of migration and their indirect impact on other drivers 
 
Source: Foresight (2011, 12) 
Moreover, the definition of an environmental migrant or “climate refugee” is still controversial 
and not universally accepted (Adger et al. 2014). In fact, there are a variety of terms used in 
literature including environmental or climate change migration; environmentally-induced 
migration; ecological or environmental refugees; disaster-induced displacement; and climate 
change refugees which are used in slightly different context and with different definitions.41 
Climate change is experiencing increased attention not just as a driver of migration but also as 
an adaptation strategy, as recognised by the Cancun Accord of United Nation Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (2010).42 The recent Paris Agreement (2015) explicitly 
mentions in its preamble the need of ‘develop recommendations for integrated approaches to 
avert, minimise and address displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change”. 
In the EU, the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM) recognised in 2011 that 
‘addressing environmentally induced migration, also by means of adaptation to the adverse 
effects of climate change, should be considered part of the Global Approach”43 . A few years 
later, the Commission presented an Adaptation Strategy and working paper on climate change, 
environmental degradation and migration (European Commission 2013a). The European 
Agenda on Migration cites climate change as a source to feed directly and immediately into 
migration and the subsequent need to mitigate this “threat”. However, according to the World 
                                                          
41 http://migrationeducation.de/56.1.html?&rid=208&cHash=6cf222c08c5309a7e2288d393f5ba88d  
42 2009 UNFCCC COP15: Copenhagen Accord United Nations Human Rights Council Resolution: human rights 
and climate change. 2010 UNFCCC COP16 Cancun Paragraph 14F on migration. 2011 UNFCCC COP17 Durban: 
Advances on Green Climate Fund and National Adaptation Plans (NAPs); Global Migration Group (GMG) 
Statement on Migration and Climate. 2012 UNFCCC COP18 Doha, Migration in Loss and Damage, paragraph 7 
(a)(vi) Launch of the Nansen Initiative. 2013 EC Adaptation Strategy and working paper on climate change, 
environmental degradation and migration; UN High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development
 Resolution 46th; UN Commission on Population and Development (OP28) mentions “climate and migration” 
UNFCCC COP19 Warsaw. 2014 IPCC Report UN SG Climate Summit Small Islands Developing States 
conference UNFCCC COP20 Lima (IOM, 2015). 2015 Paris Agreement; moreover some Intended Nationally 
Determined Contributions (INDCs) indicate migration as adaptation strategy. 
43 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: The Global Approach To Migration And Mobility /* 
COM/2011/0743 Final */, p.7 
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Economic Forum the idea that climate-induced migration could produce large inflows of 
people are extremely unlikely to happen (Cattaneo and Peri 2015).  
A concrete difficulty for the EU in understanding the strategic, political, and humanitarian 
aspects associated with climate change and its links to migration has been attributed to the 
shared competences among various EU institutional actors, namely DG HOME, DG DEVCO, 
DG ECHO and the EEAS (Petrillo 2015).  
Data availability and research gaps 
Migration is driven by a plethora of different factors and it is therefore difficult to establish 
straightforward, causal relationships between environmental degradation and migration 
(Warner 2011). As a consequence, it is a challenge to isolate environmental causes on 
migration from other factors. Consequently, there exists a wide range in expert estimates of 
climate change and environmental induced migrant populations.  
Current studies use diverse range of approaches (quantitative methods, modelling, and 
qualitative research). Earth-System models aim to establish future climates and their 
environmental impacts, but they are only approximations and often not capable of describing 
current climates. Analysis from long-term records of remote sensing data can provide evidence 
for verification and validation, but they describe the past; extrapolation to the future based on 
past data may not fully take changing environmental regimes into account. Moreover, climate 
projections would always include a wide range of uncertainty and can therefore describe only 
possible scenarios. Multi-model and ensemble approaches are essential to describe the 
probabilities of certain outcomes, acknowledging that there is a  best scenario.  
When trying to understand the impact of environmental changes on migration, not only the 
physical processes but also socio-economic processes need to be understood and underpinned 
with data. Calibration and validation at regional scale of the meta-model combining bio-
physical indicators of water security with socio-economic-political data are the main research 
challenges.  
Moreover, researchers are often forced to work with very limited amount of data, in particular 
when dealing with developing countries, which are usually also the most vulnerable ones. 
According to Brown (2008a), real baseline data for ongoing migration movements are not 
available and developing countries often do not have the capacity to collect these data. 
Difficulties in obtaining information on internal migration (see following Chapter I.b.ii) are 
considered for establishing the relationships between migration and climate change. Similarly, 
the estimates of potential migrants in the near and distant future vary considerably (Brown 
2008b).  
Therefore, datasets (see Annex 2) that apparently have a global coverage, may have been 
extrapolated from sparse underlying data, making reliable conclusions difficult. Often studies 
are based on the number of people exposed to increasing environmental risks and not on the 
number of the people expected to migrate. 
To summarise, the main challenges for the study of the environment – migration nexus (Koubi 
et al. 2013; Warner 2011; Randers 2012; European Commission 2013a) are: 
 Definition and estimates: Different definitions, crucial in guiding policy-making; 
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 Drivers: Lack of data and theoretical model to know which individuals decide to 
migrate and why environmental change causes migration in some regions or countries, 
but not in others; 
 Scenario and impacts: Creation of reliable global scenarios of climate change and 
economic development, studies on their impacts on society and well-being as well as 
design of effective adaptation scenarios. 
 
Approaches and solutions to overcome the gaps and challenges 
IOM44 highlights that the complex interactions and feedback mechanisms between climate 
change, environmental degradation and migrations must be “addressed in a holistic manner, 
taking also into account other possible mediating factors including, inter alia, human security, 
human and economic development, livelihood strategies and conflict”.  
Reliable and sufficient data for the different sectors, robust methodologies and models will 
contribute to inform policy makers about evidence-based scientific possibilities. 
Communication on the reliability of the data and the subsequent uncertainties and 
consequences will require an attempt to develop objective and empirically-based detailed 
numerical scenarios for the physical and socio-economic processes. This will be particularly 
important for mainstreaming policies such as the EU strategy for adaptation to climate change 
(2013)45, which specifically addresses the link between climate change, environmental 
degradation, and migration. The adaptation strategy46 promotes migration as a possible and 
effective coping mechanism to climate change. Furthermore, specific actions foreseen by the 
strategy are improved preparedness and emergency response in particular with regard to high 
impact weather events.  
DG JRC could continue to play a role to promote advancements in the study of root causes for 
migration, with a particular focus on environmental issues. In the current and planned activities, 
DG JRC is leading the development of an index for the Global Climate Change Alliance built 
for DEVCO to include development elements. DG JRC is also working towards multi-risk 
early warning systems for severe weather events to allow for better preparedness and better 
organisation of humanitarian aid for disasters and will  be working on adaptation options to 
climate change in developing countries to increase resilience to weather extremes in those 
countries. While IOM, in collaboration with SciencePo, is currently designing an Atlas of 
Environmental Migration (as of March 2016), DG JRC is more specifically developing an Atlas 
of Water Cooperation and Conflicts that could be used as a layer to understand displacements. 
Studies would focus on: 
 The development of “best data sets” versus official data sets on population, migration 
and displacement, as well as various drivers. Best data sets can consist of a blending of 
official data with remote sensing and social media sampling; 
 Research on the impact of climate change on environmental degradation and socio-
economic impacts globally and across multiple sectors with specific focus on 
agriculture, water resources, coastal and urban areas; 
 Comparative research across countries, which could allow the identification of key 
common characteristics for different types of displacement strategies (internal, 
external, temporary, permanent).  Most of the existing studies are country specific;  
                                                          
44 https://www.iom.int/migration-and-climate-change 
45 http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/adaptation/what/documentation_en.htm 
46 With regard to the role of migration as adaptation strategy the EC DEVCO funded the project implemented by 
IOM “Migration, Environment and climate change: evidence for policy”.  
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 Micro-level analysis of the perception and attitude towards environmental change in 
order to identify the reason why some people might leave when facing environmental 
change and not others; 
 Assessment of the linkages between adaptation and migration for building resilience, 




Policy and debate 
Conflict-induced migration occurs whenever the country of origin has armed conflicts, civil 
war, generalised violence or whenever a person is persecuted on the grounds of nationality, 
race, religion, political opinion or social group. This movement of population might lead to 
different categories of migrants namely, internally displaced persons (IDPs), or persons under 
some other type of international protection.47 However, these persons can also be added to the 
number of irregular or smuggled migrants, as well as fall into human trafficking networks. 
According to the UNHCR (UNHCR 2015a), at the end of 2014, 59.5 million people (of which 
38.2 million IDPs and 1.8 million asylum seekers) were forcibly displaced due to conflict, 
generalised violence, or human rights violations. The number of refugees worldwide grew by 
45% between 2012 and 2015.48 With a refugee population of 15.1 million, 2015 witnessed the 
highest level of refugees in the last 20 years: top origin countries being Syria, Afghanistan and 
Somalia, and top host countries being sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and the Pacific region, 
followed by Europe. According to UNHCR,49 children account for almost half of forcibly 
displaced people worldwide.   
Recently, South and Jolliffe (2015) found that migration decisions in conflict areas are based 
on five main factors: physical security; prospects for a stable livelihood; access to services and 
amenities; perceptions and levels of confidence in the peace process; and influences from 
various political actors and authorities. Davenport et al.’s (2003) transnational comparative 
study on forced migration has shown that threats to personal integrity are a key driver for people 
to abandon their homes.  
Under the first pillar of the European Agenda on Migration (the Agenda) ‘Reducing the 
incentives for irregular migration’50 there is a mention of civil war and persecution that can 
cause migration. Placing forced migration under Pillar I (irregular migration) and not under 
Pillar III (asylum seekers) may foster the perception of an asylum seeker being an irregular 
migrant. It also exemplifies a long-standing difficulty of the conceptualisation of forced 
                                                          
47 The 1951 UN Geneva Convention defines a refugee as a person who “owing to a well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, 
is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the 
protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual 
residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.." (art.1). An 
internally displaced person (IDP) is “someone who was forced to flee his/her home but who did not cross a state 
border” (European Commission 2015d). 
48 First six months. http://www.unhcr.org/558193896.html. 
49 http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c1e8.html.  
50 Sub paragraph ‘addressing the root causes of irregular and forced displacement in third countries’. 
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migration (Zetter 1991; Turton 2003), which is the use of certain labels according to 
institutional responses.   
The European Commission is involved in providing humanitarian aid to assist displaced people 
in the areas of crisis, especially with the actions carried out by the DG ECHO.51 The Agenda 
focuses on root causes, including conflicts, yet it does not necessarily address the factors 
influencing forced migrants' decisions to stay in the destination country, to return, or resettle 
in the country of origin.  
Data availability and research gaps 
The available information is produced by various stakeholders using different methods. 
Country-level data is published by UN agencies engaged in humanitarian relief such as the 
UNHCR, IOM, OCHA (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs) or the World 
Food Program. Another source of information are governments and local authorities. With an 
increasing demand for information by key actors, the media, and the general public; data 
collection and availability has increased over the past few years (UNHCR 2015b). The main 
databases and data sources are provided in Annex 2. 
Comprehensive data on IDPs is not only crucial for providing assistance and protection, it is 
also important to estimate the likelihood for them to move outside the country. The decision to 
leave the country of origin closely depends on whether there are any durable options to stay in 
the country of origin. Such information is of utmost value for potential host countries, including 
the EU. In 2010, the Inter-Agency Standing Committee has released a framework on durable 
solutions for IDPs which may be used for evaluation (Inter-Agency Standing Committee 2010). 
The focus of forced migration studies has been on the root causes seeking to establish a 
correlation between the factors that shape the emergence and persistence of conflicts, their 
nature and level of violence, and migration patterns of aggregate groups (Williams and Pradhan 
2009). Data used in these studies are usually survey data about individuals and households, 
data about violent events/conflicts or instability over time. Field research and k-informant 
interviews are also used. Some studies use a threat-based decision model, which is designed to 
explain how the macro-level context determines the micro-level behaviour. It is based on the 
general assumption that armed conflict (physical threats) places absolute constraints on 
individual choices  (Williams and Pradhan 2009; Davenport, Moore, and Poe 2003; Moore and 
Shellman 2004). The importance to understand individual situations, which until now has been 
less explored, has been highlighted in a more recent report  (South and Jolliffe 2015) on forced 
migrants' decision-making processes.  
Studies on the post-migration phase for refugees focus on the availability of durable solutions 
and their role in the peace process, especially in their country of origin (Lindley 2008; South 
and Jolliffe 2015; Jolliffe 2015). 
                                                          
51 Humanitarian aid for refugees helps to meet the most pressing needs of refugees; protect and support refugees 
during their displacement and when returning to their place of origin; increase the self-reliance of refugees and 
reduce their 'dependency syndrome'. ECHO also assists refugees who are trapped in protracted situations (in exile 
for five years or more without prospects of immediate durable solutions), which affect more than 45% of the 
world's refugees. ECHO works also towards decreasing the number and scale of refugee crises through its work 
on disaster preparedness and prevention, which aims to reduce the vulnerability of disadvantaged communities 
and prevent their displacement. 
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There are several gaps and challenges faced by researchers which can be divided into the 
following sections:  
 Definitions: categories or labels based on institutional responses to the movement of 
people partially caused by the lack of a commonly agreed, operational definition 
(Turton 2003; Lindley 2008; NRC and IDMC 2015); as well as established threshold 
of violence required to identify a conflict-induced migration;  
 Data availability and reliability: the debate around IDPs is often considered 
politically sensitive for governments and data can be difficult to collect; the data 
collected by NGOs, in some cases, may be misrepresented to shape the media’s 
portrayal of a crisis; it can be difficult to track demographic changes in the population 
such as births or deaths (NRC and IDMC 2015); there is a need for disaggregated data 
by location and demographics in order to identify protection gaps (UNHCR 2015b); 
 Comparability: the data stems from multiple stakeholders, covering different time 
frames and spaces, and therefore are not comparable; the differences in working 
definitions further contribute to the lack of comparability;  
 Practical obstacles: many IDPs live in informal settlements, with host families or 
scattered over urban areas which make it hard to identify them; there is limited access 
to affected areas due to security concerns, lack of transportation, logistical costs or 
government restrictions; in addition, data collection on displacement sometimes stops 
altogether once NGOs leave the areas (NRC and IDMC 2015). Finally, there is a lack 
of capacity among government and other stakeholders to collect data (Inter-Agency 
Standing Committee 2010).   
 Inadequate models: the threat-based decision model refers only to physical threats as 
drivers for migration, thereby dismissing economic, social, or political consequences 
of conflict (Williams and Pradhan 2009); there is an absence of a widely used model to 
collect the number of IDPs / forced migrants or to track them beyond their initial 
movement; there is also the need to constantly update registration databases (NRC and 
IDMC 2015). 
Approaches and solutions to overcome the gaps and challenges 
With regard to the pre-migration phase, there is a need for deeper analysis of other factors than 
the threat of violence as drivers for migration, taking into account that decisions are impacted 
by the various available options (South and Jolliffe 2015). In addition, more research could be 
done to identify a level of violence that has to be reached to make people risk migration. The 
use of already developed indices on conflict and risk assessment could be explored and linked 
to population movements (i.e. JRC Global Conflict Risk index52, Global Disaster Alert and 
Coordination System53 or Index for Risk Management54). With the aim of analysing root causes 
using quantitative data, in 2017 DG JRC will develop the EU Migration Index, which will 
create a scoreboard to capture push and pull factors for migration.  
Insecurity and lack of access to affected areas has been overcome by the use of high-resolution 
satellite imagery. Although some limitations related to budgetary and meteorological 
constraints exist, the usefulness of such methods could be further explored, and DG JRC has a 
long-standing expertise and recognised competence on this. UNHCR and the Operational 
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Satellite Applications Programme (UNOSTAT) have recently signed a cooperation agreement 
to enhance geographic information capacity using GIS data for camp monitoring.55  
Greater cooperation and information-sharing between the different stakeholders is needed to 
bridge the gaps in the available data, ensure comparability, and enhance reliability. Two 
positive examples are: 1) the Working Group for Archiving and Documentation of History of 
Forced Migration of IASFM56 as it seeks to document and preserve ‘refugee archives’, by 
calling for national and international coordination; and 2) crowd-sourced information used in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, to monitor displaced populations by drawing on local 
people to report information about IDPs and their living conditions, using their mobile phones 
and the internet (NRC and IDMC 2015). 
An interesting analysis has been developed by the World Economic Forum with the Global 
Risks Landscape (WEF 2016) that explores how emerging global risks and trends, including 
involuntary migration caused by violence and conflicts as well as by environmental or 
economic reasons, may impact societies.  
 
iii. Economy 
Policy and debate 
The economic study of migration focuses on three main aspects: the determinants of migration; 
the consequences at the country of origin; and the consequences at country of destination. In 
the literature, there is no general distinction between root causes for regular and irregular 
migration. Evidence indicates that the same economic determinants apply both to regular and 
irregular migration and the same static labour market model can be used. 
The prevailing micro-economic theory as to why people migrate is linked to the human capital 
model and attributes migration choices to a spatial disequilibrium in return of supply of labour 
and investment on the individual well-being. Migration is interpreted as a maximisation choice 
between costs and risks associated to the travel and resettlement, lost opportunities at origin, 
and life time expected income at destination. The identification of wage differentials as major 
determinants of migration dates back to Smith (1776) and Hicks (1973) and the supply of 
labour is the central element of most popular model of migration developed by Borjas (1999) 
and Sjaastad (1962).  
The supply driven theory is complemented by models, which consider migrants as consumers 
satisfying a demand for amenities or social benefits. Demand side theories are mostly applied 
by economic geographers in the field of urban and regional studies in developed countries. 
Their interpretation has been enriched in geographical theories by the inclusion of distance as 
a proxy for migration costs with the formulation of the gravity model of migration (Zipf 1946; 
Ravenstein 1885). 
Other theories underlie how migration is a result of household decisions, and in this context, 
remittances57 become an important component of migration choice.  
Considering also migration costs, it is acknowledged that an inverted U-shaped curve (a.k.a 
                                                          
55https://www.unitar.org/unhcr-and-unitar-sign-landmark-cooperation-agreement-unosat-satellite-analysis-
support. 
56 International Association for the Study of Forced Migration. http://iasfm.org/adfm/ 
57 Remittances are discussed in further detail in Chapter IV.e. 
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migration hump)58 links migration and income in a given country and whenever the per capita 
income is too low, migration is simply not affordable. Moreover, logistical and informational 
costs of moving, reinforced by underdeveloped economies, might create poverty gaps and lock 
potential migrants in their country of origin. Hence, the very poor do not migrate (King and 
Lulle 2016). Yet at the same time, there is evidence to show that migration – both internal and 
external – is an important route out of poverty.59 This consideration is relevant for the debate 
on the value of development aid and in the fight against poverty at the origin to reduce 
migration flows (Guriev and Vakulenko 2015) . 
Labour productivity and wages differentials cannot explain the many forms of migration. 
Social scientists try to fill these gaps by considering a wider range of migration determinants, 
including happiness and subjective perception of the relative deprivation in respect of a 
reference group.   
At EU level, DG DEVCO plays an important role in improving the understanding of the 
migration–development nexus.60 Besides engaging in policy dialogues with developing 
countries at national and regional level on migration, DEVCO is also implementing a number 
of projects in this area, including the “Emergency Trust Fund for stability and addressing root 
causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa”.61  The European Agenda on 
Migration, in the section related to root causes of irregular migration, mentions EU external 
cooperation assistance and in particular development cooperation to tackle global issues such 
as poverty, inequality and unemployment while focusing more on attracting talents.  In the 
following Valletta summit and subsequent Action plan (11-12 November 2015), one of the five 
priority areas is related to addressing root causes of irregular migration.62  
However,  whilst root causes for migration are basically the same for regular and irregular 
migrants, the link between irregularity and economic trends can display two facets: an irregular 
migrant can be an economic migrant who migrates to find better life opportunities, but that 
does not (or is not able anymore to) follow regular entry channels; or  a migrant can become 
irregular for economic reasons if (s)he cannot fulfil anymore legal requirements to stay due to  
job loss, which can occur especially in a downgrade economic period.    
Data availability and research gaps 
The above commentary shows that there is not a unified theory of migration determinants 
among sociological, geographical and economic disciplines. Isolated attempts to cover the 
entire world (Hatton and Williamson 2002; Mayda 2009) and to develop a unified theory - e.g. 
the world systems theory of Wallerstein’s (1974), the migration systems theory (Kritz, Lim, 
and Zlotnik 1992), a unifying perspective (Massey et al. 1993), the mobility transition theory 
(Zelinsky 1971) - are not considered sufficiently developed and universal to be operational 
                                                          
58 Please see Chapter IV.e for more detail.  
59 King and Lulle (2016) to the six-year empirical research done with partners in Albania, Bangladesh, Egypt and 
Ghana (Black 2009).  
60 More discussion of this nexus is in Chapter IV.e. 
61 The Fund is made up of €1.8 billion from the EU budget and European Development Fund, combined with 
contributions from EU MSs and other donors. The Trust Fund will benefit a wide range of countries across Africa 
encompassing the major African migration routes to Europe.  
62 One of the suggested action is investing in development and poverty eradication with, for example, a joint EU-
Africa analysis of the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement to improve the evidence-base of 
public policies, the enhancement of employment opportunities and revenue-generating activities in regions of 
origin and transit of migrants or the development of networks between European and African vocational training 
institutions, with a view to ensuring that vocational training matches labour market needs.  
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(Bijak 2011).  
The labour market model and the classical partial equilibrium models are not sufficiently 
capturing the complexity of social behaviour and individual migration choices. In addition, the 
focus of the economic literature on considering migrants as workers does not allow to fully 
capture the determinants of irregular migration. Most theories ignore forced migration, system 
shocks and do not explicitly model policy factors. In addition, existing theories and the 
available data are not capturing a progressive transition of migration towards mobility: that 
migration processes take place within regions, national boundaries are becoming more 
permeable and people are changing residence many times during their lifetime. The gap from 
a theoretical perspective is accompanied by the limitations for empirical research due the lack 
of data, especially if referred to irregular migrants. 
Regression models are used in empirical research to estimate the relevance (elasticity) of 
different determinants on the migration flows based on past data. These models are mostly 
extensions of the basic gravity equation (augmented gravity model). The gravity model 
presents from an econometric perspective several challenges - i.e. endogeneity, omitted 
variable bias and treatment of zero flows (Baldwin and Taglioni 2006), incorporation of a 
multi-lateral resistance term (Anderson and van Wincoop 2003), solution with Ordinary Least 
Squares estimates vs. non-linear solvers (Baier and Bergstrand 2009) - which are still subject 
to methodological developments. A particular aspect in the development of these regression 
models is the choice of the explanatory variables to be tested and proxies and dummies to 
represent income differences and inequalities, migration costs and regulatory and policy 
restrictions as depicted in Figure 1. 
Approaches and solutions to overcome the gaps and challenges 
The lack of a unifying theory for migration requires economist to take a more holistic approach 
in examining migration determinants. A review of forecasting methods (Disney et al. 2015) 
indicates that forecasting of migration has the highest level of uncertainty in respect of the other 
components of demographic change (fertility, mortality). The report identifies the highest level 
of uncertainty in the data and the highest level of impact on policy decisions in particular for 
the forecasting of migration of refugees and asylum seekers. Given the high levels of 
uncertainty, it becomes important for migration forecasts to state uncertainties explicitly and 
to address current limitations in the data. 
In conclusion, economic factors do not necessarily play the most predominant role in reasons 
as to why people choose to migrate and that even if a migrant chooses to move for economic 
factors, it is not necessarily because they are poverty-stricken. The approach to tackling the 
root causes to migration therefore requires a holistic one, including looking at the emerging 
field of experimental economics and well-being.  
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I. Irregular migration 
c. Fight against smuggling and human trafficking 
Policy and debate 
Academic debate 
The debate on smuggling and trafficking in human beings (THB)63 is very much related to their 
definitions and consequent conceptualisation amongst the two terms (Rubio Grundell 2015; 
ILO 2015; PICUM 2007). While trafficking and smuggling networks might operate in a similar 
way and many trafficking situations can start as smuggling, THB is to be considered a severe 
violation of fundamental rights as it implies the use of force and coercion. Instead, the 
definition of smuggling64 is based on three main elements: the transnational aspect, the illegal 
entry and the financial or other material benefit for the smuggler.  
Notwithstanding these differences, research shows how this distinction is often blurred in 
practice. Europol (Europol Joint Supervisory Body 2015) described THB as an octopus, where 
the body represents the elements of the crime (coercion, threats, deceit and exploitation) and 
while the tentacles represent the various forms of exploitation (prostitution, labour exploitation, 
etc). The risk is focussing only on the tentacles, misclassifying the event. The debates on the 
definition are relevant for policy given the practical and legal consequences between the 
different forms of irregular migration.  
IOM estimates that smugglers charge a migrant from EUR 500 to EUR 10,000 to be brought 
into Europe.65 In 2015, Europol has identified more than 40,000 individuals suspected of being 
involved in migrant smuggling and estimated that migrant smuggling has produced a turnover 
of EU 3-6 billion (Europol 2016). Research66 on the organisation of smuggling networks for 
Europe often describes an entrepreneurial organisation model with an increase use of social 
media and the provision of a plethora of services, such as forgery of documents and parallel 
banking systems. Using a sociological perspective, the relationship between migrants and 
smugglers is complex being based on mutual interest and sometimes including also family 
members in the system (Van Liempt and Doomernik 2006; United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime 2011). Some of the suspects involved in migrant smuggling are also involved in 
other types of crime, for 20% in THB (Europol 2016).  
For human trafficking, according to ILO, forced labour generates $150 billion in illegal profits 
per year and involves almost 21 million victims (2012)67. Latest available figures worldwide 
refers to 2012 and shows that only 18% of detected victims are men, while 49% are women 
                                                          
63 The EU Directive 2011/36 defines human trafficking as “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring 
or receipt of persons, including exchange or transfer of control over that person, by means of the threat or use of 
force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of 
vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control 
over another person, for the purpose of exploitation." This definition is very similar to the one proposed in the 
Palermo Protocol, GA 55/25 of November 2000. 
64 Article 3 and 6 of the Protocol Against The Smuggling Of Migrants By Land, Sea And Air, Supplementing The 
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, UN, 2000.  
65 See http://www.politico.eu/article/eu-police-agency-launches-migrant-smuggling-center-europol/  
66 An extensive review of research papers on smuggling of migrants was carried out by the United Nations Office 
on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2011). Another study prepared for 
DG HOME by Optimity Advisors (Optimty Advisors 2015) provides more recent  evidence on the smuggling of 
migrants based on case studies in several MSs and third countries. 
67 http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/forced-labour/lang--en/index.htm  
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and 33% are children. Wide regional differences have been recorded with regard to the forms 
of exploitation: Europe and Central Asia present the highest percentage of sexual exploitation 
(66%) coupled with 26% of forced labour / slavery like conditions. Most victims of trafficking 
are foreigners, however the majority of offenders are citizens of the country of conviction68 
(United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2014). Eurostat adds that in the 28 MS over the 
years 2000-2012, 65% of registered victims were EU citizens (Eurostat 2015). 
Policy debate 
At international level, there are 4 main strategies dealing specifically with the smuggling of 
migrants: the UNODC Strategy 201269, the UNODC Strategy for North Africa 2015, the EU 
Action Plan70 and UNHCR and IOM Joint UN Counter-Trafficking Strategy (2015-2017)71 . 
The EU action plan72 was adopted in May 2015 as part of the European Agenda on Migration 
(the Agenda), proposing the following priorities:  
 to enhance police and judicial response;  
 to improve gathering/sharing information;  
 to enhance prevention and assistance to vulnerable migrants;  
 to foster cooperation with third countries.  
The latest developments on the EU approach to THB are depicted in the Directive 2011/36/EU 
on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings73, based on the “3P” +1 dimensions 
of prevention, protection, prosecution and partnerships. The following EU Strategy towards 
the eradication of trafficking in human beings 2012-2016 set five priorities74 the EU should 
focus on.75  
The Agenda does not seem to reflect the recent developments proposed by ILO76 related to the 
concept of ‘modern slavery’, which includes those suffering slavery-like conditions or who 
have been trafficked. In fact, in the Agenda, THB is not linked to labour migration, rather it is 
included in the category of irregular migration. The main objective of THB policies is ‘to crack 
down on smugglers and traffickers’ networks77. Although there are numerous similarities with 
smuggling, addressing them together highlights the enforcement-centred approach focused on 
                                                          
68 It has to be noticed the diverging situation of Central Europe and the Balkans, where 92% of offenders are 
nationals, and Western and Southern Europe, where the percentage decreases to 40% (United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime 2014). 
69 Comprehensive Strategy to Combat Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants, 29 February 2012. 
70 Contribution to the International Efforts to address the smuggling of migrants across the Mediterranean - 
Strategy for the building of Capacity of North African Countries through an Integrated Response, UNODC, 
January 2015. 
71 Strategy to Address Kidnapping, Human Trafficking and Smuggling in Persons – Strengthening Alternatives 
to Onward Movement  
72 EU Action Plan against migrant smuggling (2015 - 2020), COM(2015) 285 final, European Commission, 
Brussels, 27 May 2015 
73 That replaces the 2002 framework decision. 
74 Including ‘increased knowledge of and effective response to emerging concerns related to all forms of 
trafficking in human beings.” The others being: 1. Identifying, protecting and assisting victims of trafficking; 2. 
Stepping up the prevention of trafficking in human beings; 3. Increased prosecution of traffickers; 4. Enhanced 
coordination and cooperation among key actors and policy coherence. 
75 An online portal has been launched by the EU to provide information, material and news on the fight against 
THB http://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/citizens-corner-eu-actions-explained/eu-actions-explained_en  
76 ILO Protocol of 2014 o the Forced Labour Convention (1930). 
77 A European Agenda on Migration.(COM (2015) 240 Final), p.7 
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curbing irregular entries (Dimitriadi 2015). This might risk to focus more on MS – rather than 
the person – as the real victim of this criminal activity.   
The Agenda also mentions the interest of the Commission to ‘step up action against illegal 
employment of third country nationals, inter alia through better enforcement and application 
of the Employers Sanctions Directive which prohibits the employment of third-country 
nationals who have no right to stay in the EU’78. Irregular status rather than slavery-type 
working conditions or exploitation is considered to be once more the main angle. 
Data availability and research gaps 
The EU action plan gives explicit emphasis on data collection for smuggling activities, while 
the strategies from UNODC and IOM indicate priorities on research and analysis. Also the ILO 
Protocol to the Forced Labour Convention and its Recommendation no 203 (2014) calls on 
MSs to collect reliable statics, including on trafficking for the purpose of forced labour. 
Several initiatives regarding data collection on THB79 have been promoted under the previous 
EU Action Plan (2006-2010)80. In 2009, a Delphi survey has been used to reach consensus on 
basic indicators of human trafficking under a joint EC/ILO project (ILO and European 
Commission 2009). The results consisted of six operational indicators for labour and sexual 
exploitation.81 In the same year, a Guidelines for the Collection of Data on Trafficking in 
human beings was developed by IOM (2009), recommending that data should be collected on 
victims, traffickers, trafficking process and the criminal justice responses, suggesting a 
template for each of these subjects. In 2010, the International Centre for Migration Policy 
Development (ICMPD 2010) published a comprehensive study which gives an overview of 
publicly accessible data on human trafficking. 
Precise data on smuggling and THB, however, are rare owing to the very nature of the topic 
itself involving hidden populations and criminal networks. In terms of methodology, most of 
the analyses have to rely extensively on qualitative information, interviews, ad hoc surveys and 
case studies. Quantitative research is strongly affected by the lack of reliable data. Empirical 
data includes law enforcement records and criminal justice statistics, both dependent on the 
number of detected cases (and this can be impinged by a number of factors, such as the 
reluctance of victims to report crimes or the capacity of the system in detecting cases of 
trafficking) and only able to capture a subset of the whole population. Estimates derive from a 
larger pool of sources, including non-governmental reports or qualitative analyses, such as 
interviews with k-informants, victim of trafficking (VoT) or analysis of court verdicts. Surveys 
                                                          
78 Ibidem, p. 9 
79 Other projects and activities related to human trafficking worth to mention are hotline services for victim of 
human trafficking, which can create extensive dataset (e.g. https://traffickingresourcecenter.org, 
https://polarisproject.org/resources/building-global-safety-net-victims-human-trafficking-toolkit-hotlines; a 
guidelines to prevent abusive recruitment, exploitative employment and trafficking of migrant workers produced 
for the Baltic Sea Region (http://www.heuni.fi/en/index/researchareas/humantrafficking/adstringo-
addressingtraffickinginhumanbeingsforlabourexploitationthroughimprovedpartnershipsenhanceddiagnosticsandi
ntensifiedorganisationalapproaches.html ) with the sustain of the EC; a number of prevention initiatives such as 
awareness-raising campaigns and capacity building activities (https://www.iom.int/counter-trafficking ) and 
finally various manuals and handbooks on THB for criminal justice practitioners or police forces, such as Anti-
Slavery (2005), United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2009), Council of the European Union (2015). For 
an overview please refer to European Commission (2013b).  
80 COM(2006)437.  
81 Namely deceptive recruitment, coercive recruitment, recruitment   by   abuse   of vulnerability; exploitation;  
coercion  at  destination;  and  abuse  of vulnerability at destination. 
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represent a method for estimating the numbers of people living in modern slavery,82 often 
combined with extrapolation methods for those countries not covered by surveys. Non-
governmental organisations also collect data and are relevant sources, although some of the 
limitations are linked to the lack of standard data collection and/or reporting mechanisms. 
To date, victim-centred data constitutes the primary source for THB. The strength of this 
primary data lies in the relatively easy way to get in contact with the VoT (identified by the 
law enforcement or NGOs) and the possibility to retrace the trafficking process. Nonetheless, 
there exist some ethical, methodological and practical limitations in using this victim-derived 
data, such as the selection effect, the emotional impact on the victim, under reporting, the 
limited knowledge on the global process. A more general obstacle in this kind of data source 
is the criteria used for the identification of victim of trafficking, which differ in terms of scope 
and implementation, making even more challenging comparative analysis.83  
Research on criminal organisations are more limited for budgetary reasons, narrow 
geographical coverage and security risks. Criminal justice data, including police investigation 
and court transcripts, as well as ethnographic studies, can reveal information on these activities.  
The main actors84 involved in collecting (different) data on smuggling and THB are mainly 
IOM, UNODC, ILO, Frontex, and as of 2013, Eurostat. A number of indices have also been 
developed to evaluate and measure the impact of policies and initiatives against THB, mainly 
using text analysis and following the 3Ps paradigm of prosecution, protection and prevention.85 
More information about the databases is available in Annex 2.  
International and regional entities (UNODC, Europol, Eurostat) are unanimous in highlighting 
the difficulties to estimate ‘dark figures’. Generally, the dispersion of data among various 
entities and the lack of a standardised data collection weakens the reliability of different 
measurement and analysis, hampering the comparability across countries.  
In addition, their interpretation is complex: for example an increase of detected human 
trafficking cases might reflect: a) a higher effort by the system to fight against human 
trafficking; b) an increase of trafficking activities; c) a change in the legislation; d) a new/more 
functional identification process; e) a successful campaign to denounce trafficking: and f) a 
change in information gathering. With a specific focus on the EU, Eurostat (2013) noted that 
the quality of the statistics collected did not comply in all respects with the requirements of the 
European Statistics Code of Practice. Thus data validation checks have been introduced to 
improve the situation, although differences “still exist in the process of recording data, as well 
as differences between national legal definitions, make it difficult to compare and assess rends 
across EU Member States” (2014,15). 
                                                          
82 To increase the likelihood of identifying victims in a random sample survey, the Walk Free Foundation survey 
questions are based on a network sampling frame which used “family” rather than “household” as the reference 
group. 
83 See EMN (2014).  
84 In addition, at European level, the Fundamental Right Agency (FRA 2010) has addressed the issue of child 
trafficking in the EU, while Frontex developed a training package on detection and identification of VoT for 
border guards (Frontex 2012) and EASO created a training module on interviewing vulnerable persons and 
children (2013) and is mapping MS current practices as regards identifying vulnerable asylum applicants. Europol 
has been tasked to assist in facilitating information exchange. Eurojust supports the cooperation between national 
authorities in the investigation and prosecution of THB. The European Police College (CEPOL) organises training 
for policy officers (Justice and Home Affairs Agencies 2014). 
85 A comparison of the indices is available in Seo-Young Cho (2014). 
           
34 
Some of the gaps and challenges of empirical research on smuggling and trafficking86 can be 
included in the following categories: 
 Topic: confusion between smuggling and THB; overemphasis on trafficking in women 
and sexual exploitation;  
 Data: dark figures, many cases remain unreported or undiscovered; detailed data are 
not available or partial and incomplete at global and regional level; hard-to-compare-
data; lack of time series; difficulty to publically access data;  
 Clarity / Identification: little uniformity in the application of the Palermo Protocol by 
the governments and by the researchers; different methods to identify and therefore 
counts VoT87; differences in criminal justice systems and in the classification of 
offences; unwillingness of many victims to be identified; disincentives to act against 
traffickers (i.e. insufficient training for victims’ identification, inadequate legislation to 
prosecute traffickers);  
 Methodology: rarely properly explained; absence of standardised guidelines for data 
collection; short timeframe and geographic coverage; small samples not necessary 
representative of the entire population; fragmented data risks of double counting 
victims; need for multi-method and interdisciplinary approaches; absence of centralised 
reporting and data-gathering at national level; no systematic exchange of information 
across entities and countries; indices that lack long-term indicators (3P) or lack of 
systematic evaluation standards and limited geographic coverage (Greta Scorecards); 
 Evaluation: few evaluations and monitoring of counter trafficking initiatives88, 
including of prevention measures; difficulties in draft assessment of the long-term 
impact; duplication in funding similar activities. 
Approaches and solutions to overcome the gaps and challenges 
In response to these challenges, experts in the field have proposed some suggestions,89 
summarised following the above categories: 
 Topic: focussed research  on: a) smuggling and trafficking corridors, (including routes 
from Central, East and southern Africa) how networks work at regional level; b) 
demand side of this criminal activity;90 c) traffickers behaviours and their role in the 
process; d) investigation on money flow related to THB (with financial investigations 
and cooperation with money transfer companies); e) other forms of exploitation, such 
as child begging; promote initiatives for fair recruitment practices91;  
                                                          
86 (IOM 2005; IOM and Nexus Institute 2010; IOM and Nexus Institute 2014; Farell and McDevit 2008; UN.GIFT 
2008; ICMPD 2010; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2014; CBSS TF-THB 2011; Laczko 2002; EMN 
2014b; Eurostat 2015; OSCE 2011; European Commission 2015e). 
87 Some of the criteria adopted are persons who have been pre-selected as potential victims of trafficking, those 
officially recognised as VoT by the law enforcement officers, or by the NGOs, self-identified VoT, only those 
officially recognised as victims who are willing to testify against traffickers… Detailed criteria for the 
identification of VoT are not indicated in the existing asylum acquis; MSs are only obliged to establish appropriate 
mechanisms. Methods of screening also differ with regard to timing, authorities in charge of the screening…(EMN 
2014b). 
88 (IOM and US PRM 2008).  
89 (ICMPD 2010; Farell and McDevit 2008; FRA 2014; IOM 2005; Altai Consulting and IOM MENA Regional 
Office 2015; CBSS TF-THB 2011; PICUM 2007; IOM 2015b; ILO 2015).  
90 Ongoing project: http://www.demandat.eu/ 
91 For example the ILO Fair Recruitment Initiative (http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/fair-recruitment/lang--
en/index.htm); or the IOM Initiative on Ethical Recruitment (http://iris.iom.int/ ). 
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 Data: promote data accessibility, respecting privacy; create central coordination in data 
collection; 
 Clarity / Identification: robust and regular capacity building activities92 on data 
collection (especially in the countries of origin of THB)93 and on victim’s identification 
(especially in the countries of exploitation); increase the incentive to report for VoT 
and the disincentives for such criminal activities; better coordination at all levels94 (i.e. 
define a mechanism to data exchange between countries / organisations);  
 Methodology: in order to better understand the contextual setting, organisational 
network analysis, life histories, the use of interviews with smugglers could be 
promoted; a situational approach could be applied in order to study the demand-side of 
the trafficking (national demands, specificities of various markets…); initiate a series 
of small field studies at local level for specific geographical realities; longitudinal 
research investigating the circumstances of individuals before, during, and after 
trafficking; comprehensive approaches, and involving both countries of origin and 
countries of destination; snowball sampling could be used to estimate dark figures;  
 Evaluation: ensure independent evaluation of current and past anti-trafficking 
initiatives; increase labour inspections to detect cases of trafficking at workplace; assess 
the capability of the VoT to integrate or reintegrate into the society to understand the 
long-term impact of trafficking.  
A recent study by the European Parliament Directorate-General for External Policies 
(European Parliament 2015) has stressed that in the absence of safe and legal channels to seek 
asylum in the EU, people crossing the Mediterranean and along their route in Europe 
(particularly on the Western Balkans route) are liable to trafficking, smuggling and violence. 
The report considered that protection and securitisation of the borders is becoming the primary 
aim of governments rather than the development of effective strategies to protect the human 
rights of migrants and to save lives. IOM, among others, is also suggesting that one tool to 
address migrant smuggling in a comprehensive way is the creation of more legal channels for 
migration, and were more critical on the intent to systematically identify, capture and destroy 
vessels used by smugglers.95 
Latest developments have seen ILO as a promoter of a multi-stakeholders process to harmonize 
THB data collection worldwide. Recommendations on the measurement of forced labour will 
be drafted by 2018 and by 2020 at least 20 statistical surveys will be completed. In addition, 
by 2016 ILO wants to set up a Global Slavery Observatory as an instrument to manage and 
share knowledge on forced labour and as a dynamic tool for policy developments (ILO 2015). 
The ILO and the European Commission intend to promote joint activities within the context of 
2030 Agenda for Sustainable development, and explore further cooperation in the fields of 
labour migration / fair recruitment / forced labour and THB as a renewed strategic approach 
and partnership96.  
                                                          
92 The Valletta Action Plan takes into consideration the training needs for law enforcement, judiciary and border 
management authorities on investigation methods and judicial treatment of victims. Identification methods should 
as well be reinforced for all border officers.  
93 FRA (2014) called the MSs to ensure proactive dissemination and systematic use of tools developed a European 
and international level to assist border guards in identifying victims. 
94 The Dutch experience has been considered has a successful one (Eurojust - THB 2015). In January 2016 a 
Global Action initiative has been launched : https://ec.europa.eu/anti-
trafficking/sites/antitrafficking/files/invitation_lunchtime_conference_21.01.2016.pdf 
95 http://www.iom.int/news/iom-welcomes-european-commission-proposals-migration. 
96 12th High-level meeting between the ILO and the EC, Brussels 30/09/2015 – 01/10/2015 (ILO and European 
Commission 2015). 
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Taking into consideration DG JRC's knowledge and operational capacity, some concrete 
actions and research projects that could be promoted at the EU level are the following: 
 Considered the increasing number of information sources and the consequent impact in 
data quality and comparability, produce a review of available data and update it 
regularly, with the inclusion of critical analysis of methodologies used and categories 
of data collected, in a way to support sound comparability and cross/national analysis, 
in collaboration with ILO (ICMPD 2010); 
 Given recent developments in the modus operandi of criminal networks with the use of 
cyberspace97 for recruiting migrants and victims of trafficking (Hughes 2014; Aziz, 
Monzini, and Pastore 2015), a new approach that is able to analyse social media content 
is needed to support prevention and prosecution of human trafficking. DG JRC has 
developed extensions to the European Media Monitor software to automatically detect 
pages on social media used by smugglers to attract migrants and refugees. DG JRC will 
support Frontex and Europol in deploying and further developing technical solutions to 
detecting internet pages used by smugglers; 
 To best use all available information, a composite index could be created for European 
countries by integrating statistical (Eurostat) and qualitative – textual information (3P 
or Greta scorecards), in collaboration with Goettingen University (see (Seo-Young Cho 
2014); 
 A number of information sharing platforms98 have been set up during the past months, 
namely the IOM/IMO/UNODC platform99 on migrant smuggling by sea and the 
Europol European Migrant Smuggling Centre.100 DG JRC could contribute to the 
development of tools and methods in the areas of data mining, anomalies detection and 
risk analyses, and identification of falsified or forged documents. DG JRC will build 
on domain expert knowledge from relevant authorities (MSs’ authorities, Frontex, 
Europol,) to code modi operandi and analyse behaviors of interest for migrant carrying 
vessels; 
 New technologies could be used to tackle smuggling and criminal networks. UNHCR 
is already exploring the possibility of using satellite imagery to identify smugglers’ 
boats,101 a competence well developed by DG JRC. In addition, DG JRC has developed 
a platform for remotely detecting and tracking vessels at sea (Blue Hub) and carries out 
R&D activities on innovative platforms and sensors for small boats detection.  
                                                          
97 Recent project: https://ec.europa.eu/anti-trafficking/eu-projects-and-funding/improving-and-sharing-
knowledge-internet-role-human-trafficking-process_en 
98 These in addition to the main information systems maintained at international level as Interpol - TOP 
Programme giving access to Interpol’s global police communications network (I-24/7); Interpol Stolen and Lost 
Travel Documents Database (SLTD Database); Interpol - Stolen and Suspect Vessels database; IOM - border 
management information system MIDAS (previously PRIS); Europol - Secure Information Exchange Network 
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I. Irregular migration 
d. Return 
Policy and debate 
According to the United Nations Statistics Division for collecting data on international 
migration (Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration 1998) the definition of 
return migrants are "persons returning to their country of citizenship after having been 
international migrants (whether short-term or long-term) in another country and who are 
intending to stay in their own country for at least a year". Thus, it encompasses country of 
origin; place of residence abroad; length of stay in the host country; and length of stay in the 
home country after return (Dumont and Spielvogel 2008, 164). The EU's Return Directive 
(European Union 2008) does not define a returnee per se, but rather applies standards and 
procedures in relation to return decisions to "third country nationals staying illegally102 on the 
territory of a Member State."103 Therefore, there are two main categories of returnees – forced 
(including expulsion, obligation to leave the country, removal, etc.) and voluntary (that follows 
a personal decision of the migrant).  
Migration has become far more complex. As noted by King and Lulle (2016, 28), new 
migratory geographical flows came into existence after 1989, which described the flexible, 
transient and unpredictable nature of migration from one country to another, and to another, 
using terms such as 'incomplete migration'; 'pendular migration'; and 'liquid migration'. 
Moreover, there have been changes to the time people spend as migrants, with circular 
migration104 becoming more popular, in addition to other short-term types of migration. 
Therefore, there are various cases of return migration, as shown in the figure below. 105 
Fig. 3: Various cases of return migration 
 
Source: (Dumont and Spielvogel 2008, 165) 
Just as return is no longer seen as a single migratory act, there has been a building body of 
knowledge on the theories surrounding return106: including neo-classical economics; new 
economics of labour migration; structuralism; transnationalism; and cross-border social and 
                                                          
102 The definition of 'illegal stay' is the presence on MS territory that does not or no longer fills conditions of entry 
into that State. The 'Return Handbook', which was adopted with the EU Action plan on Return in September 2015, 
provides further clarification to these definitions, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-
do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package/docs/return_handbook_en.pdf 
103 Article 2 (1) of the Return Directive 
104 A repetition of migration by the same person between two or more countries (EMN Glossary). 
105 This chart is to show that return can be part of a more complex migration history: the last country of residence 
before return is not necessarily the country the migrant had first emigrated to.  
106 Cassarino, Jean-Pierre, 'Debates on return migration', Return Migration and Development Platform, European 
University Insitute, http://rsc.eui.eu/RDP/research/schools-of-thought/ 
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economics networks, which aim to better understand the magnitude and dynamics of return 
migration to the countries of origin.  
The European Agenda on Migration (the Agenda) tackles the questions from an EU political 
level and mostly concerning irregular migration, whereas the academic debates and the wider 
statistical analysis looks into return for regular and irregular migrants. Also in academic 
literature (King & Lulle, 2016) return is seen  from a wider context, which impacts upon 
circular and temporary migration, and should be considered more thoroughly in the policy 
process.  
The Agenda identifies the low enforcement rate of return, but does not touch on the data 
inconsistencies (see next section for further detail). This lies at MS level, and because there are 
differences in definition, in methods of collecting, etc. it is difficult to compare the data. 
Another issue which is touched upon in the Agenda is the reintegration of returnees, which has 
been stressed as well by civil society. The question of reintegration also leads into negative or 
positive connotations connected to return that can have significant impacts on the morale of 
the returnee and their community at large. If the returnee is seen as a failure, then this will make 
the incentive to return much lower. If return is seen more than a single migratory act and part 
of the migration process, with skills, resources and values being acquired along the process, 
then it becomes a far more beneficial experience to the returnee.  
A number of EU policy documents 107 have identified key challenges related to the study of the 
topic:  
 The Agenda and the EU policy documents on return note that the EU return's system 
works imperfectly and that there is a comparatively low rate of enforcement of return 
decisions. The Commission’s Communication on EU Return Policy108 notes that “there 
is a considerable gap between the persons issued with a return decision […] and those 
who, as a consequence, have left the EU”. 
 That voluntary return (whether assisted or not) is the most preferential policy on how 
to return migrants.  
 Harmonising the implementation of the Return Directive or at least reducing divergence 
of implementation to a minimum. 
 Commitment from third countries to cooperation agreements regarding readmission.  
 A more integrated system of return management: joined up cooperation between the 
EU's return operations programmes such as EURINT (the European Integrated 
                                                          
107 European Agenda on Migration, COM (2015) 240 final, 
http://ec.europa.eu/lietuva/documents/power_pointai/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_
en.pdf; Communication on EU Return Policy, COM (2014) 100 final, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/com/com_com%282014%290199_/com_com
%282014%290199_en.pdf; EU Action Plan on return, COM (2015) 453 final, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-
affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-
package/docs/communication_from_the_ec_to_ep_and_council_-_eu_action_plan_on_return_en.pdf; Council 
Conclusions on EU Return Policy, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/jha/143105.pdf; Council conclusions on the 
future of the return policy, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/10/08-jha-return-
policy/; Valetta Summit Action Plan, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-
summit/2015/11/11-12/; Communication on the State of Play of Implementation of the Priority Actions under the 
European Agenda on Migration, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-
migration/proposal-implementation-
package/docs/managing_the_refugee_crisis_state_of_play_20160210_en.pdf 
108 COM (2014) 199 final, p. 3 
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Approach on Third Countries), ERIN (European Re-integration Instrument Network), 
and EURLO (the European Return Liaison Officers network). 
 Enlarging the mandate of FRONTEX so that it can initiate return operations.  
Data availability and research gaps 
A number of organisations - including IOM, Frontex and Eurostat - collect data on return 
migrants, described in  Annex 2.  
Improving statistical information related to return is promoted in the Communication on Return 
Policy, which notes that emphasis will be given to improving statistics on return whether from 
or among MSs.109 Furthermore, the EU Action Plan on Return notes that "Reliable, comparable 
and consistent statistical data is crucial for enabling the development of adequate policy 
responses. While Member States provide statistical data on returns to Eurostat, inconsistencies 
have been identified."110 It has been remarked that there has been a discrepancy between the 
data MS provide to Eurostat and that to the EMN regarding return.111  
Limited available data is a view highlighted by both the OECD and the IOM (2008). There is 
little in the way of internationally comparable statistical information available on return 
migration due to two factors: that countries differ in legislation regarding nationality, and that 
they collect data differently. In case of the latter, some countries mainly collect data directly 
through population registries, whilst others collect data at border points (Joliver, Xenogiani, 
and Dumont 2012; Dumont and Spielvogel 2008).  
Moreover, different definitions regarding return can create problems for data collection on 
return migrants. One of the most notable debates about return is that less attention is paid to 
return than to the decision-making process around emigration (King and Lulle 2016). 
According to King and Lulle (2016), this could be because the decision for a migrant to return 
is far more complex than the decision to emigrate.  
Although the Migration Statistics Regulation112 has gone a long way in harmonising and 
providing quality assurance in how they collect data, Eurostat does recognise certain problems. 
Since its data comes from the administrative records of the national authorities - mainly the 
Ministries of Interior or Immigration Agencies - completeness of data is still lacking. In 
addition, because not all MS have managed to harmonise their methodologies, disparities do 
exist, although over time they should reduce.113 Also Frontex expresses caution in interpreting 
the data, noting that, "Despite all efforts of the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit and Member State 
experts involved in data exchange and analyses, it is conceivable that minor errors will occur 
in these reports due to very challenging timelines and the growing volume and complexity of 
the data and other information exchanged within the FRAN community." 
                                                          
109 COM (2014) 199 final, p.10 
110 COM (2015) 453 final, p. 10. 
111 All MSs are obliged to provide data on forced and assisted voluntary returns (with unassisted voluntary returns 
being optional) to Eurostat. They also provide data for the same three routes (forced, assisted, unassisted) to EMN. 
However, it has been pointed out that UK identified inconsistencies between the data MS supplied to Eurostat and 
that of EMN. Thus an independent review has been called for. 
112 Regulation (EC) No 862/2007 of 11 July 2007, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:32007R0862  
113 More detailed information regarding the analysis of the metadata, please see (European Union 2007) 
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At EU level, in 2014 the EMN Return Expert Group (REG) was established as a subgroup of 
the EMN. The aim of the REG is to create a forum to exchange expertise and good practice on 
(voluntary) return to improve implementation of policy in this area.  
In 2008, the OECD published a paper on return migration, attempting to improve the 
international comparability of data on return (Dumont and Spielvogel 2008). In its report, it 
collects data on several indicators such as the retention rates of migrants; the distribution age 
at the time of return; return rates by entry category of migrants; forced returns; educational 
attainment of return migrants compared to that of the total population; occupation of return 
migrants. The data of this report has been compiled using information from OECD member 
countries by means of a questionnaire, and has also made use of studies produced for an expert 
meeting.114 However, the OECD notes the following limitations associated with data 
collection:  populations registries do not register irregular migrants and there is the possibility 
that people fail to return as planned, or fail to even let authorities know that they have left 
because they would still like to hold on to certain entitlements. Data collected at border control 
tends to be more for immigration purposes and there is little information regarding 
demographic characteristics. Longitudinal surveys are more in-depth and provide better 
analysis behind the cause and consequences of migration, but sample sizes are small.  
DG RTD has funded projects relating to return. In its policy review (King and Lulle, 2016)  the 
following projects were reviewed: 
 The MAFE (Migration between Africa and Europe)115 project which collected data on 
the characteristics and behaviour of migrants from Sub-Saharan countries to Europe. 
The reasoning behind the project was that the traditional one-way  migration no longer 
holds and that return migration, circulation and transnational actions are significant and 
need to be recognised in policy design. 
 TEMPER (Temporary vs. Permanent Migration)116 aims to identify the main drivers of 
return and circulation decision of migrants and the immigration policies have on 
individual decisions. 
 Redial117 establishes a broader European network of judges dealing with return cases 
and corresponding legal academics from all EU MSs with a view to exchanging 
knowledge and experience regarding the proper implementation of the EU Return 
Directive.  
Possibilities of indirect measurement include labour force surveys or census collected at 
countries of origin or of destination. The drawback of such measurements is that it is not 
possible to control for the date of arrival in the destination country, and therefore the length of 
residence in that country.  
According to the EU Action Plan on Return, the Visa Information System (VIS) can help with 
facilitating the issuing of travel documents for return, thus collecting data on returnees. The 
use of VIS for return purposes seems to be at a premature stage. According to an EMN Ad hoc 
query118 it appeared that at least 9 MS (of the 15 that replied) did not have experience in using 
                                                          
114 "Return Migration and Development" Expert meeting, Paris, 12 November 2007 
115 http://mafeproject.site.ined.fr/ 
116 http://www.temperproject.eu 
117 www.redial.eu, co-funded by the European Return Fund.  
118 EMN, 'Ad-Hoc Query on First Experiences with the use of the Visa Information System (VIS) for Return 
Purposes', Requested by COM on 10th June 2013, compilation produced on 14th August 2013 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/reports/docs/ad-hoc-
queries/return/483_emn_ahq_first_experiences_vis_1july2013_wider_dissemination.pdf 
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VIS for this purpose. The mentioned Action Plan on Return proposes changes to the Schengen 
Information System (SIS) by making it compulsory for MS to introduce all entry bans and 
return decisions into it. The EMN notes that MS do not systematically enter entry bans into the 
SIS, thus obstructing enforcement of the entry ban in the Schengen area.119 Furthermore, the 
study notes that there is a lack of monitoring of the use of entry bans in the SIS and doubts 
whether they are deleted once the period of the entry ban has lapsed.  
Civil society notes that insufficient evaluations of return and reintegration programmes have 
been completed. Also any evaluation that is done is up to a 6 – 12 month period after return is 
unlikely to collect the experiences of those who had a difficult time upon return.  
Approaches and solutions to overcome the gaps and challenges 
There is currently an ongoing evaluation of the Return Directive, which is due to be completed 
by 2017. This will provide more detail as to whether and how the Directive needs to be 
amended. In addition, infringement proceedings are ongoing for those MS that have failed to 
implement it properly. 
Eurostat does its best to quality control the data but perhaps it could join forces with FRONTEX 
which seems to provide up-to-date or on the ground data. DG JRC could be a quality provider 
and check to make sure that the data has been thoroughly checked. 
The EU Action Plan tries to find a solution to the gap on inconsistencies of data provided by 
MS on return saying that a working group has been set up to further examine the 
inconsistencies.120 As indicated above, it proposes changes to, or at least making full use of the 
Schengen Information Systems, Visa Information Systems and Eurodac. These systems contain 
important data to enable MS to have a better idea concerning return and irregular migration 
and share such information in this regard. 
A need for more training for MS to be able to record return information in SIS and for more 
systematic entry of entry bans into the SIS could be proposed, as well as regular monitoring to 
delete bans which have expired. The DG JRC could play a role in providing training in this 
regard.  
Concerning the better information flows at the operations level (ie synergies between ERIN, 
EURINT, EURLO and FRONTEX), DG JRC has been asked to assist by designing a system 
to enable such information flow, with DG DIGIT in charge of developing it. Other research 
could look into alternatives to detention for irregular migrants awaiting removal, such as 
considering the feasibility of electronic tagging, as requested by DG HOME to the JRC.   
                                                          
119 EMN, 'Good practices in the return and reintegration of irregular migrants: Member States' entry bans policy 
and use of readmission agreements between Member States and third countries', 2014 
120 On p. 10 of the EU Action Plan on Return, the remark on inconsistencies in the provision of data have been 
identified.  
           
42 
II. Border management  
Policy and debate 
With the implementation of the Schengen agreement in 1995, protection of the external borders  
is  a joint European responsibility. Nonetheless, border management has remained a sensitive 
issue, where the principle of solidarity and burden sharing are difficult to operationalise. 
Moreover, effective border management is also dependant on cooperation with third countries 
EU’s neighbours (Wolff 2008).  
In 2015, media reported a much-feared demise of the Schengen area as the reintroduction of 
internal border controls. The recent analysis conducted by Guild, Brouwer, and Groenendijk, 
Kees Carrera 2015 posits that Schengen open borders are here to stay while the real challenge 
for Schengen border control is ensuring that controls are run in full compliance with 
fundamental human rights obligations and independent monitoring of the implementation of 
EU legal standards.  
The Schengen Borders Code provides EU States with a single set of common rules that govern 
external border checks on persons, entry requirements and duration of stays in the Schengen 
Area. Consequently, the area of border management is broadly advanced, with technological 
elements as major building bricks such as the Schengen Information System (SIS), 
EURODAC, the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR), the Visa Information 
System (VIS)121.  
Furthermore, two agencies, namely FRONTEX (2004) and eu-LISA (2012), were mandated 
with operational tasks in this context. FRONTEX’s mission is to develop and promote best 
practices in border management and to coordinate joint operations, the latter becoming more 
prominent in the humanitarian crisis in the Mediterranean sea. A new proposal by the 
Commission, tabled in December 2015, aims to transform FRONTEX into a European Border 
and Coast Guard Agency with extended mandate on operations and with own operational 
staff122. eu-LISA has the task to maintain the proper functioning of the large scale IT systems 
SIS, VIS and EURODAC.   
Harmonised security features for passports, residence permits and visas were introduced in 
2006 in order to improve the security of these essential identity documents. Biometric features 
(facial image and fingerprints) reduce falsification and counterfeiting and establish a reliable 
link between the document and its holder. A recent initiative, the “Smart Borders” Package 
(SBP), suggests the establishment of an Entry/Exit System (EES)123 and a Registered Traveller 
Programme (RTP).  
The EU Internal Security Fund was established to sustain solidarity between the Schengen 
States by supporting those MS with a heavy financial burden in implementing common 
standards on external border controls. 
                                                          
121 More info in the section concerning data.  
122 Among other new provisions, the new agency will have a reserve pool of 1,500 experts that can be quickly 
deployed to trouble spots where the EU’s external borders are under threat. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-15-6327_en.htm  
123  The aims of the EES is to improve the management of external borders; reduce irregular migration, by 
addressing the phenomenon of overstaying; to contribute to the fight against terrorism and serious crime and 
ensure a high level of internal security. Third country nationals arriving to the EU on short stay visas (Schengen) 
will have to scan their finger prints and have facial recognition upon entry of an EU border (from outside the 
Schengen area). 
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The European Agenda on Migration (the Agenda)124 makes reference to the legislation on 
border management in two ways: 
 By stressing the needs to fully implement the already existing legislation (e.g. 
exploiting capabilities of EUROSUR, or the Internal Security Fund of 2.7 billion Euro 
for 2014-2020); 
 By proposing certain extensions to “close gaps” that were only specified to a limited 
extent (e.g. increasing mandate and budget of FRONTEX); 
 By announcing that IT systems and technology like SIS, VIS and EURODAC shall be 
used in a more efficient way, in particular with respect to the envisaged Smart Borders 
package. 
Though the relevant proposals have already been tabled and a Smart Borders Pilot completed 
in 2015, there are still a lot of legal and technical questions open. For example, will there be 
more synergies between those large IT systems, despite data protection concerns? What will 
be the precise usage of the additional information gained by and Entry/Exit system? 
With regard to the desired full exploitation of existing means, the Agenda does not seem to 
define where MS fall short in this. Some examples of this could be: 
 EUROSUR and SIS as voluntary “push systems”: MS can currently use them to share 
information with other MS but are not obliged to do it. However, efficiency depends 
on the amount of information that is actually shared. Potentially, this scheme could be 
replaced by a “pull system” in which an authority (to be nominated) acts in collecting 
systematically the relevant information; 
 Electronic passports: the regulation for the minimum requirements on security features 
has foreseen the storage of fingerprints in order to establish a strong link between the 
document and its owner. However, the finally chosen concept for protecting the 
fingerprint data in the passport would require the exchange of certificates between MS 
that still lacks full implementation; such exchange of certificates is necessary as MS 
did not agree to establish a central European issuance authority (e.g. maintained by the 
Commission). In other areas like the European Tachograph the Commission (through 
DG JRC) acted successfully this way, thus avoiding the mentioned problems;  
 EU citizens versus third-country nationals: there are certain border checks from which 
EU citizens are exempted. However, the distinction between EU and third-country 
citizens is effectively done on the assumed possession of a MS passport that in itself is 
not fully checked according to all potential security features125. 
The general debate is focused on the on-going conflict between the abolition of internal border 
and national security interests. As can be seen from the current suspension of the Schengen 
agreement in some MS, the threat is real and the Agenda does not currently address it, also 
because it was published before the first suspensions were going to happen. 
Data availability and research gaps 
Effective border management can be defined as the ability to fully decide and control who is 
passing the border. This implies the proper verification of the relevant ID documents on 
                                                          
124 A European Agenda on Migration, (COM(2015) 240 Final. 
125 For example the so-called active authentication of the chip inside or the verification of the stored fingerprints. 
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entrance, temporary permissions (visas) so that those exceeding the permission can be 
identified.  
With regard to data, the sector suffers from a lack of relevant current or future operational data 
(e.g. precise numbers of visa over-stayers, or appropriate biometric test data for future technical 
systems to be deployed). One of the main challenges with this type of data is the question of 
how to obtain them (either by experimental setups or through synthetic generation) and the 
sensitiveness with regard to data protection. 
As mentioned above, a number of databases have been created to collect data, each one with 
its own specific purpose and specific data structure: 
 EURODAC serves to identify the country of first asylum registration. It contains only 
fingerprints (along with data and place of registration) and no other personal information. 
 SIS serves to share information amongst MS on lost and stolen travel documents, wanted 
or missing persons or on those persons for which entry into Schengen area is not permitted. 
For person alerts there may be in the future also fingerprint data attached. 
 VIS as of 2011, serves for the registration and verification of short stay visas into the 
Schengen area. It contains full personal data, including fingerprints and face image. 
 EUROSUR is a voluntary information sharing and cooperation mechanism introduced end 
of 2011. It shall provide Schengen countries with a common operational and technical 
framework, assisting them in countering cross-border crime, preventing unauthorized 
border crossings and diminishing causalities of migrants at sea.  
Apart from these EU-level databases there are a couple of further databases that are consulted 
during border control, such as national law enforcement databases or the Interpol database, 
most of them on lost and stolen documents.  
Schengen turns out to be effectively a mixture of commonly binding rules, voluntary activities 
and responsibilities under national sovereignty. This mixture is reflected in the mentioned IT 
systems and related concepts (including the work of agencies) and explains their gaps and 
limits.  
Indeed, due to data protection principles, these databases are not synchronised. As a 
consequence, the full spectrum of queries could reveal in certain cases inconsistent or even 
contradictory information. This applies in particular to alphanumeric data (transliteration 
problems or false registration), but also to biometric data (certain incompatibilities due to 
different enrolment schemes).  
In addition, while there is comprehensive data captured and processed at entry to the EU, there 
is almost no data on departure. In particular, there was so far no systematic check whether and 
when third country nationals with visa requirement have left Europe within the validity time 
of the visa. The planned Entry/Exit system (as part of the Smart Borders package) shall change 
this, but the corresponding legislative debates lack reliable data on this phenomenon. 
Moreover, there is currently no common European policy to deal with potential cases of over-
stayers. Thus, clear purpose and accuracy of data remains an issue. 
In short, due to information being stored separately in each system, the lack of inter-
connectedness between systems and data privacy concerns, the EU's IT border control systems 
is fragmented.  
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The Smart Borders package aims to diminish those gaps and limits, thus rebalancing the 
mixture towards more binding rules. However, criticism of the new package include, for 
example, by Spijkerboer and Last (2015), the analysis of the package leads to three 
observations: 1) inability of the European Union to develop a functioning asylum system, 
considered to be the root cause of the ‘migration crisis’; 2) the permanent intensification of 
visa policy measures led to an ever increasing demand for human smuggling, and the new 
proposal presents the same policy; 3) in response to border fatalities the proposal is to intensify 
current restrictive migration policies. 
Approaches and solutions to overcome gaps and challenges 
There are already a large number of useful elements available, yet efficiency could be 
improved. Proper design of technical systems will require appropriate recognition of the 
various positions of relevant stakeholders and whether these positions could be potential 
“showstoppers”, as well as the involvement of unbiased technical advice from the earliest point 
in time. 
Nonetheless, IT systems and technology cannot replace the needed solidarity in the EU, but 
systematic information exchange, full exploitation of existing security concepts, and attempts 
to combine these elements in a more efficient way could help to better manage migration and 
reduce fears. The proposal in the Agenda to use in a more efficient way the IT systems and 
technology could be moved toward a central data repository with appropriate access rights in 
accordance to relevant data protection legislation.  
Most of the mentioned systems involve biometric data that is supposed to provide unambiguous 
distinction of individuals. The accuracy of this distinction is usually called “biometric 
performance” as the distinction is performed by an automated IT system. There is a 
standardised way of estimating the performance of a system but this estimation strongly 
depends on the required test data. The strong deviations between performance claims of 
vendors (measured with own test data under laboratory conditions) and real performance of the 
deployed systems have been observed. It is therefore decisive for the proper and timely 
deployment of technological solutions that accompany policy to have appropriate test data 
available. The closer the characteristic of that data is to the expected later operational data, the 
more effective specification and design of the technology in question can be accomplished. 
DG JRC has been successful in providing biometric test data, in particular in relation to 
children.126 The fingerprint data were useful in two ways: feasibility of fingerprint recognition 
could be demonstrated (directly exploited for the revision of VIS regulation) and the quality of 
operational data (taken in the context of issuing passports) could be investigated.  
Further proposals for which the DG JRC could have an active role: 
 Demonstrate that central systems (according to the Communication on "Stronger and 
Smarter Information Systems for Borders and Security" COM(2016) 205) can be 
implemented in a privacy friendly way. Experience gained by US authorities in the context 
of their national border control systems could be taken into account; 
 With regard to technical systems (databases, biometric sensors, algorithms) there exist 
standards covering parts of it but not fully. For example, there are standards for biometric 
components but no standards covering full systems involving biometric components. The 
                                                          
126 Thanks to an agreement with the Portuguese government in 2009, the DG JRC could analyse fingerprint data 
of children.  
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DG JRC, in cooperation with FRONTEX, develops currently security evaluation guidelines 
for Automated Border Control systems and aims to promote these guidelines as minimum 
requirements for all such deployments in Europe.  
 The establishment of a European Biometrics Expertise Group (as a central EU reference 
point) could be explored. 
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III. Asylum and protection 
a. Common European Asylum System (CEAS) 
Policy and debate 
In force since 1999, the idea behind the CEAS is that asylum seekers upon entering a MS 
should be treated equally under an open and fair system independent of the MS in which they 
arrive127. The harmonisation of the asylum process across MS was also seen as a way to limit 
the phenomenon of 'secondary movement' where asylum seekers were thought to move on to 
another MS, to benefit from a more generous social welfare system (Garlick, 2010). 
The CEAS has been supported by many milestones: the Asylum Procedures Directive128;the 
Dublin Regulation129 and its accompanying EURODAC system130; the Reception Conditions 
Directive131; the establishment of the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) in 2010,; the 
Temporary Protection Directive132; the Qualification Directive133. Furthermore, significant 
convergence towards common standards has been achieved thanks in part to the Court of 
Justice of the European Union, which has helped clarify ambiguities. However, the mass influx 
of asylum seekers has revealed failings in harmonisation, causing the system to move towards 
fragmentation rather than unification. 
One of the biggest discussions concerning the CEAS has been the lack of proper 
implementation across MS.134 A factor hindering its implementation is the current mass 
migration influx, which the CEAS is ill-equipped and unable to operate effectively in such a 
climate135. Matters are not helped by the fact that there seems to be a lack of trust and 
insufficient political will by MS to support EU measures designed to tackle such influx (e.g. 
the re-introduction of border controls in the Schengen area, the slow relocation of asylum 
seekers). The UNHCR High Commissioner Grandi has said that there has been complete failure 
of European cooperation and solidarity with respect to the registration and distribution of 
refugees (Sattar, 2016). Moreover, positive public opinion towards the handling of the refugee 
flow is dwindling. According to the Eurobarometer (European Commission 2015a), negative 
feelings towards immigration of people outside the EU has increased to almost 60%. This 
makes it unlikely that the political resistance against CEAS will vanish, with 24% of EU 
population against it.  
                                                          
127 Except for DK, IE and UK. 
128 Directive 2013/32/EU on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection. 
129 Regulation No. 604/2013, of which its main principle is that the country that the asylum seeker first applies for 
asylum is responsible for either accepting or rejecting asylum, and the seeker may not restart the process in another 
jurisdiction. 
130The fingerprint database to identify asylum seekers and irregular migrants. 
131 Directive 2013/33/EU laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection. 
132 Directive 2001/55/EC on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of 
displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts between MSs in receiving such persons and 
bearing the consequences thereof. However, it is to be noted that the provisions are yet to be triggered.  
133 Directive 2011/95/EU on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as 
beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary 
protection, and for the content of the protection granted. 
134 In July 2015, infringement procedures launched against 19 MSs for failing to transpose into national law the 
EU Directives that make up the CEAS. 
135 This was highlighted in the seminar, 'Beyond the Dublin System: A new common European Asylum Scheme?' 
at the CEPS Ideas Lab, 25 – 26th February 2016. 
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There has been widespread agreement that the Dublin system has failed to provide a fair and 
sustainable solution to the uneven distribution of asylum seekers across the EU and that its 
revision is necessary (ECRE 2015; Guild et al. 2015; Mouzourakis et al. 2015).  The European 
Political Strategy Centre (EPSC, 2015) concludes that the current political and humanitarian 
turmoil is due, to a large extent, to an EU asylum system that allows asylum applications only 
on EU soil.  
At the moment, only negative decisions are mutually recognised. However, there is strong 
support towards the mutual recognition of positive asylum decisions136, seen as a necessary 
step towards harmonisation, that could also mitigate the negative impact of the Dublin system 
on individual asylum seekers (Guild et al. 2015). In order to do so, there is agreement that a 
legislative change will be necessary (ECRE 2014). 
Furthermore, there are major asymmetries among the MS regarding the reception, recognition, 
integration conditions and future prospects for asylum seekers and refugees (Toshkov and de 
Haan 2013; Aiyar et al. 2016, 41–44; Bank 2014; Mouzourakis et al. 2015; Guild et al. 2015). 
These asymmetries are due to a number of factors: MS austerity and budgetary constraints to 
assist asylum seekers and refugees; the number of asylum seekers and refugees; public attitudes 
towards migration (which highlighted above is increasingly negative); the growing diversity of 
the home population; as well as the historical experience with immigration and the way in 
which this experience is treated by politicians, the media and civil society (Triandafyllidou 
2011; Van der Brug et al. 2015).  
Perhaps unexpectedly, private sector funding, citizens’ initiatives and social media have all 
played a tremendous role in reception and resettlement, for example the private shipping sector 
involved in rescuing people at sea (AFP 2015). 
The European Agenda on Migration (the Agenda)137 clearly recognises the need to revise the 
Dublin Regulation and this revision has been decided. Nevertheless, the overall focus of 
proposed measures in the Agenda tends to be on better monitoring of the Regulation and on 
improving identification mechanisms (including increased efficiency in fingerprinting asylum 
seekers).  Mutual recognition of positive asylum decisions and the role of the private sector are 
not discussed. In addition, the Agenda does not necessarily touch on how to deal with the social 
tensions (and scaremongering by the media) that derive from such an influx of asylum seekers, 
apart from the call for integration. Thus, in this respect, the Agenda appears to touch on some 
of the issues above to a limited degree, and none on others.  
Data availability and research gaps 
Annex 2 provides the main databases and data sources concerning asylum, ranging from 
asylum trends and population movements and the current implementation of relocation and 
hotspots.  
The first overall remark is that there is a significant amount of global data on migration 
available.138 However, it is still difficult to distinguish between data concerning asylum seekers 
and that of migrants arriving to the EU for other reasons. Moreover, if there are data available 
on asylum seekers, it is only due to them being registered. Consequently, there are an unknown 
                                                          
136 This was also highlighted at the CEPS conference 2016 as referenced above.  
137 A European Agenda on Migration, (COM (2015) 240 Final). 
138 This includes also a large variety of analysis, such as the one produced by OECD regarding indicative statistics 
on the education levels of asylum seekers and refugees, or on unaccompanied minors.  
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number of cases where such registration was impeded, e.g. in cases where proper border control 
was suspended due to extremely large numbers of immigrants.  
King and Lulle (2016) note that there is still little theory formulated behind asylum, partly 
because as a field of theory, it is still relatively recent, having only emerged as a distinct one 
in the 1980s. Another factor could be that research involving refugees and vulnerable 
populations in general pose particular moral and ethical challenges (Schweitzer and Steel 
2008). Detailed case studies beyond simple counting of numbers require the proper recognition 
of these challenges. 
Regarding the relationship between quantitative and qualitative data, there appears to be a 
disconnection between the two. The quantitative data on asylum seekers and refugees’ stocks 
and flows provide limited information about their demographic characteristics. The qualitative 
data demonstrates refugees and asylum seekers’ motivations and experiences in Europe.  
Although both categories of data are crucial for designing asylum policies, at present, policy-
making relies heavily on the former. Researchers employing qualitative methodology and 
providing potentially important insights for policy find it hard to communicate the results of 
their studies in a way that would attract policy-makers’ attention.  
A team of NGOs139 that have been monitoring asylum procedures, reception conditions and 
detention in 18 European countries for the past three years and produce AIDA140 annual reports 
points to the lack of reliable and accurate statistical data concerning the progress of the CEAS: 
for instance, in how the Dublin Regulation is applied by MS; and concerning the use of 
detention or accelerated procedures. Regarding the latter, the current data on detention of 
asylum seekers is incomplete and inaccurate in many MS, it is often part of general statistical 
information on the detention of third-country nationals in an irregular situation. 
While analysis of statistical data is becoming more and more important in the development of 
the EU’s asylum and border-management policy, these gaps prevent a reliable analysis of real 
and perceived outputs of the EU’s asylum instruments (Mouzourakis et al. 2015).  
There is also a lack of detailed statistics on the cultural and educational background of asylum 
seekers, apart from studies done by individual researchers. Thus, the available material may 
vary in scope and terminology due to individual approaches and selection of sources. 
Incomplete knowledge in this area can give rise to stereotyping and irrational fear of asylum 
seekers. Linked to this is also the public perception of asylum seekers. King highlighted the 
need for more research on public opinion of migration.141 Even though the Eurobarometer does 
do surveys into this perception, its data has limits. The survey results are estimations, the 
accuracy of which depends on the sample size, which tends to be quite small.    
 
 
Approaches and solutions to overcome gaps and challenges 
At the policy level 
                                                          
139 Including the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) 
140 Please refer to Annex 2 regarding the AIDA database. 
141 This was a conclusion made by Professor King at the European Commission DG Research and Innovation's 
recent conference, Understanding and Tackling the Migration Challenge: The Role of Research, 4 – 5th February 
2016  http://ec.europa.eu/research/conferences/2016/migration-challenge/index.cfm 
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In terms of managing the large numbers of asylum seekers responsibly, the EPSC proposes 
that, as an interim solution, the EU should promote the expanded use of humanitarian visas or 
humanitarian admission to grant short-term residence in receiving MS, a proposal promoted  
by UNHCR.  
Concerning the redistribution mechanism of asylum seekers, the EPSC proposes the creation 
of a solidarity framework in which MS have to agree to accept a minimum number of relocated 
refugees. A “solidarity scoreboard” could be created in which the distribution figures are 
determined in relation to a number of criteria. In other debates, any technical solution to 
improve the redistribution mechanism has to be underpinned by a careful consideration of 
socioeconomic and political dimensions of the process to ensure the acceptance of all MS. The 
political dimension has to be tackled through negotiations between the EU and the MS based 
on the recognition of the peculiarities of each country. The socioeconomic considerations 
could, among other things, include an analysis of economic impacts of increased refugee flows 
on the EU host countries (OECD 2015a; Huettl and Leandro 2015; Aiyar et al. 2016) and the 
assessment of current and future skills shortages in the host countries. The DG JRC could 
provide support by modelling different criteria to be associated to the level of absorption of 
each MS.   
Moreover, instead of forcing the asylum seeker to relocate, which in itself is traumatic, new 
ways of involving asylum seekers in determining their destination could be explored (Guild et 
al. 2015). For example, by making sure that special links that go beyond nuclear family ties or 
specific skills of an applicant are taken into account (Mouzourakis et al. 2015). This has already 
been recognised in a recent Council decision142 establishing provisional measures in the area 
of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece. 
As for the private sector, support of its involvement in areas ranging from search and rescue at 
sea to reception and resettlement could be beneficial to CEAS. Taking account of the increased 
accountability and transparency advantages of multi-actor arrangements, the EU's Fundamental 
Rights Agency has recommended an official role for the private sector in resettlement, 
including the possibility to introduce and/or support resettlement applications for individuals 
in need in regions of conflict through private sponsorship schemes (FRA 2015). 
To counter negative profiling, the EPSC proposes a “partnership with an informed public”. 
Given that the migration challenge is particularly prone to stereotyping and resulting social 
tensions, recourse to the facts is needed. 
At the data level 
The authors of the AIDA report (Mouzourakis et al. 2015) suggest that the Commission should 
take steps to ensure that MS comply with their obligations to communicate statistical data in 
accordance with the Migration Statistics Regulation.143 
As highlighted above, if steps are to be made towards the mutual recognition of positive 
decisions throughout the EU, more data are needed on the dynamics of these secondary 
movements to really determine what could be their impact. Data about the effects of refugees’ 
and asylum seekers’ secondary movements could be gathered thought longitudinal panel 
                                                          
142 Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015. The decision takes note that “specific account should 
be given to the specific qualifications and characteristics of the applicants concerned, such as their language 
skills and other individual indications based on demonstrated family, cultural or social ties which could facilitate 
their integration into the MS of relocation.” p.8. 
143 Regulation (EC) No 862/2007. 
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analyses in which data would be collected over time about the same individuals, mapping their 
trajectories. This would be extremely useful to understanding the extent, rationale and effects 
of their secondary movements but also more broadly the specific dynamics of the refugee 
integration.  
The revision of the relocation process would benefit from better data about the structure of the 
refugee population which would go beyond their country of origin, gender and age. More than 
a year after the mass influx of asylum seekers to Europe began, we still lack comparable and 
reliable data on their education, skills and work experience covering asylum seekers and 
recognised refugees in all major EU host countries. The existing data is based on surveys 
carried out in some of the MS (OECD 2015b). One area of DG JRC's contribution might be to 
devise a mechanism of pooling together the available data from different sources (e.g. pre-war 
surveys of Syrian population, smaller-scale surveys of refugees in different EU countries, etc.) 
to quickly produce at least some indicative answers to questions about the composition of 
newly arrived asylum seekers.  
Alongside quality data, a foresight process, facilitated by DG JRC, could help enrich the 
discussions about the necessary steps and options available for achieving an actual common 
European asylum system. For example, back-casting is a participatory foresight method used 
in complex situations where there is a desired future vision (i.e. achieving CEAS) but it is 
unclear how to reach it. It can be particularly effective in the context of a fundamentally 
uncertain future in which unexpected events can dramatically influence the success in reaching 
the desired objectives. Once the objectives are agreed, stakeholders explore alternative 
solutions, different pathways (i.e. scenarios) and identify the bottlenecks. Such a process could 
help create an open space for safe exploration of new and innovative policy solutions and 
provide an opportunity for exchange among diverse stakeholders who are instrumental for the 
success of the CEAS.  
The EPSC suggests the establishment of a European Observatory on Migration, following the 
model of the Migration Observatory of University of Oxford. Data and information on asylum 
seekers needs to be structured in way that can help lead the public debate. This would require 
the establishment of a reliable network of relevant organisations across Europe, at regional or 
European level. An observatory, as part of the envisaged Commission Knowledge Centre, 
would process and evaluate the acquired data and derive credible conclusions and 
recommendations. It would also continuously refine the list of knowledge gaps to which the 
observatory could respond to. 
In response to the EPSC's suggestion to process asylum applications in some third countries, 
DG JRC could perform a particular feasibility study on remote asylum applications, such as 
the possibility for Syrian refugees to apply under CEAS in Lebanon or Turkey. 
DG JRC is currently assisting DG HOME in the revision of EURODAC. It is investigating 
how current practices for the biometric registration of asylum seekers in the context of 
EURODAC can be improved by: addressing fingerprint enrolment; how to overcome the 
problems with data quality and recognisability; as well as the feasibility of alternative biometric 
identifiers such as face and iris.  
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III. Asylum and protection 
b. Additional: Unaccompanied Minors 
Policy and debate 
According to Save the Children, an estimated 26,000 unaccompanied children entered Europe 
in 2015.144 Europol stated that during the last 18-24 months around 10,000 refugee children 
went missing (The Observer 2016), half of them disappeared in Italy alone. Many are feared to 
have fallen into the hands of traffickers, but generally their fate is simply unknown. These 
worrying statistics shed light on the vulnerable situation migrant children are faced with. 
The European Migration Network (EMN 2015) concluded that the number of unaccompanied 
minors (UAMs) seeking asylum in the EU has increased steadily since 2010, reaching a total 
of 24,075 minors in 2014 or 4% of the total number of asylum applicants in 2014. 86% of these 
UAMs are boys; 65% of these minors are between 16 and 17 years old, with only a small 
proportion being less than 14 years old. Furthermore, the number of UAMs who arrive in the 
EU and not seeking asylum is largely unknown. However, data from a few MS indicate that 
they were more than 8,500 in 2013. 
It is crucial to recognise that for both sexes the status of being an UAM renders young people 
particularly vulnerable and exposed to exploitation and that they should receive targeted 
support that follows the ‘best interest of the child’ approach. However, the debate about 
unaccompanied minors should reach beyond the notion of vulnerability and wider and long-
term implications of their growing numbers in Europe should be considered.  
Since 2009, the EU has introduced a number of polices and legislation towards the protection 
of UAMs: the Action Plan on Unaccompanied Minors145 and the Common European Asylum 
System (CEAS),146 as well as the recast of the Asylum Procedures,147 Reception Conditions148 
and Qualification Directives;149 the Dublin III Regulation; 150 and the Anti-Trafficking 
Directive.151 Despite the strengthening of protection, there remain gaps (EMN 2015). Namely, 
that asylum and non-asylum seeking UAMs constitute two different legal categories and thus 
receive discriminatory treatment when entering the EU. This is despite the fact that some 
UAMs leave their countries on humanitarian grounds yet may not provide this information to 
the competent authorities due to trauma or other reasons. 
In addition, asylum systems in many EU MS remain ill-equipped to address the needs of the 
growing number of vulnerable asylum seekers, including UAMs (Mouzourakis et al. 2015; 
Guild et al. 2015; King and Lulle 2016). The EMN highlights a number of deficiencies in this 
regard (EMN 2015): lack of specialist training for police or border guard authorities in 
identifying UAMs nor in safeguarding children; little support for children turning 18 (and thus 
having impact on their legal status in the country); no common EU guidelines on assessing age; 
the need for MS to be better at recording disappearances and at preventing them. The study 
                                                          
144 Save the Children, Response to the IDC report on Syria, 5th January 2016,  
http://www.savethechildren.org.uk/2016-01/response-idc-report-syria 
145 COM(2010)213 final 
146 Discussion of the CEAS is in Chapter III.a. 
147 (2013/32/EU recast).  
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also identified certain gaps in the collaboration and cooperation that takes place between the 
various authorities dealing with UAMs in the MS, during border control and reception stages, 
as well as the follow-up of disappearances. Finally, good practices are not systematically shared 
or developed towards common binding practices.152  
The issue of the rising number of unaccompanied children is tackled  marginally in the 
European Agenda on Migration (the Agenda) with the promise to pay particular attention to 
the needs of vulnerable groups, such as children. The Commission however will develop a 
comprehensive strategy to follow up on the Action Plan on Unaccompanied Minors (2010 -
2014) to cover missing and unaccompanied children.  
Data availability and research gaps 
Annex 2 provides the available statistics on UAMs at international, EU and national level.153 
Immigration authorities, local NGOs and child protection authorities hold data on the total 
number of UAMs, including some figures on those that are not intercepted at  reception centres 
or those who turn 18  years.  
In 2010, the Action Plan on Unaccompanied Minors highlighted the problem of reliable data 
(beyond those collected by Eurostat on registered asylum applications) and looked to stronger 
cooperation between MS, relevant agencies (mainly FRONTEX, EASO and Europol) and the 
Commission to strengthen it. As of 2015, the EMN has detailed information about UAMs, at 
least with respect to those who claim asylum. The existing data is regularly updated by input 
from MS, based on a common template (EMN 2015; EMN 2014a). 
However, the EMN (2015) also revealed a general lack of comprehensive and comparable data 
on the numbers of and outcomes for UAMs receiving some form of protection in the EU. The 
current obligation for MS to provide annual data only on UAMs applying for international 
protection restricts the scope for properly assessing the situation of all UAMs arriving in the 
EU.  
Approaches and solutions to overcome gaps and challenges 
To overcome the mentioned challenges, the EMN (2015) recommends: 
 Systematic collection from MSs of annual disaggregated data on UAMs who are not 
applying for international protection154;  
 Development of a standardised method to record the disappearances of UAMs; 
 Development of common indicators on outcomes for UAMs turning 18 years of age; 
 Elaboration of durable, long term solutions for UAMs, both asylum and non-asylum 
seeking and of monitoring methods to evaluate them. 
                                                          
152 For example, Ireland does not refuse entry to any UAM, regardless whether an application for asylum is filed; 
Spain and The Netherlands have the practice to provide specialised staff who guide UAMs through all necessary 
processes; UK has set up care standards for UAMs/ children, as well as robust monitoring and accountability 
measures. 
153 Some relevant studies to mention on the topic have been produced by OECD (available at 
http://www.oecd.org/migration/Is-this-refugee-crisis-different.pdf), IOM (available at 
https://publications.iom.int/books/unaccompanied-children-move) and IOM / UNICEF (available at 
http://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/press_release/file/IOM-UNICEF-Data-Brief-Refugee-and-Migrant-Crisis-
in-Europe-30.11.15.pdf). 
154 Currently, only seven MSs could provide data on the numbers of UAMs arriving in Europe and not seeking 
asylum. 
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DG JRC could very much contribute to filling certain gaps: 
 Provide support for the further systematic collection of data on UAMs, in particular 
with respect to those not applying for asylum. The data repository could become an 
integral part of the envisaged Knowledge Centre. DG JRC would need to liaise with 
relevant stakeholders and MS authorities. 
 The problem of disappearance could be addressed by more systematic and 
comprehensive immediate (“first 24 hours”) registration of UAMs, in particular with 
fingerprints for later re-identification. According to existing and ongoing research 
of DG JRC,155 the minimum age of 14 years could be significantly reduced. It would 
be necessary to verify the technical feasibility for the expected type and quality of 
data, including some field trials. 
 Further research could be provided on the problem of age assessment in general, 
essential for the identification as “minor”. DG JRC has done already some research 
on age identification in the area of “child sexual abuse online”.156 If robust indicators 
will be developed, intrusive (and expensive) examinations could be avoided. In any 
case, cooperation with medical research stakeholders would need to be established. 
 The sharing of good practices could also be adopted by the envisaged Knowledge 
Centre. Potential relevant stakeholders to be liaised with, apart from MS authorities, 
are NGOs addressing specifically UAMs, e.g. the German Federal Association for 
Unaccompanied Minor Refugees, Unicef or Save the Children. 
  
                                                          
155 For example, wkp 3534, Fostering Accurate Biometric Systems; there is also work being done in the context 
of EURODAC, which is wkp 3769,  Secure and ethical registration of Asylum seekers.  
156 Wkp 560, Authors and Victims Identification of CSA On-Line. 
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IV. Legal migration 
a. Additional: access to and quality of data 
 
Policy and debate 
Regular migration data are essential to understand and inform policy about patterns and 
emerging trends on international migration. Migrants are defined by international statistical 
standards (Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration 1998) as persons 
changing their country of usual residence; and long term migrants are persons who change their 
country of residence for more than one year. It is however both the national and international 
definitions of a 'migrant' that inevitably causes data inconsistences and incompatibilities, as 
discussed further in the data section.  
The matter of being able to access good quality data on regular migrants is not explicitly 
mentioned in European Agenda on Migration (the Agenda)157 except for a short reference to 
the data access from the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR), which "enables 
near real-time sharing of border-related data between members of the network, consisting of 
Schengen countries and Frontex." Despite the lack of reference, it must be recognised that 
having harmonised and consistent data is essential to manage and evaluate the Agenda's 
policies and initiatives.  
In this respect, it is relevant to continue supporting activities aimed at improving the 
accessibility and quality of data on migration. At EU level, there were two such research 
projects funded under the 5th and 6th Framework Programme, respectively, COMPSTAT158,  
PROMINSTAT159 and THESIM160. It would be desirable to further develop these projects to 
address in particular the gaps concerning the comparability and consistency of migration data. 
As a result, this will contribute to better informed policy decisions. 
Data availability and research gaps 
Annex 2 highlights the main sources of migration data at international and national level.  
To complement the data provided in official statistics by international organisations and 
national registers, there are several up-and-coming initiatives to understand migration and 
mobility trajectories (Gerland 2015). This big data can be sourced from phone records; mobile 
phone traffic; email logins; social media; search engines; online banking. While still at its 
infancy in respect of policy applications, big data can offer opportunities to understand better 
general mobility patterns, to provide information on location and to explore social interactions 
of individuals. The main obstacles linked to collecting such data are phone coverage, as well 
as privacy and confidentiality concerns. 
                                                          
157 A European Agenda on Migration, (COM(2015) 240 Final). 
158 Comparing National Data Sources in the Field of Migration and Integration http://research.icmpd.org/research-
home/projects/migration-statistics/compstat/ 
159 Promoting Comparative Quantitative Research in the Field of Migration and Integration in Europe 
http://www.prominstat.eu/drupal/node/64 
160 Towards Harmonised European Statistics on International Migration http://research.icmpd.org/research-
home/projects/migration-statistics/thesim/ 
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The most common research problem encountered is that it is not easy to compare international 
data: "official international migration data collected by national statistics institutes, and 
collated by Eurostat and the United Nations, are not directly comparable due to differences in 
definitions, measurements and data collection procedures" (Sander, Abel, and Bauer 2014) . 
As Lemaitre notes "…the same permit duration threshold may encompass migration flows of 
very different character in different countries. International statistics which ignore or take no 
account of this basic fact will tend to be of questionable comparability" (Lemaitre 2005, 6). 
This is due to a number of reasons, of which some are highlighted here. First, there is confusion 
as to who is a regular migrant. Most definitions of migrants are based on being born in or being 
a citizen of a foreign country or a combination of these two. In some cases, the country of 
residence for a certain period before arrival is considered as the country of origin. The 
differences in migration and citizenship laws can classify a person as a migrant in one country, 
and yet as a non-migrant in another.161 Therefore, this causes inconsistencies and lack of 
comparability in the data. Secondly, different approaches are used in different countries to 
collect the data, an example being data on resident permits.162 
Whilst migrants stocks are more easily available and normally part of population statistics, 
identifying the number of people migrating in a given year between countries is more 
challenging as this requires reconciling data between incoming and outgoing flows and other 
demographic components.  
At the EU level, despite quite comprehensive data available, the understanding and modeling 
of migration patterns and determinants, as it is the case of international trade (Anderson and 
van Wincoop 2003), requires considering not only one-way migration flows but also the wider 
global context to account for all possible destinations and migration routes. 
Another limitation on collecting information about migrant flows is that virtually no 
information on it is available at local level. This is a phenomenon that has been noted, that 
migration forecasts are done at national level, yet the impact is at local level.163 This hinders 
the possibility to analyse the high concentration of migrants in certain areas or towns where 
actually most problems of integration occur.  
Furthermore, there is limited data available on migrants' characteristics such as age, gender, 
education skills, occupation, wages, and other social-economic information. This type of 
information is critical for being able to conduct meaningful policy analysis linked to the 
integration of migrants into labour markets or their social-economic performance. 
Finally, an effective way of analysing whether the migration has been beneficial for the migrant 
or their offspring is via longitudinal data.164 Most longitudinal data on migrants are collected 
                                                          
161 For example, naturalised persons whom may be granted citizenship after a certain period of residence would 
be still classified as migrants under the foreign born approach but not under the citizenship one. 
162 As noted by Eurostat, "certain methodological aspects are not fully harmonised between the reporting 
countries due to different legal or IT systems. Therefore, the data availability may differ between countries and 
the interpretation of the figures resulted should be done with the help of metadata file related to Residence Permits 
Statistics."http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Residence_permits_statistics 
163 This was a conclusion made by Professor Bridget Anderson, of Oxford University, at the European 
Commission DG Research and Innovation's recent conference, Understanding and Tackling the Migration 
Challenge: The Role of Research, 4 – 5th February 2016  
http://ec.europa.eu/research/conferences/2016/migration-challenge/index.cfm 
164 Sometimes referred to as panel data, longitudinal data "track the same sample at different points in time. The 
sample can consist of individuals, households, establishments, and so on. In contrast, repeated cross-sectional 
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with panel surveys or from administrative sources. There are, however, some limitations to 
longitudinal survey data. First, they are costly compared to cross-sectional sample surveys.165  
Secondly, there is also the challenge of panel attrition when respondents from the original 
sample do not respond to subsequent surveys. Thirdly, the issue of sample attrition is expected 
to be more acute in the migrant population, who tend to be more mobile and harder to contact 
in subsequent data collection. 
Approaches and solutions to overcome gaps and challenges 
Harmonisation 
There has been some progress in harmonising the collection of data: adapting national 
definitions to internationally recommended ones, such as the Migration Statistics 
Regulation166. However, the latter has not brought about the expected results (Eurostat 
2014).167 Therefore, additional actions have been taken, such as the discussion on the impact 
of different definitions of migration (Thorogood 2012) and more recently on new forms of 
migration, e.g. in UNECE Task Force on Circular Migration.168 Alternative data sources have 
been explored by the Suitland Working Group.169  
It is recommended that harmonisation of different data sources be promoted in order to generate 
more consistent migration statistics. An example of this attempt was the 6th Framework 
Programme PROMINSTAT project, which conducted in-depth analyses of the scope, quality 
and comparability of statistical data on migration in a wide range of thematic fields (e.g. 
population stocks and general demographic characteristics, migration flows, residence 
permits). DG JRC could be in a good position to take it over.  
DG JRC could also be involved, together with Eurostat, in promoting cooperation to harmonise 
definitions and methodologies on migration data. Since this may require international 
coordination, this activity may be better suited to be carried out by a regional stakeholder such 
as the European Commissions' Knowledge Centre on Migration and Demography. 
Furthermore, there could also be better coordination of the information flow on data needs 
between users and producers of migration statistics. DG JRC could also be in a good position 
to take on such coordination.  
 
                                                          
data, which also provides long-term data, gives the same survey to different samples over time." 
https://www.nlsinfo.org/content/getting-started/what-are-longitudinal-data 
165 "Cross-sectional research involves using different groups of people who differ in the variable of interest but 
share other characteristics, such as socioeconomic status, educational background, and ethnicity." 
http://study.com/academy/lesson/cross-sectional-research-definition-examples-quiz.html 
166 European Commission (2007) European Parliament and the Council of European Union Regulation (EC) No 
862/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 on Community Statistics on Migration 
and International 
Protection and Repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 311/76 on the Compilation of Statistics on Foreign 
Workers, Official Journal, L 199. 
167 As Lemaitre notes, "it has proven to be exceedingly difficult to bring about the required changes to data 
collection and processing in order to produce statistics according to international guidelines, especially since the 
statistics currently produced are generally considered adequate for national needs" (Lemaitre 2005, 6) 
168 For terms of reference, see 
http://www.unece.org/?id=32321 
169 For more information, see http://www.unece.org/stats/groups/suitland/suitland.html. 
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Production of migration data 
It is recommended that such production should be based on different sources not only on 
exhaustive compilation of records from primary data sources, but also on estimates (outcomes 
of probabilistic statistical models) from sampling surveys. 
Quantifying migration flows 
Concerning the difficulty about quantifying migration flows at the international level, this issue 
has been addressed by researchers by reconciling migration flows with stock data through 
statistical models. For example, the Integrated Modelling of European Migration (Raymer et 
al. 2012) is a Bayesian model to correct inconsistencies on the availability definitions and 
quality of official reporting systems. The model focuses on migration flows between the EU 
MS and EFTA countries between 2002 and 2008. The Institute of Applied Systems Analysis 
(IIASA) (Abel and Sander 2014) has developed a model to estimate the global bilateral 
migration flows required to match the sequential stock tables published by the United Nations 
for the period 1990-2010.170 DG JRC could strengthen its partnership with IIASA on migration 
and demography analyses.  
Longitudinal surveys 
Regarding the limitations of longitudinal surveys, alternatives exist. Cross-sectional data 
sources comprising immigration and socio-economic information are generally more available 
than longitudinal data sources. However, even in the absence of longitudinal data, the 
longitudinal perspective can be achieved: (1) by using cross-sectional data from census or 
surveys which ask the same question at different stages; (2) by asking retrospective questions 
about how and when a characteristic changed through time. When the same socio-economic 
concepts are repeatedly measured in cross-sectional data, indicators can be presented to 
illustrate trends and patterns or change between time periods, although straightforward 
causative interpretations of associations are incorrect in such cases.  
Another alternative already applied by some countries is the creation of longitudinal data 
through data linkage, such as linking different administrative data to population registers (e.g. 
Norway and Denmark), or linkage between censuses and administrative data sources (e.g. 
Canada and Australia). Thanks to these  methods, socio-economic indicators for migrants can 
be derived over time (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 2015).  
Due to limited information on the socio-economic characteristics of migrants, it is 
recommended that longitudinal studies are conducted also to provide such data.171 This would 
be important not only for top-level aggregated figures but also for the whole set of 
disaggregated data (Eurostat 2014).   
                                                          
170 See Annex for details on methodology. 
171 Examples of such single country studies are the United Kingdom Household Panel 
(https://www.understandingsociety.ac.uk/about/ethnicity) and the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) 
(http://www.diw.de/en/diw_01.c.422167.en/iab_soep_migration_sample_just_started.html).  
           
59 
IV. Legal migration 
b. Additional: Demography 
Policy and debate 
According to the UN World Population Prospects,172 the world's population is set to rise beyond 
9.6 billion by 2050 and the population of the least developed countries is projected to surpass 
the population of the more developed regions by 2035. This demographic change will be 
shaped by decreasing birth rates and increasing life expectancy, together contributing to 
demographic ageing at a global scale.  
The EU's demographic changes also mean that the proportion of workers supporting those in 
retirement will halve from an average of four today, to just two, by 2060 (European 
Commission 2015). Whilst Europe may experience a declining population, Africa's will be on 
the rise and it is projected that more migrants than before will come from this continent.173 
Replacement migration is known as the international migration that needs to take place to offset 
a declining population as a whole (including the working population).174 This replacement may 
be necessary to meet the EU's demographic challenges.  
A topic that is fiercely debated is ageing and its impact on public policy. Currently, the EU 
population is rapidly ageing and the working age population is expected to decline at an annual 
average rate of 0.4% over the coming four decades (European Commission 2015b). Studies 
have shown that in developed countries, it costs more to support over 65 year olds than to 
support a person younger than 20.175 However, cognitive decline is shifting to later in life, in 
particular for better educated people who remain mentally and physically active.176 Therefore, 
one public policy question concerns whether the retirement age should be extended. Policies 
on retirement will also have an impact on migration policy. 
These trends will have major implications on public spending, particularly of health and 
residential care. International migration and internal mobility will thus become increasingly 
important in addressing economic convergence and growing demographic disparities.177  
At the EU level, the European Agenda on Migration (the Agenda) does not consider the topic 
of demography, even though it is clear that migration will have an impact on demographic 
trends and vice versa. However, there are initiatives amongst the DG services e.g. DG HOME 
has recently established a migration information hub which is looking at demographic trends.  
 
                                                          
172 http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/ 
173 As noted in the EUI Forum on Migration, Citizenship and Demography, 4 – 5th February 2016, 
http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/eui-forum-migration-citizenship-demography-follow-up/ 
174 'Replacement Migration: Is It a Solution to Declining and Ageing Populations?' 
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/migration/migration.htm 
175 The UN DESA refers to a number of studies, albeit they are from the 1990s. 
176 As noted in the presentation, 'Europe's demographic future: 4 Dimensional scenarios for assessing the impacts 
of migration, by Professor Wolfgang Lutz, EUI Forum on Migration, 2016. 
177 For a more comprehensive list of demographic changes on an international scale, please refer to UN 
Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, 'Replacement Migration: Is It a Solution to 
Declining and Ageing Populations?' 2000, 
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/migration/migration.htm 
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Data availability and research gaps 
Annex 2 provides detail of data collection at both EU and international level relating to 
demographic trends, ageing and migration. Studies from Commission DGs are also mentioned. 
Full demographic data are not readily available on an international level, however the 
Population Division of the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs does publish global 
population estimates and projections. Hypothetical population projections, however, are 
inherently uncertain and one of the main challenges is transmitting the meaning of uncertainty 
to lay audiences. Although different methods exist of depicting and measuring uncertainty, 
such as alternative scenarios and probabilistic models; even when choosing a central scenario 
as "best guess" for future trends, it is important to communicate that this is only one possible 
outcome, and any prediction of the future is uncertain. Smart policies should therefore 
anticipate multiple possible outcomes.  
Another important data source comes from OECD reports178. Data from non-OECD countries 
is much more difficult to retrieve due to weaknesses in institutional and organisation resources, 
as well as in infrastructure. Instead of data collection being done by authorities (the exception 
being border authorities), it is usually done by indirect actors, such as NGOs and civil society 
organisations. 
Population data is not collected at EU level. Demographic data is collected by MS, which is 
sent to Eurostat for consolidation and to ensure that data is comparable. What is also missing 
is the territorial data at provincial level, which would be useful to study the migration impact 
at local level. In addition to this, a broader view on demographic trends which sees Europe as 
interconnected with other parts of the world (Africa and the Middle East) is necessary. 
Approaches and solutions to overcome gaps and challenges 
The complexity of the demographic challenge has been recognised by many leading 
organisations.179  Demographic data is collected on a quantitative basis, and there has been 
little work done in analysing the meaning of trends from a more qualitative perspective. 
However, the question persists as to whether quantitative approaches alone can bring the 
desired future of sustainable human development? The answer perhaps lies in the 1994 Cairo 
International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) and its Programme of 
Action, adopted by 179 Governments. It agreed that the well-being of individuals, rather than 
numerical population targets, should be the goal of the global population agenda. Therefore, a 
multi-disciplinary approach towards demography is necessary. 
Social welfare, health, pensions, labour market and education policies are still very much 
shaped by current thinking and assumptions about the demographic challenges we are facing 
today, rather than what we will face in the future. Policy-thinking needs to be reshaped and 
conditioned to incorporate demographic trend analysis when planning for longer-term and 
                                                          
178Such as the International Migration Outlook report, an annual publication that analyses recent developments in 
migration movements and policies in its countries; or the Society at a Glance report, a biennial report that provides 
internationally comparable data on demography and family characteristics, employment and wealth, mobility and 
housing, health status, social expenditure, subjective well-being, social cohesion, and other social measures. 
179 For example, by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA), the Stockholm Resilience 
Center at the Stockholm University, the Earth Institute at Columbia University, the Sustainable Development 
Solutions Network (SDSN) and the Alpbach-Laxenburg Group, who have jointly launched the initiative "The 
World in 2050".  
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resilient policies, including that of migration policy. An EU population-migration centre, which 
provides projections on demography across the EU, looking into trends and expanding data to 
include employment and social indicators could be promoted in partnership with leading 
research centres (e.g. IIASA). 
In terms of the data, a number of recommendations are made:  
 Increase the quality of survey data on fertility and mortality, and improve the quantity 
and the quality of data available on migration both within countries and across national 
borders; 
 Improve not just the methods of collecting data but also the access to it: there is ample 
room to improve access to information through partnerships with NGOs and 
researchers, and collaboration with governments;  
 Combine a human capital approach with demographic data collection in order to shift 
the demographic debate to one that is beneficial rather than a threat; 
 Use anticipation exercises that incorporate demographic trends (combining qualitative 
and quantitative analysis i.e. modelling and foresight exercises). DG JRC could play a 
valuable role in undertaking such analysis. 
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IV. Legal migration 
c. Visa Policy 
Policy and debate 
A visa is the authorisation or decision of a MS required for transit or entry for an intended 
stay180 in that MS or in several MS,181 while a resident permit is any authorisation valid for at 
least 3 months issued by the authorities of a  MS allowing a third country national to stay 
legally on its territory182. Third country nationals who want to stay longer183 than three months 
need to obtain a national long-stay visa and/or a resident permit / work permit, according to the 
legislation in that MS (EMN 2013).  
The main objective of having a visa policy is to manage the trade-offs between facilitating 
cross-border movement on the one hand, and controlling such movement on the other. The visa 
policy is thus considered as a key government instrument to exercise selectivity on the mobility 
of people (Malmstrom 2014; EMN 2013) and an ‘influential instrument’ for a forward-looking 
policy on mobility.184 
Although, harmonisation of visa policies has been on the EU policy agenda since the early 
1990s, this is actually turning out to be a difficult process, as individual MS face different 
national realities and have different interests. Both aspects of the EU visa policy (for short and 
long term visa) are being debated actively. The benefits of a liberal visa policy are usually 
associated with economic growth,185 and thus visa restrictions may have a detrimental effect 
on the economy and for the individual, reducing the flow of travellers and therefore the benefits 
associated with the freedom of movement (Neumayer 2010). On the other hand, a too liberal 
visa policy may lead to a high increase of migration flows, which may negatively affect labour 
markets and public finances, incite social tension, or put national security at risk.186  
Short term visa (Schengen visa)187 
The European Agenda on Migration (the Agenda)188 acknowledges that this visa policy needs 
to be modernised. Making travel easier for legitimate travellers should foster the EU’s 
attractiveness and increase demand for tourism, as well as cultural, educational and business 
services in the EU. 
                                                          
180 With a short term visa the person is allowed to travel to any or all of the 25 Schengen area countries for a 
maximum of three months within a six-month period. 
181 EMN Glossary.  
182 Eurostat (2016) Residence permits statistics, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Residence_permits_statistics 
183 For circular migration and mobility partnerships, see the Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions of 16 
May 2007 on circular migration and mobility partnerships between the European Union and third countries 
(COM(2007) 248). 
184 COM 2011 Commission’s Communication on the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM); The 
EU immigration portal provides practical information about immigration to the EU for third country citizens: 
http://ec.europa.eu/immigration/eu-immigration-portal-home_en. 
185 As highlighted in President Juncker’s ten priorities, http://www.eesc.europa.eu/resources/docs/jean-claude-
juncker---political-guidelines.pdf 
186 European Commission, COM (2014) 165 final, ‘A smarter visa policy for economic growth’ 
187 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/visa-policy/index_en.htm 
188 A European Agenda on Migration, (COM(2015) 240 Final). 
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Some critical elements related to the Schengen visa are (Malmstrom 2014): 
 Cumbersome, lengthy and costly visa procedures; 
 No fast track procedure189 for 'known' applicants, who have been granted a visa in the 
past (and not misused it), to go through an easier application process for family visits; 
 Lack of a visa or another type of permit that allows travellers to stay more than 90 days 
in any 180-day period in the Schengen area; 
 Differences across MS in the implementation of the Schengen visa.190 
 
Long term visa 
The four main reasons for MS issuing long-term visas are: employment, education & training, 
family reunification and other reasons191 (Eurostat 2016). The main reason for first residence 
permits issued in the EU is for family reasons.192  
Coming to the EU as a highly-qualified worker can happen through the participation in 
programs, such as Horizon 2020 and the Blue Card. 193 As with the need to modernise the 
Schengen visa, the Commission acknowledged that the Blue Card was not as successful as 
hoped194 due to many reasons, such as MS having preference over their own national schemes, 
or different attractiveness of the EU MS or deficiencies in transposing the Directive195. These 
considerations have guided the draft of a new proposal that should be finalised by 2016.  
In addition, one of the objectives of the EU in education is to promote Europe as a centre of 
excellence for studies196. Generally, the international education and training programs are 
considerably more successful in attracting skills and talents from third countries than highly-
skilled employment programs. Erasmus+197, mentioned in the Agenda, is one of the EU 
programmes in these fields for the period 2014-2020 that includes a strong international 
dimension (European Commission 2016). The proposal on the Directive on Students and 
Researchers198 aims to provide these groups new mobility and opportunities in the EU.  
                                                          
189 E.g. waiving the requirement to lodge the application in person and to submit certain/all supporting documents. 
190DG Migration and Home Affairs, having recognised this, set up a public consultation on improving procedures 
for obtaining short stay Schengen visas.  http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-is-new/public-
consultation/2013/consulting_0025_en.htm 
191 Including stay without the right to work, international protection, etc… 
192 29.5% of total number of first residence permits in 2014 (Eurostat).  
193 http://ec.europa.eu/immigration/who-does-what/more-information/the-future-of-the-eu-migration-policy-
general-context-and-new-initiatives_en;   
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/legal-migration/work/index_en.htm 
194 In the first two years after its introduction, only 16,000 Blue Cards were issued, which corresponds to 0.000067 
of the EU labour force (240.2 million). Moreover, more than 80% of all Blue Cards (13,000) were issued by a 
single MS, Germany (European Commission 2015c, 15).  
195 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation of 
Directive 2009/50/EC on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purpose of highly 




197 Regulation (EU) No 1288/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 
establishing 'Erasmus+': the Union programme for education, training, youth and sport . 
198 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the conditions of entry and residence 
of third-country nationals for the purposes of research, studies, pupil exchange, remunerated and unremunerated 
training, voluntary service and au pairing (Recast) COM(2013) 151 final, 
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The Agenda mentions the effect of a clear and well implemented framework for legal pathways 
to entrance by reducing push factors towards irregularity. Nonetheless it leaves little or no 
space for other type of employment rather than for highly-skilled individuals, not 
acknowledging the analysis done in 2004 regarding the link between the existence of legal 
migration entry channels and the increase of irregular migration199 .  
In addition, the EU visa policy has a strong foreign policy dimension, reflecting and impacting 
on international relations. The Agenda does not mention the fact that visas actually play a role 
in EU sanctions against third countries. It has been argued that sometimes visas remain the 
EU’s sole offensive instrument deployed in diplomacy.200  
Data availability and research gaps 
Annex 2 outlines where the data for each type of visa comes from.  
Currently, the Schengen visa data collected by separate consulates are merged together and 
made available at the European level. However, there is no exchange of information between 
consulates meaning that before deciding upon a visa application, a MS "A" is not in 
consultation with MS "B" about reasons for a potentially declined visa by MS "B". Without a 
harmonised application of general legislative provisions, ‘visa shopping’ (i.e. the practice of 
making further visa applications to other EU States when a first application has been 
rejected),201 and a different treatment of visa applicants in different MS cannot be prevented. 
Also, information about Blue Card applicants and issuance are not shared among the MS202, 
resulting in missing out on best practice and improvement of the system.  
There is little or no systematically collected information about individuals from third countries 
with education and training visas issued for participation in programmes, such as, Erasmus+, 
after they have completed the education or training programme in the EU. This has implications 
since it is not understood how such programmes help in career development. It has also been 
highlighted that there is little information regarding definitive data on number of students who 
overstay their visas, as this was certainly the case for the UK (The Migration Observatory 
2011).  
In relation to visa sanctions, the criteria for their implementation and their impacts (political, 
social, economic, military, etc.) are largely unknown. By understanding their impacts, the EU 
could implement more targeted and efficient measures.  
Approaches and solutions to overcome gaps and challenges 
In terms of the Schengen visa, it is suggested that in order to manage at best the above 
mentioned trade-offs, the EU visa policy needs to be sufficiently liberal and selective at the 
                                                          
199 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Study on the links between legal and illegal migration. 
COM(2004) 412 final   





202 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation of 
Directive 2009/50/EC on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purpose of highly 
qualified employment, COM(2014)287 final, 22.5.2014, Brussels.   
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same time. Currently, the criteria used for the assessing such benefits and risks are not 
systematically exchanged, harmonised, or made transparently available between MS. A more 
streamlined and disciplined approach would seem to be needed.  
In order to appreciate the benefits to career development that an education and training permits 
can provide, data on this could be collected. Whilst such data cannot be captured through 
statistical sources (due to privacy issues), they could be collected on the basis of voluntary 
surveys, which perhaps DG JRC could be involved in.  
As for the employment channel, success of a policy instrument depends amongst others on its 
implementation. For example, in order to identify the impacts of implemented visa sanctions, 
a study assessing them could be carried out by DG JRC. It would require the use of 
macroeconomic models. First, a baseline without visa sanctions would be simulated, then a 
policy scenario with visa sanctions would be constructed and implemented in the adopted 
model. By simulating a counterfactual scenario with visa sanctions and comparing it with the 
baseline trajectory, the true impact of visa sanctions (difference between the simulated baseline 
and the counterfactual scenario) will be identified.   
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IV. Legal migration 
d. Effective integration 
Policy and debate 
Despite being constantly referred to when discussing the positon of immigrants in the host 
societies, integration is understood both as a process and an end-result. Moreover, there is a 
wide range of opinions as to what roles should immigrants and host societies play in this 
process and who is responsible for the end-result. In academic debates, relations between 
integration and other less commonly-used concepts of assimilation, multiculturalism and 
super-diversity are far from being agreed upon (for a brief summary of these debates see King 
and Lulle 2016, 54–55; European Forum for Migration Studies 2006). For the purpose of the 
following discussion, integration is understood as a process of becoming an equal part of 
society. 
Integration is a multidimensional process. It is most often measured through labour market, 
political, educational and housing outcomes of immigrants. However, there is now an 
understanding that other dimensions such as cultural integration, social capital (in a sense of 
trust and the quality of social relations) and self-identification of immigrants are also crucial 
for understanding its dynamic and its interconnected nature. For example, failure in one field 
such as housing or education can jeopardise progress in others. Moreover, in recent decades 
there has been more scholarly and political interest in the so-called second generation 
immigrants (Eurostat 2011a), especially as little internationally comparable statistical material 
has been gathered on the second generation. 203 
In addition, temporal aspects of integration are crucial. In other words, it takes a long time for 
integration as an end-result to demonstrate itself and it takes different amounts of time for 
immigrants with different starting points (they migrate for reasons such as international 
protection, family, work or study) (Eurostat 2011a). The challenge for assessing integration 
outcomes in Europe as a whole is to take into account both the diverging conditions for 
integration in different MS and the diversity of the immigrant population.  
Although there is a common belief that too many immigrants cannot be effectively integrated, 
existing data analysed by the OECD shows that integration challenges do not necessarily 
increase with the share of immigrants in the population (OECD and European Union 2015). 
Nonetheless, the level of acceptance of immigration by the general public is susceptible to 
dramatic shifts in response to media events. However, attitudes toward immigrants vary 
throughout Europe and differ substantially depending on the socio-economic background of 
the immigrant and of the native person. For example, Europeans with tertiary education, who 
are younger and employed, showed more positive views towards migration (IOM 2015a; 
OECD and European Union 2015). 
One of the most studied aspects of migrant’s integration is related to their inclusion in the 
labour market. It appears that migrants are more likely to have a lower employment rate than 
their native-born counterparts (Eurostat 2011a; King and Lulle 2016; OECD and European 
Union 2015). Better-educated, third-country nationals in the EU have greater difficulty finding 
a job than both their EU peers and other lower-skilled immigrants. They are 50% more likely 
to be overqualified for the job they are doing than the host-country nationals (Eurostat 2011a; 
                                                          
203 As noted by the project, 'The Integration of the European Second Generation' 
http://www.tiesproject.eu/index9ed2.html?lang=en 
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OECD and European Union 2015). This contrasts with immigrants' overall higher employment 
rates in OECD countries as a whole (OECD and European Union 2015), implying that 
conditions in Europe may be particularly difficult for migrants' labour market integration. This 
is heightened by problems with recognising foreign qualifications, leading to unequal treatment 
in the labour market (Heddleston, Niessen, and Tjaden 2013). However, there is an agreement 
that over time, labour market outcomes of immigrants converge with that of the native-born 
(Eurostat 2011a). 
When it comes to the European Agenda on Migration (the Agenda)204, it appears that the 
discussion on integration is quite limited because integration policies are primarily within the 
competence of MS. The Agenda mostly consists of financial and other forms of support to 
national governments, local authorities and civil society. Nevertheless, the Commission at the 
end of 2015 launched an internal Inter-service Group on the integration of third country 
nationals, and is planning a related Communication in the second quarter of 2016.205 
Concerning healthcare services, there has been criticism of the Common European Asylum 
System (CEAS)206 and how different levels of its implementation have left gaps in access to 
healthcare for asylum seekers.207  
Data availability and research gaps 
Measuring migration integration 
In general, migrant integration can be measured in terms of labour market participation; 
education; political participation; access to citizenship; family reunification; health and the 
level of experienced discrimination208. More description on the databases can be found in 
Annex 2. Eurostat annually monitors the results of integration policies in the areas of 
employment, education, social inclusion and active citizenship, known as the EU Zaragoza 
indicators209, drawing on surveys such as the EU Labour Force Survey (EU LFS)210 and the 
EU Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU SILC)211. However, there are limitations to 
the statistics collected by Eurostat because of the survey data. Both the EU-LFS and EU-SILC 
target the whole resident population and not specifically migrants. Issues concerning coverage 
of survey data arise in the following cases:212 
                                                          
204 A European Agenda on Migration, (COM(2015) 240 Final). 
205 The European Agenda for the Integration of third-country nationals was published in 2011: COM (2011) 455 
final.This initiative builds upon the 2011 one. 
206 CEAS is discussed in Chapter III.a. 
207 These were highlighted by health experts in the session, 'Health and Migration' at the European Commission 
DG Research and Innovation's recent conference, Understanding and Tackling the Migration Challenge: The Role 
of Research, 4 – 5th February 2016  http://ec.europa.eu/research/conferences/2016/migration-
challenge/index.cfm 
208 Migrant Integration Policy Index  http://www.mipex.eu/ 
209 The Zaragoza Declaration was approved at the informal Justice and Home Affairs Council in June 2010, which 
called upon the Commission to undertake a pilot project to examine the indicators, to analyse the significance of 
the defined indicators taking into account the national contexts, the background of diverse migrant populations 
and the different migration and integration policies of MSs and to report on the availability and quality of the data 
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 Recently arrived migrants: They are missing from the sample in every host country, 
resulting in under-coverage of the actual migrant population in the EU-LFS and EU-
SILC; 
 Collective households213: the EU-SILC only covers private households. Persons living 
in collective households and in institutions for asylum seekers and migrant workers are 
excluded from the target population. This also results in under-coverage of migrants in 
the survey; 
 Response from migrant population: a significant disadvantage of the surveys is that 
a high percentage of the migrant population do not respond to them. This may be due 
to language difficulties, misunderstanding of the purpose of each survey, difficulty in 
communicating with an interviewer, and/or fear of a possible negative impact on their 
right to remain in the country after participating in them. 
 Sample size: given the nature of the EU-LFS and EU-SILC as sample surveys, these 
cannot fully capture the characteristics of migrants in EU MS with very low migrant 
populations. 
 Information on country of citizenship and country of birth: this information is asked 
from all persons in private households sampled in the EU-LFS, whilst in the EU-SILC, 
this information is collected only for those aged 16 and over, resulting in an under-
estimation of the number of migrants by country of citizenship and country of birth. 
 
Employment 
Proper evaluation of the convergence process depicted above is difficult due to the lack of 
longitudinal data to support this opinion, since very few employment surveys use representative 
samples of immigrants over long periods of time (OECD and European Union 2015).  
Ethnic entrepreneurs are a potentially significant group for which Europe-wide comparative 
data is missing. Entrepreneurial opportunities are important for integration, job creation and 
social cohesion (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions 
2015). However, company registers seldom provide data on entrepreneurs’ nationality, and 
even more rarely on their country of birth. It is therefore impossible to assess the scale of the 
sector and to compare the creation of new business from country to country (OECD and 
European Union 2015). 
Education and social inclusion 
The discussion below will highlight more explicitly the general insufficient information on 
migrants' use of public services. Generally speaking, there is little information about the impact 
of immigration on the use of public services (especially about the value of migrants’ 
contributions to the provision of public services and costs), which includes also fiscal effects 
of immigration (The Migration Observatory 2011). It must be noted, however, that the 
references here concern the UK mainly, demonstrating the limited amount of information 
available in this area.  
i) Housing 
                                                          
213 Collective households or institutional households (as opposed to private households) are, for instance: 
hospitals, old people’s homes, residential homes, prisons, military barracks, religious institutions, boarding houses 
and workers’ hostels (Eurostat Statistics Explained). 
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Little has been done on the ways immigration directly and indirectly impacts house prices, 
rents, and social housing at national and local levels (The Migration Observatory 2011). 
ii) Education 
Concerning higher education, there is a lack of data on the number of migrant students; those 
who have over-stayed, their contribution to net-migration over the long term, and the impact 
of foreign students on the higher education sector and labour market (The Migration 
Observatory 2011); As for primary and secondary school, there is insufficient cross-country, 
comparable information about the impact of immigration on the use and provision of school 
services and very limited information on the number of migrants’ children in schools. This is 
because enrolment data does not often record nationality, country of birth, or immigration 
status (The Migration Observatory 2011). 
Although cognitive skills are measured in the OECD’s Programme for International 
Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIAAC)214, no information about non-cognitive 
competencies like the ability to interact and communicate with others, or to persevere when 
performing different tasks, is available (OECD and European Union 2015). 
iii) Health 
The FRA report (FRA, 2013) notes that data on ethnicity is hardly collected systematically in 
national surveys or their samples are not large enough to allow for the further break down of 
data. If one looks at more international data, such as the latest OECD report which highlights 
migrants' access to services (OECD and European Union 2015), there are some limitations, 
such as the surveys about medical treatment at national level are small; information is of limited 
validity, there is no information available about refugees health status or emergency cases. 
Other data challenges,215 have been identified as: the importance to focus on the health needs 
of the full length of the migration trajectory (immediate, medium and long-term needs); to look 
at patterns of health in countries of origin; to undertake epidemiological field work, as well as 
participatory research and scenarios in order to plan the (changing) health care system due to 
migration. Finally more research is needed in what the implications of migration will be on EU 
health care systems and its cost. 
iv) Active citizenship  
Active citizenship, meaning civic and political participation, is one of the indicators measuring 
effective integration. However, reliable and comparable data on this indicator is scarce, in part 
because this is quite difficult to measure for migrants especially until the moment they acquire 
political rights. There does not appear to be any database or survey which properly collects 
information about this. Eurostat only reports data on the number of persons who acquired 
citizenship and the number of resident third-country nationals (Eurostat 2011b).The European 
Social Survey (ESS)216 could provide a potential data source but this survey is not designed to 
measure such an indicator among immigrants.   
                                                          
214 See Annex for further information. 
215 These were highlighted by health experts in the session, 'Health and Migration' at the European Commission 
DG Research and Innovation's recent conference, Understanding and Tackling the Migration Challenge: The Role 
of Research, 4–5th February 2016  http://ec.europa.eu/research/conferences/2016/migration-challenge/index.cfm 
216 http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/ 
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However, information about the ways in which young people are prepared to undertake their 
roles as citizens, as well as about students’ knowledge and understanding of concepts and issues 
related to citizenship, for both immigrant and native students are provided by the IEA 
International Civic and Citizenship Study (ICCS).217 Nevertheless, the migrant sample tends to 
be small.  
Approaches and solutions to overcome gaps and challenges 
Measuring integration and best practice 
Some recommendations with respect to data sources (Heddleston et al 2013) include increasing 
sample sizes in all the surveys which measure integration: European Union Labour Force 
Survey (EU-LFS), European Union Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), 
OECD surveys such as Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA)218, Survey of 
Adult Skills (PIAAC),219  European Social Survey (ESS),220  and showing uncertainty while 
presenting estimates based on sample surveys (e.g. confidence intervals). 
As stated at the beginning of this section, integration is a process of becoming an equal part in 
society. For this to succeed, accommodation of both immigrants and host societies is required 
and it needs to be acknowledged that the receiving society has much more power over this 
process (European Forum for Migration Studies 2006). The funding from the European 
Commission as mentioned in the Agenda can play a big role.  
More specifically, there are already a number of platforms where best integration practices are 
being shared (e.g. the European Migration Network, the European website on Integration 
(EWSI)221 or Migrant Integration Policy Index222) and MS could take stock from these. 
Financial support to MS to improve integration could be enhanced by the rigorous and 
systematic assessment of the impacts and effectiveness of various integration measures and 
integration actors across the EU.  
Although numerous studies have emphasised the high integration potential from migrants 
organising themselves (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working 
Conditions 2015), the integration programmes in the EU are still largely run based on an 
asymmetric model of representatives of the host society providing assistance to immigrants. 
As flows of immigrants are likely to grow in the near future, more could be done in terms of 
engaging the industry and the private sector in the integration process. 
Access to services 
A proposed approach to assess the impact of immigration on the use of public services, is to 
use longitudinal data where repeated measures of the same participants are needed. More 
information could be gained from cross-sectional studies. However, both the challenges and 
feasibility of using cross-sectional and longitudinal surveys have to be considered (see Chapter 
IV.a). 
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IOM223 has recently carried out a review on data collection mechanisms and referral systems 
along the different phases of the reception process in the southern EU MS, including in 
open/closed centres and border facilities, highlighting the need for standardised health 
assessments and statistics both between countries and within the same country. In addition, it 
is conducting a thematic study on the cost analysis of non-provision of healthcare to migrants 
aimed at covering a lack of information related to the impact of migrants in accessing national 
health assistance.  
With regards to health, it is noted that DG SANTE is trying to address the challenges 
highlighted in (iii) with a recent call on migration and health.224 The aim of the call is not to 
provide direct healthcare to incoming refugees and migrants, but rather to support MS activities 
in the provision of health care, in particular at the hotspots where refugees and other migrants 
are registered.  
From the DG JRC perspective, it could help set up a European network of national public health 
authorities for the standardised collection, analysis, and synthesis of information and data of 
refugee and immigrant health at the European level as well as create partnerships (with IOM 
for example) to promote further analysis on the integration of migrants in the social systems 
and the subsequent impact.   
                                                          
223 http://equi-health.eea.iom.int/. 
224 http://ec.europa.eu/health/programme/events/ev_20151030_en.htm 
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IV. Legal migration 
e. Maximising the development benefits of countries of origin 
Policy and debate 
The migration-development nexus is not always an easy relationship: "Understanding the 
migration-development nexus is bedevilled both by conflicting empirical advice and by 
competing theoretical and ideological positions," (King and Lulle 2016, 93). The positive and 
negative views regarding this nexus since the 1960s are: the brain gain for receiving countries, 
brain-drain for sending ones; filling skills shortages in receiving countries, yet also driving 
down wages and taking jobs from the local population; remittances helping develop receiving 
countries. 
It is only recently that migration has been formally recognised as positively contributing to 
development. Indeed, the 'migration-development nexus' only gained popularity in 2000 (King 
and Lulle 2016). It is now generally accepted that migration and development have a symbiotic 
relationship where migration is seen, first, as a developmental tool, whereby tackling “root 
causes” of migration such as poverty and unemployment can prevent migration at the source; 
and secondly, migration networks and diasporas that provide remittances and a transfer of skills 
and knowledge can also be positive factors in advancing development.225  
The key topics in the migration – development nexus that have driven the debate as of 2005 
are the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM), the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) and remittances.  
Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (e.g. mobility partnerships, readmission 
agreements) 
Since 2005, the GAMM acts as the overarching framework of the EU external migration and 
asylum policy.226 GAMM's agenda has four objectives: to better organise legal migration, and 
foster well-managed mobility; to prevent and combat irregular migration, and eradicate 
trafficking in human beings; to maximise the development impact of migration and mobility; 
and finally, to promote international protection, and enhance the external dimension of asylum. 
In an attempt to take a more managed and global approach to migration, the EU has proposed 
dialogues and negotiated mobility partnerships with migrant-sending countries since 2008. 
Some of the elements related to development are the support of voluntary return, sustainable 
reintegration of returning migrants or a tailored circular migration scheme. Mobility 
partnerships aim to address this issue, but  have been faced with several challenges such as the 
lack of uniformity in implementation and full MS participation.227 Overall, migrant-sending 
countries often have different views than the EU as to what the root causes of migration might 
be and what the developmental needs are.  
                                                          
225 The recent JRC Technical 2015 Report on ‘The EU Blue Card: Managing Migration Challenges and 
Opportunities for Developing Countries’ analyses channels of maximising the development in countries of origin 
such as the transfer of knowledge from receiving to sending countries, JRC94323, EUR 27080 EN  
226 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/international-affairs/global-approach-to-
migration/index_en.htm 
227 European Commission, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 'Report on the implementation of the Global 
Approach to Migration and Mobility2012-2013',http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/e-
library/documents/policies/international-affairs/general/docs/gamm_implementation_report_2012_2013_en.pdf 
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Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 
The 2030 Agenda on SDGs228 includes migration for the first time in a global development 
framework, where migration is mentioned in 7 targets: student mobility, trafficking, workers' 
rights, managed migration policies, resilience to shocks, disaster risk and management, and 
data disaggregation. Implementing and monitoring the new Agenda will be challenging, partly 
because of its universality: it applies to all countries at all levels of development. Both the 
quantitative and qualitative data on indicators and targets are currently being developed (each 
country choses the indicators best suited to them to track its achievement of sustainable 
development). Therefore, success will require international coordination and collaboration, 
which in turn requires accountability and monitoring at the international level (de la Mothe, 
Espey, and Schmidt-Traub 2015).  
Remittances 
Remittances are private transfers from the migrant who is considered a resident of a host 
country to recipients in the migrant's country of origin (The World Bank 2011). Remittances 
have been traditionally associated with financial transfers but they can also be in the form of 
goods (consumer products, medicines). Within the last couple of decades, social remittances 
have become the subject of research (Levitt 1998), and they are defined as ideas, values, beliefs; 
intra-family responsibility; principles of age and gender equality; and community participation.  
Remittance flows could improve access to wider financial services for migrants and remittance 
recipients; however the link between these two is in need of being strengthened. Remittances 
are sometimes expensive to send back, thus removing legal barriers and cost barriers to sending 
remittance could significantly reinforce the impact that these flows have on development in 
countries of origin. One of the targets of the SDGs is reduce to less than 3% the transaction 
costs of migrant remittances and eliminate remittance corridors with costs higher than 5%, by 
2030.229 The European Agenda on Migration (the Agenda)230 makes it a priority to facilitate 
cheaper, faster and safer remittance transfers. 
In general, the Agenda recognises a need for "enhanced coherence between different policy 
sectors, such as development cooperation, trade, employment, foreign and home affairs 
policies,"231 and the fact that the EU must "continue engaging beyond its borders and 
strengthen cooperation with its global partners, address root causes, and promote modalities 
of legal migration that foster circular growth and development in the countries of origin and 
destination"232.  
The Agenda, however, does not specifically take into account how the relationship between 
migration and development functions, and how demographic and socio-economic changes in 
developing countries could reinforce migration pressures. For example, contrary to 
assumption, economic development in sending countries can result in more migration in the 
short-term, a.k.a. the migration hump model (inversed U shape) (King and Lulle 2016).233 
                                                          
228 To see how migration is reflected in the SDGs, please visit https://unobserver.iom.int/2030-agenda-
sustainable-development 
229 As noted in the OECD Expert Meeting, 'Perspectives on Global Development 2016: International migration in 
a shifting world', http://www.oecd.org/dev/migration-development/pgd-expert-meeting.htm 
230 A European Agenda on Migration.,(COM(2015) 240 Final). 
231 Ibid p.6. 
232 Ibid, p. 7 
233 Further research on this has been done by Martin and Taylor (1996), de Haas (2007), Telli (2014).  
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Therefore, since people require resources to migrate, developmental policies can actually 
enable people to migrate, and this clearly has important policy implications. 
In addition, the Agenda is focused mainly on high-skilled migrants when it comes to harnessing 
development potential of migration (i.e. the overhaul of the Blue Card scheme). However, the 
impact and needs for low- and medium- skilled workers needs further analysis and should be 
better integrated into the Agenda. 
Consequently, the challenge is to identify the actions and policies that are needed both in 
countries of origin and destination in order to fully harness the development potential that 
migration brings.234 The importance of non-migration policies should not be downplayed 
(given the fact that some of the most important factors in migration flows do not deal with 
migration per se) nor should policy coherence for development. Moreover, how to adapt 
policies to fit local realities, rather than a one-size-fits-all approach could be further explored. 
Data availability and research gaps 
The major players in this arena include the Centre for Global Development (CDG) and the 
OECD, of which more information can be found in Annex 2. In October 2016, the OECD is 
expected to release a report, 'Perspectives on Global Development 2016: International 
Migration in a Shifting World', in which new data will be released, as well as a scenario-based 
foresight exercise considering future migration scenarios.235 Furthermore, Annex 2 notes 
interesting initiatives from the IOM to monitor newly adopted SDGs.236 
Linked to the remark that migration policies should not have a one-size-fits-all approach, there 
is a need for more research on different categories of countries of origin, which would serve to 
develop more tailored approaches, especially given that countries of origin are becoming more 
diverse whereas the destination countries are more concentrated. Despite this, policies in both 
origin and destination countries (i.e. social protection, linguistic, integration in civil, cultural 
and economic fields) could also be studied more carefully.  
Remittances 
Annex 2 provides examples of the datasets used to record remittances, although data collection 
on remittances, both in countries of origin and destination shows gaps. This is due mainly to 
the fact that remittances are not necessarily sent through official channels, thus making official 
recording in both origin and destination countries difficult (Gammeltoft 2003; Carling 2008; 
The World Bank 2011; King and Lulle 2016). Therefore data currently produced on 
remittances underestimates total flows. It is also difficult to analyse just how remittances are 
being spent once they reach the countries of origin, whether for investments, day-to-day 
expenditures, education, etc.  
It is important to stress that a significant proportion of the remittances are in-kind and 
immaterial, yet they have an immense indirect effect not only on the economy but on the social 
and political sectors of the country of origin, which is a research area that remains unexplored. 
Therefore policies should not only aim at reducing the cost and stimulating money transfer, but 
also foster real drivers of development such as knowledge and skills transfer. 
                                                          
234 Research is being done by the OECD on this topic, http://www.oecd.org/dev/migration-
development/ippmd.htm#About2 and see Annex 2. 
235 http://www.oecd.org/dev/migration-development/pgd-expert-meeting.htm 
236 Further information can also be found here https://unobserver.iom.int/2030-agenda-sustainable-development 
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Approaches and solutions to overcome gaps and challenges 
Countries of origin differ (as to destination ones) and therefore tailor made responses are 
necessary. Furthermore, economic prosperity of the sending country can lead to more migration 
and therefore this needs to be taken into account as well. As for the GAMM, although extremely 
beneficial, better coordination and involvement between MS, partner countries and EU 
delegations is needed for improved implementation.  
Few projects are currently in place to better analyse the link between migration and 
development. The OECD is currently developing one project that aims to provide empirical 
evidence on the interrelations between public policy, migration and development237 and 
another one that seeks to understand how immigration affects the economies of a number of 
low-income and middle-income countries.238 IOM is working on a Migration Governance 
Index with the Economist Intelligence unit with the end goal of measuring the degree to which 
national policies facilitate and promote responsible, safe and regular migration of people, as 
per the sustainable development goals (SDGs). It will serve both as an evaluating mechanism 
and as a tool for countries, particularly in migration capacities development and policy 
framework and implementation.239 
Furthermore, more creative and innovative policy developments are needed that move beyond 
remittance flows and circular migration schemes as a means to 'manage' migration, and which 
consider both low and high-skilled migration, i.e. potential global skills partnerships. In 
addition, modelling could be used to research migration pressures linked to labour market 
needs. 
Regarding data on remittances, King and Lulle (2016) suggest that collecting primary data on 
remittances through sample surveys could provide more accurate data as they give information 
about who sends, who receives, and what the money is used for. The downside is that they 
would only capture a very small part of total global transfer and respondents may not give 
accurate responses. They also recommend direct surveys. 
With regards to DG JRC, there are a number of initiatives which could be of particular interest. 
For example, the tool being developed by the Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and 
Development (KNOMAD)240 to measure policy and institutional coherence for migration and 
development (PICMD), could be something to which the DG JRC could contribute to. 
DG JRC could also assist in developing and monitoring the indicators for the SDGs, in 
cooperation with DG DEVCO, DG HOME and the IOM. DG JRC is currently doing some 
work packages on SDGs, giving specific focus to climate change and environment as drivers 
for migration.  
DG JRC could also contribute to the research gaps regarding remittances, whether in providing 
more sample surveys, or looking into the aspects of social remittances.  
  





240 See Annex 2 for more detail. 
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IV. Legal migration 
f. Additional: The economic effects of migration 
Policy and debate 
At the international and the EU level, there are several initiatives and declarations that provide 
the framework for defining the priorities of economic migration. For example, the UN General 
Assembly High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development recognised both 
the contribution migration makes towards achieving sustainable development, and to countries 
of origin, transit and destination (United Nations 2013). From the EU perspective, President 
Jean Claude Juncker, has made attracting talent from third countries one of the European 
Commission's priorities.241  
Currently, what is troubling both policy and academic debate is the socio-economic impacts of 
the mass migration from Syria into the EU. The debate centres on the uncertainty surrounding 
the potential social, macroeconomic and budgetary implications242: how many will come? How 
long will they stay? How much do they cost?  
Only a few studies have attempted to quantify the potential macroeconomic effects of the 
continuing mass migration flow into the EU. Aiyar et al (2016) recognise that EU GDP gains 
from the refugee influx may be modest in the short-term, as little as 0.13% by 2017. In the 
medium to long-term however, the GDP growth could be considerably more substantial, 0.25% 
by 2020, although this is conditional on the successful integration of migrants into the EU 
labour markets. OECD studies tend to show that migration has a positive effect on the 
economy: (i) immigrants have a broadly neutral fiscal impact in the OECD countries (rarely 
exceeding 0.5% of GDP); (ii) migrants account for the greatest share of the workforce increase; 
(iii) migrants usually supply labour to fill important niche markets both in fast-growing and 
declining sectors of the economy; (iv) the proportion of the highly educated migrants is rising 
in the OECD countries; (v) migrants make important contributions to the receiving countries' 
economy as they bring skills and abilities and enhance human capital; and (vi) migrants 
significantly enhance the labour-market flexibility, notably in the EU(OECD 2013; OECD 
2014a; OECD 2014b). 
However, the latest policy briefs stress that the economic effects of the refugee inflow are often 
driven by ill-informed perceptions, which can lead to public antagonism and public policy in 
jeopardy (OECD 2014b). Constant (2014, 1) argues that "[n]either public opinion nor 
evidence-based research supports the claim of some politicians and the media that immigrants 
take the jobs of native-born workers” . The study also shows that immigrants of all skill levels 
do not significantly affect native employment in the short-term, but boost employment in the 
long-term. 
The general conclusion to make – dependent on good labour integration243 – is that  whilst the 
net fiscal impact of immigration is likely to be negative in the short-term, the long-term 
economic gains varies from small (Boubtane, Dumont, and Rault 2014) to substantial (IMF 
                                                          
241 http://www.eesc.europa.eu/resources/docs/jean-claude-juncker---political-guidelines.pdf.  
242 According to the 2015 Eurobarometer survey (European Commission 2015a), the increasing inflow of refugees 
is among the most important concerns of EU citizens overtaking issues such as the economic situation, 
unemployment or public finances.  
243 The IMF notes the importance of sound labour market integration policies on the positive contribution of 
migrants (IMF 2015). 
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2015). This highlights the uncertainty surrounding migration: that it can be beneficial for the 
economy, but the extent can vary.  
Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that the sizeable influx of migrants into the EU may 
have adverse economic impacts on the EU labour markets, particularly for small countries and 
for lower-skilled sectors. Such effects of the impacts need to be identified and a unified strategy 
needs to be developed as to how to address them. At the moment however, a unified response 
from the EU to the mass inflow of refugees is difficult to achieve.  
Yet, one has to also bear in mind the economy on refugees. Findings by Koehler et al. (2010) 
suggest that the economic crisis led to the deterioration of employment prospects for migrant 
workers more significantly than for the local population. Furthermore, it increased the inter-
sectorial mobility amongst migrant workers; as well as caused more migrants to receive welfare 
benefits than the local population, which was in the reverse before the crisis. 
The European Agenda on Migration (the Agenda)244 is yet to consider the effects of the mass 
influx of migrants on the economy, rather it looks at how to develop benefits for countries of 
origin, which was discussed in the Chapter IV.e. Furthermore, since the Agenda does not cover 
migration as temporary, circular, seasonal or unpredictable, nor initiatives such as the 
facilitation of temporarily migration to support industries facing labour shortages (e.g. 
agriculture, construction). 
Data availability and research gaps 
Data collected in this area is noted in Annex 2.  
The European Labour Force survey (EU-LFS) and the European Union Survey on Income and 
Living conditions (EU-SILC) are used to study various economic effect of migrants' labour 
market participation;245 data provided by United Kingdom Household Panel, the German 
Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) or the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), has 
also assisted academics in studying the socio-economic conditions of migrants.246  
In addition, the other data sources (mostly at national level)247 are collected and employed in 
the academic and policy literature to study various issues of migration, some of which are 
mentioned in Annex 2.248 
According to the ILO249, comprehensive, comparable and reliable statistics or estimates of the 
economically active migrant population are largely unavailable, while data on the short-term 
migrant are even more difficult to capture. The availability of the migration data disaggregated 
by socio-economic characteristics (e.g. age, sex, occupation, skills, working conditions, wages) 
remain very fragmented and unreliable at the national, regional and international levels. 
Furthermore, there is poor socio-economic data available in support of emerging policy issues, 
such as that of the current mass influx of refugees. This is often because the data collected for 
                                                          
244 A European Agenda on Migration, (COM(2015) 240 Final). 
245 See for example Dustmann, Fabbri, and Preston (2005), Kraler and Reichel (2010), Font and Mendez (2013). 
246 See for example Büchel and Frick (2005) and Jaeger et al. (2010). 
247 See for example the Longitudinal Survey of the Integration of First-Time Arrivals for France 
(http://www.immigration.interieur.gouv.fr/Info-ressources/Statistiques/Etudes-et-publications/Etudes/Enquete-
Longitudinale-sur-l-Integration-des-Primo-Arrivants-ELIPA) or the TIES project which collects data through 
surveys to study the socio-economic integration of descendants of immigrants from Turkey, ex-Yugoslavia and 
Morocco in fifteen cities across eight EU countries (http://www.tiesproject.eu/) 
248 For example, ELIPA, MAFE, TIES. 
249 http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/labour-migration/policy-areas/statistics/lang--en/index.htm 
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such issues is done on an ad-hoc basis, linked to the research interest of the particular network, 
institution or policy question. 
The study of Boubtane, Dumont and Rault (2014) suggests that even official country-level data 
from the OECD International Migration Database and the UN International Migration Flows 
Database are not readily available to be employed for economic cross-country impact analysis, 
as they are not harmonised and are not comparable across countries. As a result of which 
Boubtane, Dumont and Rault (2014) have made a substantial effort to collect and produce a 
comparable data for the 22 OECD countries included in their study. 
In conclusion, the main constraint for analysing the economic impacts of migration is the 
limited availability of consistent, harmonised and reliable socio-economic data specifically on 
migrants.   
Approaches and solutions to overcome gaps and challenges 
In response to the gaps around data availability and collection, these could be filled in several 
ways by: 
 Promoting the collection and harmonisation of economic data on migration and making 
them available through official sources (Eurostat 2014); 
 Supporting the collection of longitudinal micro-economic data on migration across the 
EU to address gaps in data consistency and availability, in order to monitor and evaluate 
the impacts of migration in a wider socio-economic context; 
 Collecting targeted economic data on an ad-hoc basis in order to provide a swift 
response to the emerging policy issues on migration.  
In order to contribute to reducing the uncertainties around the recent flows, DG JRC could help 
identify the socio-economic impacts of the current refugee influx by performing targeted 
surveys of refugees, with the aim of establishing their education, qualifications, work 
experience, etc.. 
There is also the potential to improve the understanding of the economic impacts of migration. 
The EU migration policy could benefit from previous work in the following directions: 
 Using an agent-based approach to study the behaviour of migrants at the individual 
level, and impacts of migration policies on the EU economy (e.g. fiscal effects); see, 
for example, application of the EUROMOD model in Aiyar et al. (2016) to study the 
macroeconomic effects of refugee influx; 
 Using a general equilibrium model to study the potential economy-wide impacts of 
migration and migration policies on the EU economy (e.g. GDP growth, labour 
integration policies); see, for example, application of the RHOMOLO model in Ciaian 
and Kancs (2016) to study the labour marker mobility and labour market integration; 
 Using statistical and econometric methods to exploit available micro (longitudinal or 
cross-sectional) and macro (cross-country time series) data for quantifying the 
economic effects of migration policies; see, for example, Boubtane, Dumont and Rault 
(2014), who employ econometric estimations at the country-level panel data for 22 
OECD countries, to study the migrants’ human capital impact on economic growth. 
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Finally, the expected social, macroeconomic and budgetary impacts of the current refugee 
influx in the EU could be evaluated in a DG JRC study. This could be carried out by simulating 
a counterfactual scenario with refugee simulation compared to a baseline trajectory (no 
migration).   
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Annexes 
Annex I: Table summary of challenges and gaps; approaches and solutions 
Pillar I Policy challenges Research gaps Approaches and solutions 
Irregular 
migrants 
Conflation of what a 
migrant is: mixed flows and 
motivations; no reliable 
statistics for over-stayers, 
secondary flows of asylum 
seekers 
Difficult to quantify data in consistent, comparable 
manner – not officially recorded coherently; 
Data: partial coverage from different sources; 
Difficulties of having reliable and updated data; 
More evidence needed on migration routes external & 
in EU, push factors, decision making, role of  social 
media; strengthening identification 
Enhance cooperation between Frontex, Europol, IOM, 
ICMD to improve knowledge on irregular migration. 
Research partnerships to expand evidence base on irregular 
migration.  
Root causes : 
Environment 
More internal movement 
from rural to urban, extreme 
weather conditions to be 
factored in 
Cannot make causative link between migration and 
environment; 
Studies use diverse approaches, climate projections 
have much uncertainty, limited amount of data in 
developing countries 
Holistic approach: take into account human security, 
economic development. 
JRC competences - Global Climate Change Alliance, multi-
risk early warning systems for severe weather, Atlas of 
Water Cooperation and Conflicts. 
“Best data sets”- blending official data with remote sensing, 
research on impact of climate change on environmental 
degradation and socio-economic impacts. 
Comparative research- identify common characteristics for 
different types of displacement strategies. 
 
Conflicts Threats to personal integrity 
is an important driver 
Difficult to collect data on IDPs, comparability (data 
from multiple stakeholders), inadequate models (don’t 
capture enough factors), practical obstacles. 
Identify factors other than threat of violence; examine levels 
of violence that drives migration. 
JRC developed indices on conflict & risk. 
EU migration index looking at root causes in a quantitative 
manner. 
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Economy Economic factors aren't 
necessarily predominant 
driver of migration, well-
being to be considered.  
Labour market models do not capture social behaviour 
and individual choices. 
 




Conflation of trafficking and 
smuggling, both are 
lucrative businesses.  
Identify + protect witnesses, 
increase prosecution, 
increase coordination 
between key actors.  
Precise data difficult due to its nature. 
Under reporting of victims, unstandardised data 
collection – hampering comparability.  
More research needed on smuggling/trafficking corridors 
and the money flow. 
Data transparency and central coordination.  
Capacity building on data collection and victim 
identification. 
Fuller methodology: understanding contextual setting, study 
demand side, longitudinal surveys to investigate individual 
circumstances. 
ILO could play a role in harmonising modern slavery data 
collection world-wide. 
JRC competence – could support in the analyse of social 
media (Frontex media monitoring), websites used by 
smugglers; composite index integrating statistical and 
qualitative data; identification of falsified documents, 
anomalies detection; technologies for detecting and 
identifying trafficked vessels. 
Return Migration is complex-
pendular, circular, 
temporary, liquid; long-term 
reintegration of returnees; 
harmonise Return Directive; 
coordination between actors 
involved in return ops 
(EURINT, Frontex, ERIN, 
EURLO); alternatives to 
detention. 
 
Improved stats on return; inconsistencies in data 
supplied from various sources. 
Little internationally comparable data on return – 
different definitions of migrant; data collected 
differently, national authorities collect better info on 
entering than leaving, MS not systematic in entering 
entry bans into SIS, not familiar with collecting return 
info via VIS. 
More integration between IT systems so that data can be 
captured and shared; continuous training to MS in 
effectively recording return info and entry bans into these 
systems.  
Improve flow of information in return operations between 
actors 
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Pillar II Policy Research Approaches and solutions 
Border 
management 
Frontex mandate, Smart 
Borders package – looking 
at biometric identifiers. 
How to obtain biometric data – privacy and integrity 
concerns. 
Little data on departure, no systematic check that visa 
holders have left once visa has expired.  
Systematic info exchange and full exploitation of security 
concepts can help control the border effectively. 
More accurate ‘test data’ to test the effectiveness of IT 
systems and achieve better deployment of systems. 
JRC’s competences: expertise in biometric identifiers 
(including of children) can assist with improving IT 
systems. 
Pillar III Policy Research Approaches and solutions 
CEAS Difficulties in harmonisation 
and proper implementation 
across MS; negative public 
opinion of asylum seekers; 
reform of Dublin; 
asymmetries re reception, 
recognition and integration 
across MS, the role of 
private sector in relocation 
& resettlement. 
Hard to distinguish data between asylum seekers and 
others, unprecedented influx means unknown no.s 
unaccounted for.  
More emphasis on quantitative data over qualitative has 
been registered.  
Little info on education/cultural background, trigger 
rise to stereotypes. 
More research on public opinion on asylum seekers. 
EPSC’s “solidarity scoreboard” – distribution determined by 
a no. of criteria. 
Private sector involved in reception & resettlement. 
JRC competences – modelling socio-economic 
considerations &future skills shortages to forecast level of 
absorption of MS of asylum seekers; pooling together data 
from different sources to identify composition of new 
arrivals that go beyond gender, age, nationality; foresight 
exercise as to how to achieve a full CEAS; European 
observatory on migration (proposed by EPSC); feasibility 
study on remote asylum applications; improvements to 
EURODAC. 
Understanding dynamics of secondary movements through 
longitudinal surveys. 
UAMs Worrying no. of UAMs and 
their inclusion in the 
society; differential 
treatment of asylum and 
non-asylum UAMs; many 
Lack of reliable data – strengthen cooperation between 
MS, Europol, EASO and COM.  
Lack of comprehensive & comparable data on UAMs 
receiving some form of protection – only for those 
seeking asylum.  
JRC competences – support systematic collection of data on 
UAMs; reduce likelihood of disappearance through 
biometric identification (can be lowered to below 14); work 
on age assessment; sharing of good practices in 
accommodating UAMs. 
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MS ill-equipped to 
accommodate UAMs. 
 
Pillar IV Policy Research Approaches and solutions 
Regular 
migration 
Harmonised and consistent 
data- essential to manage 
&evaluate policy. 
 
Not easy to compare international data: differing 
definitions, methods. 
Little data available at local level.  
Limited data on migrants’ characteristics.   
 
Working groups/Task Force to increase harmonisation of 
data collection.  
JRC competence – continuation of RTD funded projects to 
improve harmonisation, promoting international cooperation 
in harmonisation. 
IIASA analysed global migration flows, JRC could assist at 
EU level.  
Option of longitudinal surveys to analyse whether migration 
beneficial for migrant. 
Big data –may improve understanding of flows. 
Demography Declining and ageing 
population, retirement 
policy amended, impact on 
health & social care 
Full demographic data not readily available at int. level. 
Population projections are inherently uncertain, difficult 
to explain this to layman.  
Difficult to retrieve data of certain countries – e.g. non 
OECD 
Multidisciplinary approach towards demography (including 
accounting for wellbeing). 
Policy still very much entrenched in present thinking, needs 
to incorporate demographic trend analysis. 
EU population migration centre (JRC – IIASA). 
JRC competence - modelling and foresight to anticipate 
demographic trends.  
Visa Policy Harmonisation of visa 
policy difficult – different 
national interests, visa 
policy focusses on highly 
skilled  
No exchange of information on visa applications 
between MS consulates. 
Little info collected on holders of education and 
training visas after completion of programme, or on no. 
of students over-stayers. 
Criteria for visa sanctions largely unknown. 
JRC competence – study on impacts of implemented visa 
sanctions , study the benefits to career development of 
education and training visas.  




Integration is a long process; 
cultural integration & social 
capital also crucial in the 
process; better educated 
migrants have difficulty 
finding jobs that match their 
skills, difficulty recognising 
foreign qualifications. 
Limitations to surveys that tend to measure integration. 
Data on ethnic entrepreneurs missing, insufficient of 
migrants access to public services (education, health, 
housing). Little info on active citizenship. 
Data on health needs along the migratory trajectory and 
in resettlement needed, also impact migration has on 
EU health care.  
Increase sample sizes which measure integration. 
Acknowledging power imbalance of MS when integrating 
migrants,  
Use longitudinal data to assess impact of immigration on 
access to services. 
JRC competence – help set up European network of national 
public health authorities for standardised collection, analysis 





Gaps in information about remittances – as well as 
further research re social remittances.  
Countries of origin – differ and thus partnerships and 
agreements need to reflect nuances – more 
understanding of this. 
Direct surveys on remittances. 
JRC competence – contribute to the tool by Global 
Partnership on Migration and Development to measure 
policy and institutional coherence for migration and 
development; developing and monitoring the indicators for 
SDGs in cooperation with HOME, DEVCO, IOM; doing 
research on remittances.  
Economic 
effects 
Difficult to quantify the 
macroeconomic effects of 
migration, yet there is little 
to suggest that migrants take 
job from local population.  
Good integration necessary 
for positive economic 
outcomes.  
Comprehensive, comparable and reliable stats on 
economically active migrants largely unavailable. 
Disaggregated data by socio-economic characteristics 
are very fragmented. 
Need to consider migration on smaller EU MS, as well 
as impact of recession on migrants. 
Promoting the collection and harmonisation of economic 
data and making available through official sources. 
Longitudinal micro-economic data on migration across EU 
to address gaps of data inconsistency and availability. 
Collecting targeted economic data on an ad hoc basis to 
respond swiftly to emerging policy issues. 
JRC competence – identify socio-economic impacts of 
migration; use past work/models to measure economic 
impacts (EUROMOD, RHOMOLO), study on expected 
social, macroeconomic and budgetary impacts of current 
migration.  
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Annex II: Preliminary inventory of migration data and data sources 
Reference Source Description Methodology Coverage Type Link 
I. IRREGULAR 
MIGRATION            
Ia - Access to data EMN Statistics on irregular 
migration 
(irregular migrants, refusals, 
apprehensions, volutary 
return, good practices in 
return and reintegration) 
 
Statistics derive from Eurostat, national 







Ia - Access to data Eurostat Data on third-country 
nationals refused entry at the 
external borders; found to be 
illegally present or ordered 
to leave  
Statistics are based on administrative data 
provided by the national authorities in line with 
the requirements of Regulation 0862/2007 on 





Ia - Access to data Frontex Quarterly Reports 
(Detections of illegal border-
crossing between Border 
Crossing Points (BCPs); 
Detections of illegal border-
crossing at BCPs; detections 
of suspected facilitators; 
detections of illegal stay; 
refusals of entry; asylum 
applications; detections of 
false documents; return 
decisions for illegally 
staying third-country 
nationals; returns of illegally 
Statistical analysis of quarterly changes of eight 
irregular-migration indicators  and one asylum 










Ia - Access to data Frontex Analytical Reports  Analytical reports exchanged by MS used for 
interpretative purposes and to provide 
qualitative information, as are other available 










Yearbook on Illegal 
Migration, Human 
Smuggling and Trafficking 
in Central and Eastern 
Europe 
Published since 2000 with the latest available 
being for 2013. It includes a survey and analysis 
of border management and border apprehension 
data from 22 States obtained via a questionnaire 
disseminated to border agencies, Ministries of 
Interior and other national authorities dealing 
with issues related to irregular migration.  
They often have a topical Special Module in 
each one. For example, in 2013 this was on the 
Detention of Migrants and Asylum Seekers.  
EU Report http://www.icmpd.o
rg 
Ia - Access to data IOM Mixed Migration flows in 
Europe and Beyond 
(data on marittime arrivals 
and fatalities) 
Data are obtained from IOM field staff and 
through consultations with Ministries of 
Interior, coastguards, police forces and other 
relevant national authorities. 
International Database http://www.iom.int/ 
Ia - Access to data UNHCR Refugees/Migrants 
Emergency Response  
(data on arrivals and 
fatalities) 
 




           
100 
Ib - Root Causes Eurostat Data on asylum applicants, 
decisions on asylum 
applications and on Dublin 
cases  
Data based entirely on administrative sources. 
These databases are disaggregated by gender, 










DEMIG data (on migration policy changes, 
migration and emigration flows and bilateral 
migration flow data), EUMAGINE data (on the 
impact of perception of human rights and 
demogracy on migration aspirations), THEMIS 










Data on internal 
displacement on an annual 
basis; plus specific maps 
displaying the location of 
IDPs within a country based 
on first order administrative 
units.  
IDMC compiles information from national 
governments, international organizations and 




Ib - Root Causes IOM Displacement tracking 
matrices  
(baseline information on 
displaced populations, 
including their number, 
demographics, needs and 
conditions in their places of 
refuge, and to monitor 
movements such as returns 
and secondary displacement) 
The methodology adopted foresees a first stage 
of data collection through a network of 
community-level key informants and 
government registration data, and a second stage 
where locations are validated.  
International Database Specific country's 
IOM website 
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Ib - Root Causes Refworld News on forced migration / 
asylum - related topics 
Online research tool, compiling information 
related to situations in countries of origin, 
policies, or international and national legal 
frameworks. Data is provided by UNHCR field 
offices, governments, international, regional and 
non-governmental organizations, academic 
institutions and judicial bodies. 
International Database http://www.refworl
d.org 
Ib - Root Causes UNHCR Statistical yearbooks, mid-
year reports on displacement 
trends, the Statistical Online 
Population Database 
Data and trends are based mainly on statistics 
collected by UNHCR country offices, 
governments, and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs). Most data stems from 
registrations (77% in 2014), surveys, censuses, 
and estimations (13% in 2014) with varying 








GRETA based scorecards The index is based on the reports of the 
monitoring body of the Council of Europe 
Convention against Human Trafficking. It 
assesses compliance with 35 policy 
requirements on legal institutional framework, 
assistance protection, enforcement, prevention.  
Main focus: institutional capacity and 
operational performance of law enforcement 
International Index www.coe.int 
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Ic - Smuggling and 
THB 
Eurostat Trafficking in human beings Based on the information provided by member 
States, Eurostat presents only empirical data as 
recorded by the authorities, exploring the 
purpose of exploitation, sector of exploitation 
with disaggregation for age/sex. It includes 
information on traffickers and a differentiation 




Ic - Smuggling and 
THB 
Frontex Risk Analysis Reports Frontex data relies on monthly statistics 
exchanged among MS through the Frontex Risk 
Analysis Network (FRAN) 
EU Report http://frontex.europ
a.eu/ 




3P Index The index evaluates the quality of governmental 
policies against the 3P (protection, prevention, 
prosecution). The country ranking is published 
every year covering up to 188 countries for a 
full dataset from 2000 to 2014. The scores are 
largely based on the US Trafficking in person’s 
reports, supplemented by UNODC reports.  
Main focus: legislative compliance 




Ic - Smuggling and 
THB 
ILO Global estimate of forced 
labour 
Data include statistics on trafficking (not 
including trafficking other than for labour 
purposes such as for the removal of organs, 
forced marriage, forced adoption…). ILO 
mainly focuses on the root causes of trafficking, 
especially weak labour market governance, 
ineffective labour migration and recruitment 
systems using media reports, reports from 
NGOs, GOs, IOs, academia, trade unions. 
International Report http://www.ilo.org 
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Ic - Smuggling and 
THB 
IOM Global human trafficking 
database 
(data on victims of 
trafficking) 
As of 2000, IOM records primary data on VoT 
under IOM assistance,  largely in countries of 
origin. Additional qualitative analyses include 
routes and trends, causes and consequences of 
human trafficking, modi operandi of criminal 
groups (national level); for a more regional 
perspective researches have been carried out in 
the areas of legislation and policy.  
 
Statistics are available to the public as analyses 
presented in studies. 
International Report http://www.iom.int/ 
Ic - Smuggling and 
THB 
UNODC Global Report on 
Trafficking in human beings 
(overview of patterns and 
flows of trafficking in 
persons at global, regional 
and national levels)  
Produced every two years. The statistical 
information is collected in two ways: through a 
short, dedicated questionnaire distributed to 
Governments and by the collection of official 
information available in the public domain 
(national police reports, Ministry of Justice 
reports, national trafficking in persons 
reports…). Official statistics from national 
authorities (criminal justice data) account for 
92% of the information collected.  
International Report http://www.unodc.o
rg 




Global Slavery Index  Combines an estimation of the number of 
people in modern slavery, the governments’ 
responses and the contextual factors making 
individuals vulnerable to slavery (mainly based 
on the 3P index). Covering 37 variables it 
covers 167 countries, it uses surveys coupled 
with desk research analyses. 
International Index http://www.globalsl
averyindex.org 
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Id - Return EUI Return Migration and 
Development Platform 
This platform holds two databases: the Cross 
Regional Information System on the 
Reintegration of Migrants (CRIS) and the 
MIREM dataset on return migrants to the 
Maghreb. These projects collect both 
quantitative and qualitative data in certain 
countries or regions. 
EU Project http://eui.eu 
Id - Return Eurostat Data on third-country 
nationals refused entry at the 
external borders; found to be 
illegally present or ordered 
to leave  
Statistics are based on administrative data 
provided by the national authorities in line with 
the requirements of Regulation 0862/2007 on 





Id - Return Frontex FRAN report  
(number of return decisions 




It gathers its data from 31 MS border-control 
authorities within the framework of the 
FRONTEX Risk Analysis Network.  
EU Report http://frontex.europ
a.eu/ 
Id - Return IOM Voluntary Return and 
Assisted Voluntary Return 
Programmes 
IOM provides data on how many migrants it has 
assisted through voluntary return programmes.  
 
Statistics are available to the public as analyses 
presented in studies 
International Report http://www.iom.int/ 
Id - Return UNHCR Returnees IDP and refugees Data represents the information about UNHCR's 
populations of concern for a given year and 
country of residence and/or origin. 
International Database http://www.unhcr.o
rg 
II. BORDER MANAGEMENT 
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II - Border Eurodac / 
eu-LISA 
Annual report on Eurodac  
(First asylum registration) 
Eurodac contains only fingerprints (along with 
data and place of registration) and no other 
personal information. MS and Associated 
countries transmit data to the Central System 
(which is managed by eu-LISA) in accordance 
with the Recast Eurodac Regulation. 
 
Statistics are available to the public as analyses 




II - Border EUROSUR Voluntary information 
sharing plaform 
Provides Schengen countries with a common 
operational and technical framework, assisting 
them in countering cross-border crime, 
preventing unauthorized border crossings and 
diminishing causalities of migrants at sea.  
 









Alerts on certain categories 
of wanted or missing 
persons and objects. 
The SIS only contains alerts on persons or 
objects falling under one of the specific alert 
categories. The eu-LISA is currently managing 
second generation Schengen Information 
System (SIS II). 
 
Statistics are available to the public as analyses 
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Registration and verification 
of short stay visas  
It processes data and decisions relating to 
applications for short-stay visas to visit, or to 
transit through, the Schengen Area. The system 
can perform biometric matching, primarily of 
fingerprints, for identification and verification 
purposes. It contains full personal data, 
including fingerprints and face image. 
The eu-LISA is currently managing the Visa 
Information System (VIS) . 
 
Statistics are available to the public as analyses 




III. ASYLUM & PROTECTION 
 
        




Regular updates on he state 
of play of the European 
Agenda on Migration and 
related goals, including how 
many refugees were 
relocated from where and by 
which countries. 
The portal provides latest data and press 
releases on, for example, reception capacity, 
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IIIa - CEAS EASO Asylum trends Monthly statistical snapshots are produced by 
EASO’s Centre for Information, Documentation 
and Analysis on the basis of data collected 
under EASO’s Early warning and Preparedness 
System (EPS). 
 
The data is provided directly to EASO by a 
network of asylum statistics experts (the Group 
for the Provision of Statistics – GPS) of the 
European Union Member States plus Norway 




IIIa - CEAS ECRE Asylum Information 
Database (AIDA)  
gathering update information 
on asylum procedures, 
reception conditions and 
detention across 18 
countries. 
Country and annual reports, legal briefings and 
video testimonies of asylum seekers; conduct 
fact-finding missions to further investigate 
important protection gaps established through 
the country reports. The website also allows for 
a comparison of different types of data related 
to the asylum procedure, reception conditions 
and detention among up to three countries.  
EU Report http://www.asylumi
neurope.org/ 
IIIa - CEAS Eurobarome
ter 
Public opinion trends in the 
EU on political and 
economic questions, 
including on migration 
Survey of all MS, fYROM, Turkey, 
Montenegro, Serbia and Albania. The survey 
covers the national population of citizens and 
the population of citizens of all the MS that are 
residents in these countries and have a sufficient 
command of the country's language to answer 
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IIIa - CEAS Eurodac / 
eu-LISA 
Annual report on Eurodac  
(First asylum registration) 
Eurodac contains only fingerprints (along with 
data and place of registration) and no other 
personal information. MS and Associated 
countries transmit data to the Central System 
(which is managed by eu-LISA) in accordance 
with the Recast Eurodac Regulation. 
 
Statistics are available to the public as analyses 




IIIa - CEAS Eurostat Data on asylum applications, 
first time applicants, 
decisions, on the Dublin 
procedure and resident 
permits, including for 
Unaccompanied Minors 
(UaM). 
Data on asylum applications are collected 
monthly while data on first instance decisions 
are collected quarterly. Statistics are based on 
data from Ministries of Interior, Justice or 
Immigration agencies of the MS and EFTA 
countries. Data can be disaggragated by age, sex 





IIIa - CEAS IOM Global Migration Data 
Analysis Centre (GMDAC) 
Global migration trends, 
including flows and fatalities 
It uses statistical data from governments and 




IIIa - CEAS UNHCR Statistical Online Population 
Database 
Data and trends on the 
population of concern to 
UNHCR 
Data and trends on refugees, asylum-seekers, 
returned refugees, internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) protected/assisted by UNHCR, returned 
IDPs, stateless persons, and others of concern to 
UNHCR, in more than 180 countries. Their age 
and sex are also recorded. 
International Database http://www.unhcr.o
rg 





Eurostat Annual data on asylum 
applicants considered to be 
unaccompanied minors 
These data are supplied to Eurostat by the 
national Ministries of Interior and related 
official agencies. Data is presented by country 
and for groups of countries: the European Union 








FRA Data on reception conditions The reports contain descriptive data that was 
based mainly on interviews, and do not include 
analysis or conclusions. 




UNICEF TransMonEE database TransMONEE is the database associated with 
the UNICEF MONEE project on the living 
conditions of children and adolescents in 
Central and Eastern Europe and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CEE/CIS). Figures on children in care (e.g. 
residential care, care of foster parents or 
guardians) but these are not disaggregated to 
show the number of unaccompanied minors. 
The database is updated every year thanks to the 
collaboration of National Statistical Offices 
(NSOs) in the countries of CEE/CIS. 
EU Database http://www.unicef.o
rg/ 
IV. LEGAL MIGRATION 
          
IVa - Access to 
data 
EMN Inform, Ad-hoc queries, 
studies, reports 
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IVa - Access to 
data 
Eurostat Statistics on immigration, 
emigration and acquisition 
of citizenship 
The statistics cover all EU MS and the period 
from 1998 to 2013.  The immigration data is 
broken down by age class, gender and country 
of citizenship, country of birth and country of 
previous residence. The emigration data is 
broken down by age, gender, citizenship and 
country of next usual residence. Data on 
acquisitions of citizenship is available by age 




IVa - Access to 
data 
Eurostat Residence permits statistics  The statistics are provided by the national 
responsible authorities, mainly Ministries of 
Interior or Immigration Agencies of the EU MS 
and EFTA countries. Data are based entirely on 
relevant administrative sources. These data are 
supplied by MS as part of the annual Residence 
Permits Data Collection conducted by Eurostat 
according to the provisions of Article 6 of 
Regulation 862/2007 on statistics on migration 




IVa - Access to 
data 
ILO Estimates on labour 
migration 
ILO provides estimates on migrant workers and 
migrant domestic workers for 176 countries for 
the year 2013. The estimates are derived by 
combining data on world population (UN), 





IVa - Access to 
data 
IOM Global Migration Data 
Analysis Centre (GMDAC) 
Global migration trends, 
including flows and fatalities 
It uses statistical data from governments and 
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IVa - Access to 
data 
MS National Census Survey existing population periodically, 
normally carried out every 10 years, have the 
widest coverage, provide a universal survey of 
the existing population at a given point in time 
and are therefore preferred in reconstructing 
world migration data sets.  
National Database National Statistical 
Institute 
IVa - Access to 
data 
MS Population registers and data 
on resident permits 
Population registers accounts of residents within 
a country. They are typically maintained via the 
legal requirement that both nationals and 
foreigners residing in the country must register 
with the local authorities. Aggregation of these 
local accounts results in a record of population 
and population movement at the national level.  
 
Residents permit represents an authorization 
issued by the competent authorities of a country 
allowing third-country national (non-EU 
citizens) to stay legally on its territory. Data on 
residence permits are collected on the grounds 
for issuing such a permit (e.g education, family, 
employment, international protection).  
National Database National registers 
IVa - Access to 
data 
OECD International Migration 
Outlook 
Data provided by national correspondents 
appointed by the OECD Secretariat with the 
approval of the authorities of Member countries. 
Each year the report addresses different topical 
aspects of migration.  
International Report http://www.oecd.or
g/  
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IVa - Access to 
data 
OECD DIOC 
Immigrants in OECD and 
non-OECD countries for the 
2000 census round 
The DIOC gives demographic and labour 
market characteristics data for 32 OECD 
member countries and 68 non-members in the 
year 2000. 
The data is based on the 2000 census round. It 
includes segmentation by country of birth, 
gender, education, age, duration of stay, labor 
force status and occupation. This database is 
being updated to the years 2010-2011 through a 
joint project between OECD, the World Bank 
and the International Migration Institute of the 
University of Oxford. 
International Database http://www.oecd.or
g/ 
IVa - Access to 
data 
OECD DIOC-extended 
Immigrants in OECD and 
non-OECD countries for the 
2000 and 2010 census 
rounds  
The dataset contains information on 
demographic and labour market characteristics 
for the 27 OECD countries in the years 2000, 
2005 and 2006. 
The data is reconstructed primarily from census, 
and when not available from population 
registers and labor force surveys. The data 
includes segmentation by country of birth, 
nationality, gender, education level, age, 




IVa - Access to 
data 
UNDESA International migrant stock  The dataset presents estimates of international 
migrant stocks by age, sex and origin. Estimates 
are available for 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010 
and 2015 and for all countries of the world. The 
estimates are based on official statistics on the 
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IVa - Access to 
data 
UNDESA International Migration 
Flows to and from Selected 
Countries 
The data set covers flows of international 
migrants recorded by 45 countries of 
destination. The data presents both inflows and 
outflows according to the place of birth, 
citizenship or place of previous or next 
residence. The data includes time series of 
number of migrants by origin and destination 






IVa - Access to 
data 
World Bank Global Bilateral Migration 
Matrix 1960-2000 
Global Bilateral Migration 
matrix for 2010 and 2013 
Matrix of migration flows between 226 by 226 
countries covering the population census rounds 
of 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000. The flows 
are reconstructed from the United Nations 
Population Division database of migrants 
stocks. The country of birth approach is given 
priority in defining migrants. 
 
The first database has been expanded in order to 
include the results of the 2010 census. 
International Database http://www.worldb
ank.org/ 






The Ageing report  Reports issued every 3 years. It sheds light on 
the economic, budgetary and societal challenges 
that policy makers will have to face in the future 
as a result of demographic trends. The report’s 
long-term projections provide an indication of 
the timing and scale of challenges that can be 
expected so as to inform European policy 
makers about the scale and timing of the 
challenges they must face. 
 
Statistical Annexes (cross-country tables and 














Employment and social 
analysis  
Reports and survey collected at EU level.  EU Report http://ec.europa.eu/
social/main.jsp?catI
d=113 
IVb - Demography OECD DIOC and DIOC-extended 
database on 
Immigrants in OECD and 
non-OECD countries. 
International Migration 
Outlook report Society at a 
Glance report 
The dataset contains information on 
demographic and labor market characteristics.  
Relevant and regular publications are the 
International Migration Outlook (yearly 
provides the latest statistical information on 
immigrant stocks and flows, immigrants in the 
labour market, and migration policies) and The 
Society at a Glance (biennial report that 
addresses the growing demand for quantitative 
evidence on social well-being and its trends 
across OECD countries).  
International Database http://www.oecd.or
g/ 
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IVb - Demography OECD International Migration 
Database  
(population statistics and 
projections) 
The database provides selected population 
statistics in the OECD countries. This dataset 
presents annual population data from 1950 
when available by sex and five year age groups. 
The data is available for the 34 member 
countries and also for Colombia, Brazil, South 
Africa and Russian Federation. Data are 
presented in thousands of persons. 
There are three sources for the data: national 
statistics offices, Eurostat and the United 
Nations. 
 




IVb - Demography UNDESA World Population Prospects The UN publishes global population projections 
and estimates every two years from 1951 using 
current population by age, and age-specific rates 
of fertility, mortality and migration to assess 
hypothetical population trends and to help 
understand determinants of population change 












Global Migration Data 
Sheet: 1990 - 2010 
Demographic changes from births and deaths 
and refugee movements are included in the 
estimates. The methodology applied provides 
maximum likelihood estimates and uses an 




IVc -Visa Eurostat Data on blue cards issued Data collected from MS EU Blue Cards holders 
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IVc -Visa MS Data on employment visas, 
data education and training 
visas 
Data for different types of visa originate from 
MS consulates, which collect and provide 
information at the aggregate level on the annual 
numbers of successful/unsuccessful visa 
applications. 
 
In contrast to the visitor’s visa, issuance of the 
employment visa contains also information 
about location (MS) of a third country citizen 
staying in the EU. 
National Database National 
Consulates 





Alerts on certain categories 
of wanted or missing 
persons and objects. 
The SIS only contains alerts on persons or 
objects falling under one of the specific alert 
categories. The eu-LISA is currently managing 
second generation Schengen Information 
System (SIS II). 
 
Statistics are available to the public as analyses 




IVd - Integration Eurostat Zaragoza indicators, in the 
areas of employment, 
education, social inclusion 
and active citizenship  
These indicators  are annually updated by the 
Eurostat drawing on already harmonised data 
sources, such as the EU Labour Force Survey 
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IVd - Integration Eurostat EU LFS (European Labour 
Force Survey) 
The EU LFS  is a large household sample 
survey providing quarterly results on labour 
participation of people aged 15 and over as well 
as on persons outside the labour force is 
conducted in the 27 MS, 2 candidate countries 
and 3 countries of the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA). The Labour Force Surveys 
are conducted by the national statistical 
institutes across Europe and are centrally 




IVd - Integration Eurostat EU SILC (EU-Statistics on 
Income and Living 
Conditions)  
The EU SILC collects comparable 
multidimensional micro-data on: income; 
poverty; social exclusion; housing; labour ; 
education; health. It covers objective and 
subjective aspects of these themes in both 
monetary and non-monetary terms for both 




IVd - Integration ILO Estimates on labour 
migration 
ILO provides estimates on migrant workers and 
migrant domestic workers for 176 countries for 
the year 2013. The estimates are derived by 
combining data on world population (UN), 
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Migration Policy Index 
(MIPEX)  
(analyzes policies to 
integrate migrants) 
The MIPEX covers eight policy areas (labour 
market mobility, education, political 
participation, access to nationality, family 
reunion, health, permanent residence and anti-
discrimination). Countries covered: EU MS, 
Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, South Korea, 
New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey and 
the USA.  
EU Index http://www.mipex.e
u/ 
IVd - Integration OECD International Migration 
Database (employment, 
unemployment and 
participation rates by place 
of birth and sex) 
The database provides selected socio-economic 
data on migration in the OECD countries 
divided into native-born and foreign born (e.g. 
employment rates, education, unemployment, 
labour market participation rates) up to 2014. 
Data collected from Labour Force Surveys.  
International Database http://www.oecd.or
g/ 
IVd - Integration OECD DIOC and DIOC-extended 
database on 
Immigrants in OECD and 
non-OECD countries. 
International Migration 
Outlook report Society at a 
Glance report 
The dataset contains information on 
demographic and labor market characteristics.  
Relevant and regular publications are the 
International Migration Outlook (yearly 
provides the latest statistical information on 
immigrant stocks and flows, immigrants in the 
labour market, and migration policies) and The 
Society at a Glance (biennial report that 
addresses the growing demand for quantitative 
evidence on social well-being and its trends 
across OECD countries).  
International Database http://www.oecd.or
g/ 
           
119 
IVd - Integration OECD PIAAC (Programme for 
International Assessment of 
Adult Competencies)  
The PIAAC is an international survey that 
evaluates skills (literacy, numeracy, and 
problem-solving in technology-rich 
environments) of working age adults surveyed 
in 22 OECD member countries. This is done in 
particular by collecting information on how the 
skills are developed; maintained or lost; used in 
the workplace, community or at home; how 
these skills relate to labour market participation, 
income, health, and social and political 
engagement.  
 
The survey enables the comparison of mean 
literacy and numeracy score for native and 




IVd - Integration OECD PISA (Programme for 
International Student 
Assessment)  
The PISA is a triennial international survey, 
which aims to evaluate education systems 
worldwide by testing the skills and knowledge 
of 15-year-old students. Around 510,000 
students in 65 economies took part in the PISA 
2012 assessment of reading, mathematics and 
science representing about 28 million 15-year-
olds globally. Of those economies, 44 took part 
in an assessment of creative problem solving 
and 18 in an assessment of financial literacy. 
International Database http://www.oecd.or
g/ 
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IVd - Integration OECD  / EC Indicators of Immigrant 
Integration 2015 
A joint publication by the OECD and the 
European Commission presents the first broad 
international comparison across all EU and 
OECD countries.  
 
Data are gathered through OECD work on 
integration issues and Eurostat.  
International Report http://www.oecd.or
g/ 
IVd - Integration DIW ESS - The European Social 
Survey  
This is  is an academically driven cross-national 
survey that has been conducted every two years 
across Europe since 2001. It measures the 
attitudes, beliefs and behaviour patterns of 
diverse populations in more than thirty nations. 
In particular, it contains attitudes of respondents 
about the immigration policy and the social-
economic impacts of immigration. Data 




IVe - Maximising 








It ranks 27 of the world’s richest countries on 
policies that affect development, including 
migration. The Index gives credit for aid, FDI, 
research and development, policies that protect 
the environment, trade policies, global security, 
and immigration policies. Focuses exclusively 
on understanding migration from a country of 
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IVe - Maximising 
dev countries of 
origin 
World Bank Remittances Data 
Migration and Remittances 
Factbook 
The WB works with statistics gathering 
agencies to data on migration and remittance 
flows. It publishes a comprehensive dataset on 
remittances data including incoming and 
outgoing flows, monthly remittances data of 
selected countries, and estimates of bilateral 




IVf - Economic 
effects country of 
destination 
ESS - ERIC ESS - The European Social 
Survey  
This is an academically driven cross-national 
survey that has been conducted every two years 
across Europe since 2001. It measures the 
attitudes, beliefs and behaviour patterns of 
diverse populations in more than thirty nations. 
In particular, it contains attitudes of respondents 
about the immigration policy and the social-
economic impacts of immigration. Data 




IVf - Economic 
effects country of 
destination 
Eurostat EU LFS (European Labour 
Force Survey) 
The European Union Labour Force Survey (EU 
LFS) is conducted in the 28 Member States of 
the European Union, 2 candidate countries and 
3 countries of the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA). The Labour Force Surveys 
are conducted by the national statistical 
institutes across Europe and are centrally 
processed by Eurostat. It also has an ad-hoc 
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IVf - Economic 
effects country of 
destination 
Eurostat EU SILC (EU-Statistics on 
Income and Living 
Conditions)  
The EU SILC  collects comparable 
multidimensional micro-data on: income; 
poverty; social exclusion; housing; labour ; 
education; health. It covers objective and 
subjective aspects of these themes in both 
monetary and non-monetary terms for both 




IVf - Economic 
effects country of 
destination 
Eurostat ECHP - European 
Community Household 
Panel 
The ECHP is a panel survey in which a sample 
of households and persons has been interviewed 
year after year, ran from 1994 to 2001. 
These interviews covered a wide range of topics 
concerning living conditions. They include 
detailed income information, financial situation 
in a wider sense, working life, housing situation, 
social relations, health and biographical 
information of the interviewed. 
As of 2003/2004, the EU-SILC survey covers 
most of the above-mentioned topics. MS 
involved were Belgium, Denmark, Germany, 
Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, 




IVf - Economic 
effects country of 
destination 
OECD International Migration 
Database (employment, 
unemployment and 
participation rates by place 
of birth and sex) 
The database provides selected socio-economic 
data on migration in the OECD countries 
divided into native-born and foreign born (e.g. 
employment rates, education, unemployment, 
labour market participation rates) up to 2014. 
Data collected from Labour Force Surveys.  
International Database http://www.oecd.or
g/ 
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IVf - Economic 
effects country of 
destination 
OECD DIOC and DIOC-extended 
database on 
Immigrants in OECD and 
non-OECD countries. 
International Migration 
Outlook report Society at a 
Glance report 
The dataset contains information on 
demographic and labor market characteristics.  
Relevant and regular publications are the 
International Migration Outlook (yearly 
provides the latest statistical information on 
immigrant stocks and flows, immigrants in the 
labour market, and migration policies) and The 
Society at a Glance (biennial report that 
addresses the growing demand for quantitative 
evidence on social well-being and its trends 
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This report is the result of the research carried out under Task 5 of DG JRC's Task Force on Migration and 
Demography. The report is structured following the four pillars outlined in the European Agenda on Migration. 
A few additional chapters are included to cover some aspects not explicitly touched on in the Agenda, but still 
considered to have a relevant role in migration and an impact on demographic trends.  
Contributions answered the following questions: 
1. What are main points/findings/debates concerning the priority area/sub-category allocated to you? 
2. How does the information gathered in question 1 relate to the scope and the structure of the European 
Agenda on Migration? 
3. What current information and data is available, who is producing it and how? 
4. What and where are the main gaps and challenges? 
5. What are the solutions or approaches to address these gaps and challenges based upon your research? 
To complement this review, two Annexes were created: the first being an overview of the main gaps and 
challenges as well as the suggested solutions for the whole report (Annex 1), and the second being a preliminary 





As the Commission’s in-house science service, the Joint Research Centre’s mission is to provide EU 
policies with independent, evidence-based scientific and technical support throughout the whole policy 
cycle. 
Working in close cooperation with policy Directorates-General, the JRC addresses key societal challenges 
while stimulating innovation through developing new standards, methods and tools, and sharing and 
transferring its know-how to the Member States and international community. 
Key policy areas include: environment and climate change; energy and transport; agriculture and food 
security; health and consumer protection; information society and digital agenda; safety and security
including nuclear; all supported through a cross-cutting and multi-disciplinary approach.
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